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ABSTRACT 
 
SHELLEY D. GOLDEN: Employment fluctuations and tobacco: How changing 
employment conditions impact smoking behavior and cigarette tax policy  
(Under the direction of Krista M. Perreira) 
 
In the last 35 years, the United States has experienced periods of extraordinary job 
growth, as well as four economic recessions, one of which was the longest downturn 
since the Great Depression. Although cyclical variation triggers questions about 
economic and housing stability, changing labor market conditions may also impact 
population health through financial and psychosocial mechanisms. This dissertation 
assesses the impact of both aggregate and individual level employment conditions on 
smoking, the leading preventable cause of death in this country. Understanding 
relationships between employment and smoking can help policymakers and health 
professionals design targeted health promotion programs, enhance tobacco control 
policies, and plan for future healthcare needs.  
In the first essay, I use nationally representative data to examine the influence of 
state labor market conditions on smoking behaviors, finding that smoking probabilities 
decline as state unemployment rates rise, but only in relatively strong economies. In the 
second essay, I assess how individual employment changes impact smoking status and 
intensity. Analyses of repeated observations of individuals over time suggest that people 
smoke more when they are unemployed than when they are working, but smoke less 
when they are out of the labor market altogether. In the third essay, I use thirty years of 
data from all 50 states to explore predictors of higher state cigarette tax rates, which are 
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associated with lower smoking prevalence. My results demonstrate little support for 
claims that high state unemployment rates drive higher cigarette tax rates.  
As the economy continues to recover from recent downturns, the results presented 
here illustrate several opportunities to enhance progress toward national smoking-related 
goals. In these analyses, economic growth and employment are associated with greater 
smoking risks, underscoring the need for continued workplace programs and policies that 
discourage or prohibit smoking. Looking for work also appears to be a smoking risk 
factor; pairing smoking prevention resources with unemployment assistance programs 
could help ameliorate this risk. Finally, while economic and employment conditions are 
not key predictors of cigarette excise taxes in my analyses, other political or regional 
factors may create policy windows that advocates can leverage to foster tobacco control 
policy. 
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CHAPTER 1: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Conventional and political wisdom suggests that poor economies marked by high 
rates of unemployment are undesirable. During bad economic times, individuals are less 
satisfied with their lives and experience higher stress levels (Catalano & Dooley, 1979; 
Fenwick & Tausig, 1994; Hibbing & Alford, 1981). One concern for the public and 
policymakers is the potential impact of economic downturns on health. Recessions are 
usually associated with rising rates of unemployment, and a significant body of 
individual level research suggests that losing work and being unemployed is bad for your 
mental and physical health (Bartley, 1994; Catalano et al., 2011; Dooley, Fielding, & 
Levi, 1996; Jahoda, 1982). In contrast, recent aggregate-level research finds that when 
the economy worsens, overall population health improves. During economic downturns, 
mortality rates and incidence of certain diseases decline (Laporte, 2004; Neumayer, 2004; 
Ruhm, 2000; Ruhm, 2003; Ruhm, 2007; Svensson & Kruger, 2012). 
Rapid modifications to health behaviors that are triggered by lost work and poor 
economic climates may account for some observed changes in mortality and morbidity, 
and serve as early indicators of future health needs. Smoking, a leading cause of 
preventable death, increases for individuals during unemployment, but declines for 
populations, on average, during recessions (Falba, Teng, Sindelar, & Gallo, 2005; 
Prochaska, Shi, & Rogers, 2013; Ruhm, 2005; Weden, Astone, & Bishai, 2006). The 
mechanisms through which smoking behaviors are modified, and the populations most 
impacted, however, remain understudied.  
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In this dissertation, I assess the impact of both aggregate and individual level 
employment conditions on smoking, incorporating key financial, psychosocial, 
demographic and political considerations in my analyses. In the first essay, I use 
nationally representative data to examine the influence of state unemployment rates on 
smoking behaviors, and investigate whether income, tobacco taxes or emotional distress 
mediate those relationships. In the second essay, I assess how individual movement in 
and out of work impacts smoking status and intensity. In the third essay, I use thirty years 
of annual data from all 50 states to explore whether state economic conditions, as well as 
key political and regional characteristics explain variation in state cigarette excise tax 
levels.  
As the economy continues to recover from recent downturns, the results presented 
here illustrate several opportunities to enhance progress toward national smoking-related 
goals. Some of the research indicates that economic growth and employment may 
heighten smoking risks, underscoring the need for continued workplace health promotion 
programs, and workplace policies that limit or prohibit smoking on the job. Looking for 
work also appears to be a smoking risk factor; pairing smoking prevention resources with 
unemployment assistance programs could help ameliorate this risk. Finally, while 
economic and employment conditions are not key predictors of cigarette excise taxes in 
my analyses, other political or regional factors may create policy windows that advocates 
can leverage to foster effective tobacco control policy. 
I. Essay One 
Previous research on the impact of labor market cycles on smoking suggests that 
when state unemployment rates rise, smoking rates fall. These studies, however, assume 
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the impact of a change in employment conditions on smoking is consistent, regardless of 
the strength of the economy in which the change occurs. In this essay, I match state 
unemployment data from 1996-2010, when the country experienced periods of both 
strong growth and severe recession, with reports of smoking behavior from participants 
in the Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System during the same period. Regression 
analyses confirm previously established procyclical smoking patterns, but also indicate 
that these relationships are attenuated in poor labor markets. Whereas a one percentage 
point increase in a relatively low rate of unemployment is associated with a 0.12 
percentage point drop in smoking prevalence, a similar labor market shift when 
unemployment is already high produces only a statistically insignificant 0.03 percentage 
point drop in prevalence. Further analyses suggest that this attenuation may be due to a 
curvilinear relationship between unemployment rates and emotional distress, in which 
unemployment rates and emotional distress are negatively correlated in strong 
economies, but positively correlated in weak ones. If the economy continues to recover, 
additional programs may be needed to ensure that growth does not unintentionally inhibit 
progress toward national smoking goals. In particular, health officials should consider 
working with new and growing industries to institute tobacco prevention measures in 
workplaces.  
II. Essay Two 
The volatile economic conditions of the last two decades have resulted in high 
rates of both job loss and hiring, with additional movement in and out of the labor market 
altogether. For individuals, changing employment status could result in financial and 
psychosocial shocks that impact health. Demonstrating a causal relationship between 
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employment changes and health, however, is difficult because effective analysis must 
account for the possibility that less healthy people may be more likely to be unemployed, 
and the fact that most prevalent health problems generally arise following a build-up of 
risk factors and behavior over an extended time period. In this essay I use individual 
fixed effects methods with six waves of nationally representative data to analyze changes 
in smoking, a rapidly modifiable health risk factor, following employment transitions. I 
find that when individuals stop working, their smoking behaviors change; how they 
change, however, depends on whether former workers leave the labor market altogether. 
People are more likely to smoke when they are actively searching for work than when 
they are working, but when they leave work to instead retire, go to school, or otherwise 
exit the labor market, their smoking behaviors decline. Although recent experiences with 
involuntary or any job loss does not appear to strengthen the impact of employment 
changes on smokers, current workers who experienced such losses smoke more often 
than their more continuously employed peers. My analyses indicate no differences in 
smoking reactions to employment changes based on gender or household income level. 
Higher levels of household wealth, however, attenuate the smoking declines that 
otherwise follow labor market departure. These results suggest that smoking prevention 
programs should target both the newly employed and the unemployed, by enhancing 
workplace policies, community-based campaigns, and unemployment assistance 
programs. 
III. Essay Three 
Cigarette excise taxes are considered one of the most effective strategies for 
reducing cigarette use because they are associated with decreased consumption and are 
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sometimes used to fund tobacco control programs. Little is known about what motivates 
changes in state cigarette excise tax levels. Tobacco control professionals have suggested 
that economic contractions may drive states to raise cigarette taxes to generate revenue, 
but political scientists argue that economic characteristics are only one of several factors 
that drive tobacco policy innovation. Political factors, like legislative control, election 
cycles, and public opinions about potential or related policies, as well as pressures from 
neighboring states, may also be important policy predictors. Using thirty years of annual 
data from all 50 states, I explore the magnitude and strength of the associations between 
key economic, political, and regional characteristics and state cigarette excise tax levels.  
Between 1981 and 2011, average nominal rates of cigarette excise taxes increased 
from $0.13 to $1.38, an increase nearly six times the rate of inflation. While taxes are 
generally higher when state unemployment is high, this relationship appears confounded 
by other factors. Once politics, attitudes and regional variation are considered in 
multivariate regression models, any relationship between state unemployment rates and 
cigarette taxes disappears. Instead, higher cigarette taxes in neighboring states and 
concerns about high federal income tax rates are each correlated with higher referent state 
rates, whereas a history of tobacco growing and Republican party control are negatively 
associated with cigarette tax rate growth. Tobacco control advocates could consider 
targeting cigarette tax initiatives in states that border others where excise taxes have 
recently increased and distinguishing cigarette taxes from other taxes in their campaigns. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: EXAMINING AND EXPLAINING THE INFLUENCE OF 
EMPLOYMENT CONDITIONS ON SMOKING 
 
I. Introduction 
Between 1996 and 2010, the United States experienced periods of extraordinary 
job growth, as well as two economic recessions, one of which was the longest downturn 
since the Great Depression. According to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 
national unemployment rates during this period fluctuated from a low of 3.8% in April of 
2000 to a high of 10.0% in October of 2009.
1
 Although cyclical variation often triggers 
questions about economic and housing stability, previous research suggests that changing 
labor market conditions may also impact population health. Understanding the impact of 
strong and weak employment conditions on health can help policymakers plan for future 
health and healthcare needs. Furthermore, identifying the mechanisms that tie labor 
markets to health, and the populations most impacted by these relationships, is necessary 
to better inform and target health promotion programs. 
Counter to conventional wisdom, previous research finds that when labor market 
conditions worsen, overall mortality rates and the prevalence of many diseases actually 
decline (Laporte, 2004; Neumayer, 2004; Ruhm, 2000; Ruhm, 2003; Ruhm, 2007; 
Svensson & Kruger, 2012). Such “procyclical” patterns, however, are not found for 
diseases like cancer, perhaps because cancer diagnoses and deaths typically occur 
following years of exposure to risk factors. It may therefore be difficult to ascertain 
                                                          
1
 Data retrieved from online Labor Force Statistics produced by BLS from the Current Population Survey. 
Monthly unemployment data are available at: http://www.bls.gov/data/#unemployment. 
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impacts from short-term employment shocks on cancer and other diseases that unfold 
over time. Yet cancer is one of the leading causes of death in the United States (Hoyert & 
Jiaquan, 2012), and both cancer incidence and costs are projected to increase over the 
next several decades (Mariotto, Yabroff, Shao, Feuer, & Brown, 2011; B. D. Smith, 
Smith, Hurria, Hortobagyi, & Buchholz, 2009).   
Cancer risk factors, such as smoking, can serve as better indicators of how 
economic declines may ultimately impact morbidity and mortality because they are more 
rapidly modifiable in the face of changing economic conditions. In addition to cancer, 
smoking is associated with heart disease, stroke, chronic pulmonary disease, and other 
health problems, and is considered the leading preventable cause of mortality in the 
United States (Adhikari, Kahende, Malarcher, Pechacek, & Tong, 2008; Mokdad, Marks, 
Stroup, & Gerberding, 2004). Smoking-related mortality risks accumulate over time and 
are correlated with total exposure (Peto et al., 2000; US Department of Health and 
Human Services [HHS], 2004), suggesting that modifications to both smoking status and 
amount smoked can have broad health implications. Currently, about 20% of adults 
smoke in the United States, a prevalence rate that remains above the 12% goal of Healthy 
People 2020 (HHS, Healthy People 2020, 2012). 
Aggregate-level research has examined the impact of changing labor market 
conditions specifically on smoking, finding that as the economy worsens, smoking rates, 
like general mortality, decline, particularly among heavy smokers (Charles & DeCicca, 
2008; Okechukwu, Bacic, Cheng, & Catalano, 2012; Ruhm, 2005). This research, 
however, is limited in several ways. Most analyses assume the impact of a change to 
employment conditions on smoking is consistent, regardless of the strength of the 
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economy in which a change occurs. Yet an uptick in unemployment rates during a 
healthy economy could impact different parts of the labor market, or be viewed 
differently by consumers, than a similar uptick in the midst of a recession. Additionally, 
the data employed in previous analyses derive from surveys conducted in the 1990s and 
early 2000s, and therefore fail to include the periods of particularly high unemployment 
observed recently. While the 2001 recession was relatively minor, the 2007-2009 Great 
Recession was characterized by the strongest increases in the unemployment rate in the 
last several decades (BLS, 2010). If non-linear relationships between employment 
conditions and smoking do exist, data from periods of both economic boom and severe 
recession are most likely to uncover them. Since high unemployment rates are persisting 
well beyond the official close of the Great Recession, determining whether previously 
observed patterns apply during difficult economic times will help the healthcare system 
anticipate long-term smoking trends. 
Furthermore, to effectively craft smoking prevention programs, it is necessary to 
understand not only the direction of the relationship between economic conditions and 
smoking, but also the reasons the relationship exists. Although theories about the 
mechanisms explaining the observed relationships have been offered, they have been 
limited in scope, and not well-supported in empirical work. For expensive behaviors like 
smoking, explanations for procyclical effects tend to focus on individual changes in 
income, hypothesizing that weak economies result in depressed incomes, leaving 
individuals with fewer resources to purchase tobacco products.  
The ability to purchase cigarettes, however, is a function of product price as well 
as income, and the potential role for prices as a mediator has not been fully explored. 
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This may be a critical issue to consider currently, since taxes on tobacco products have 
been levied at increasingly different rates across states in recent years, resulting in 
substantial state variation in tobacco product prices (Jemel et al., 2008).   
Changing economic conditions may produce stress effects in addition to financial 
effects, and high stress levels are associated with increased smoking rates (Bosma, Peter, 
Siegrist, & Marmot, 1998; Kubzansky et al., 1997; McEwen, 1998; McKee, Maciejewski, 
Falba, & Mazure, 2003; Thoits, 1995). Economic contractions could produce higher 
stress levels, if individuals fear job loss or feel income anxiety, or lower stress levels, if 
stress produced by long work hours and fast working paces are alleviated (Catalano et al., 
2011). No study, however, has analyzed distress or other mental health measures in the 
context of economic conditions and smoking.  
Finally, efforts to ameliorate the impact of changing economic conditions on 
smoking patterns can be targeted if we improve our understanding of the people whose 
smoking behavior is most strongly impacted by these conditions. Certain groups, 
including young adults, men, individuals with less education, and Blacks and Hispanics, 
face higher risk of unemployment, especially during recessionary periods (Allegretto & 
Lynch, 2010), and may therefore be particularly susceptible to income, price and stress 
effects. In addition, previous research suggests that the younger adults, Blacks and 
Hispanics are particularly sensitive to changes in cigarette price (Farrelly, Bray, 
Pechacek, & Wollery, 2001). 
The pathways linking macroeconomic conditions and health are likely complex 
(Catalano et al., 2011), and could be influenced by the severity of recent downturns. In 
this study, I examine the influence of state employment conditions on smoking behavior 
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between 1996-2010, and test whether the initial employment conditions from which 
growth or contraction occurs modify observed relationships. In addition to extending 
previous research through recent economic downturns, I consider the potential impact of 
income, tobacco taxes and emotional distress in the relationship between employment 
conditions and smoking, and whether the relationship varies by population group. 
II. Background 
A. Previous Studies 
Previous research about the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and 
smoking suggests that smoking is pro-cyclical, rising with employment rates. In the most 
extensive national study to date, using data from the 1987-2000 waves of the Behavioral 
Risk Factor Surveillance System, Ruhm (2005) found that a one percentage point drop in 
state employment rates was associated with 0.13 percentage point decrease in smoking 
prevalence (a 0.6% decline) among current smokers, with the strongest effect among 
heavy smokers. Additional studies partially confirm these results among specific 
population groups, using either employment rates, or unemployment rates, as a measure 
of labor market conditions. Using cross-sectional data from men in the 1997-2001 
National Health Interview Surveys, Charles and DeCicca (2008) find procyclical 
relationships between local area unemployment rates and smoking for most men in their 
sample. Okechukwu and colleages (2012) demonstrate procyclical impacts on the number 
of cigarettes smoked, but not smoking status among construction workers who 
participated in the Tobacco Use supplement to the waves of Current Population Survey 
(CPS) administered between 1992 and 2007. These results, however, were limited to 
periods of construction industry decline; the relationship shows evidence of reversing 
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when the industry performed better than expected.  
B. Variation in Effect by Level of Unemployment  
Most studies of the effect of labor market conditions on smoking either assume 
the relationship is linear, such that the influence of a one percentage point change of an 
unemployment rate is consistent, regardless of whether the change occurs during a period 
of relatively low unemployment (e.g. from 4% to 5%) or high unemployment (e.g., from 
8% to 9%), or report the marginal effect of a one percentage point change at the average 
level of employment in the sample. In one exception, Okechukwu and colleagues (2012) 
tested a quadratic association of labor market conditions and smoking of construction 
workers, finding some evidence for this model, especially for smoking magnitude in 
general, and smoking status among the employed. No previous work explicitly tests a 
quadratic relationship between employment conditions and smoking in a national sample 
of adults.  
There are several reasons that higher levels of initial unemployment could alter 
the impact of a rate change on smoking status. Many people lose work in both strong and 
poor economies, but they face more barriers to returning to work during recessions. 
Analyses of recent labor market conditions suggest high unemployment rates during 
recessions result more from decreases in work opportunities and new hires than from 
increases in involuntary job losses (deWolf & Klemmer, 2010; Falba et al., 2005). Some 
evidence suggests that increases in unemployment, especially in the most recent 
downturn, might produce more emotional distress than similar changes occurring under 
stronger economies (Ayers et al., 2012). If the prospect of losing work is particularly dire 
during bad times, triggering stronger stress-related smoking responses, procyclical effects 
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could be muted. Alternatively, smoking-related policy changes, like increases in tobacco 
taxes to generate revenue, may only be triggered once labor market conditions deteriorate 
to extreme levels, suggesting that if purchasing power is a key mechanism, procyclical 
relationships could strengthen during periods of peak unemployment.  
The relative volatility of the U.S. economy during the past two decades provides 
an opportunity to explore the possibility that the role of the labor market in producing 
smoking could vary based on the employment circumstances in which changes occur. In 
the 15 years between 1996 and 2010, the United States experienced both its lowest and 
highest levels of unemployment in nearly 30 years. Previous examinations of the 
relationship between employment conditions and smoking rely of reports of behavior 
prior to 2007. Therefore, they fail to include the relatively high, and sustained, rates of 
unemployment during what is now called the Great Recession. Moreover, recent 
economic swings may have more strongly impacted income than previous cycles. 
According to data from the CPS, the drop in median household income in the year 
following recession was stronger in the last two recessions (2001 & 2007-2009), than the 
two preceding recessions (1981-1982 and 1990-1991) (DeNavas-Walt, Proctor, & Smith, 
2011). Additionally, variation in cigarette excise taxes grew during this period as well 
(Orzechowski & Walker, 2011). Any effects from changing purchasing power underlying 
the relationship between employment conditions and smoking may therefore be easiest to 
identify using recent data. Similarly, recessions in the last decade also occurred in the 
context of declining job security and safety nets, and increasing income inequality. Long-
term unemployment, in which individuals are unable to find work for at least 27 weeks, 
reached record highs during the Great Recession (Allegretto & Lynch, 2010). Mental 
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health effects of labor market conditions might therefore be more identifiable during this 
period (Ayers et al., 2012). 
C. Mechanisms Explaining Procyclical Smoking 
Previous studies of procyclical smoking fail to explain why smoking rises as the 
economy grows, and unemployment rates decline. Three potential mechanisms, in 
particular, deserve further attention. Hypothesized pathways linking state unemployment 
conditions with smoking through 1) household income, 2) cigarette tax rates and 3) 
emotional distress are illustrated in Figure 2.1. The empirical and theoretical rationales 
for these relationships are described below.  
Income as a Mechanism 
Recessionary periods have previously been associated with lower average 
household incomes (Michel, 1991). Relationships between income and smoking, 
however, are likely complex. As individuals lose income or anticipate income loss, 
economic theory suggests they decrease their purchase of all normal goods, including 
cigarettes. Cigarette consumption, however, may be relatively income inelastic, or 
relatively insensitive to changes in income. A wide variety of income elasticities for 
cigarettes have been reported in the literature; a meta-analysis summarizing nearly 400 
estimates suggests that a one percent loss of income is associated with only a 0.28 percent 
decrease in cigarette demand in the short run, and a 0.39 percent decrease in cigarette 
demand in the long run (Gallet & List, 2003). Additionally, individuals might choose to 
substitute generic cigarette brands or cheaper forms of tobacco, like chewing tobacco or 
snus, when faced with an income loss, in order to maintain their consumption levels. 
Although work on cross price-elasticities for tobacco products is limited (van Walbeek, 
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2010), some research suggests that when cigarette prices increase, individuals switch to 
cigarettes that are higher in tar and nicotine (Farrelly, Nimsch, Hyland, & Cummings, 
2003), but do not substitute snus for cigarettes (Bask & Melkersson, 2003).  
Previous research on the role of income in procyclical smoking is mixed. Ruhm 
(2005) finds little evidence of an impact of income on the relationships between state 
employment rates and smoking. On the other hand, Xu and colleagues (2010) use local 
area level unemployment rates as instrumental variables for wages and income, and find 
that wage and income declines brought about by changes in macroeconomic conditions 
are associated with decreases in smoking. Their sample, however, is restricted to men 
with lower levels of education. 
Taken together, empirical and theoretical work suggests that poor employment 
conditions result in lower incomes, which might decrease smoking prevalence, but also 
may not explain changes in smoking. In Figure 2.1, income is posited as a potential 
mediator, even though the support for this hypothesis is tenuous. 
Tax as a Mechanism  
Individual consumption decisions are also impacted by the price of a product. As 
with changing income, changing cigarette prices impact purchasing power, so that when 
cigarette prices rise, a consumer can purchase fewer cigarettes for the same price. 
Additionally, other goods become less expensive relative to cigarettes, so consumers may 
opt to substitute other goods for cigarettes, if there are comparable goods that can provide 
them the same perceived benefit. Previous research suggests that a one percent increase 
in the price of cigarettes is associated with a 0.4 percent decrease in cigarette demand 
(Gallet & List, 2003), with some evidence that the influence of price may be even 
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stronger among individuals of low socioeconomic status (Townsend, Roderick, & 
Cooper, 1994).  
One of the key components of increasing cigarette prices is government 
sponsored taxes on tobacco prices. The market share weighted average price of a pack of 
cigarettes increased from $3.12 in 2000 to $5.61 in 2011; the percent of that price derived 
from cigarette excise taxes grew from about 24% to 44% (Orzechowski & Walker, 2011). 
Tobacco tax increases have been associated with declines in smoking, both among youth 
(Chaloupka & Wechsler, 1997) and the general population (Chaloupka et al., 2000; 
Chaloupka, Straif, & Leon, 2011; Levy, Chaloupka, & Gitchell, 2004). Tobacco control 
advocates have suggested that economic contractions may drive states to raise tobacco 
taxes to generate revenue, noting spikes in the number of states passing hikes following 
the national recessions of 1981, 1990 and 2001 (Campaign for Tobacco Free Kids 
[CTFK], 2012b). State –based cigarette tax response to macroeconomic decline, 
therefore, provides another theoretical explanation for the procyclical effects of smoking. 
Although three previous studies include a measure of tobacco prices or taxes in their 
analyses (Charles & DeCicca, 2008; Okechukwu et al., 2012; Xu & Kaestner, 2010), two 
only include it as a control variable and report no results specific to it. The authors of the 
final study urge caution in interpreting the slight positive, rather than negative, 
correlation between prices and smoking they find, due to the limited time period and 
price range examined (Okechukwu et al., 2012). 
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, I hypothesize that periods of high unemployment 
result in higher cigarette taxes, which in turn depress cigarette smoking prevalence.  
Emotional Distress as a Mechanism 
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Purchasing power may not be the only pathway linking labor market conditions 
and smoking. Changing employment conditions could provoke psychosocial responses in 
the people who experience them, and high stress is positively associated with smoking, 
increases in smoking levels, and perceived barriers to quitting smoking (Cohen & 
Lichtenstein, 1990; Morissette, Tull, Gulliver, Kamholz, & Zimering, 2007; Ng & 
Jeffery, 2003). Whether high unemployment rates are positively or negatively correlated 
with stress levels, however, is unclear. In addition to providing material benefits, work is 
a key social institution that facilitates social contacts and provides a sense of personal 
identification and meaning (Jahoda, 1982). Poor economic conditions may produce 
stressors in the form of job insecurity or loss, income anxiety and strain on social 
relationships (Catalano et al., 2011; Zivin, Paczkowski, & Galea, 2011), suggesting high 
unemployment rates may be associated with higher stress levels. On the other hand, work 
can be a source of stress, particularly if working environments require long hours and 
allow little autonomy (Clougherty, Souza, & Cullen, 2010; M. J. Smith, Cohen, 
Stammerjohn, & Happ, 1981). Strong economies characterized by low unemployment 
rates may therefore be associated with higher stress levels than depressed economies.  
Previous work has not directly examined the role of emotional distress in the 
relationship between employment conditions and smoking, but several studies have 
explored related ideas. Ruhm (2005) finds a one hour increase in the average number of 
hours worked per week is associated with a slight (<1%) rise in smoking, and argues this 
may reflect higher job-related stress during periods of high employment. On the other 
hand, Barnes and Smith (2009) recently examined whether increases in an individual’s 
economic insecurity increased the likelihood that men who smoked in 1983 remained 
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smokers in 1998. Specifically, they find that a 1% increase in the probability of 
unemployment is associated with a 2.4% increase in the likelihood of continued smoking; 
a 1% increase in the probability of falling into poverty is associated with a 1.1% increase 
in the likelihood of continued smoking; and each 10% drop in real income is associated 
with more than a 17% increase in continued smoking likelihood. In addition, Charles and 
DeCicca (2008) found that men’s mental health generally worsened as local labor 
markets deteriorated, with effects particularly pronounced among those least likely to be 
employed. Although this study also considered smoking as an outcome, measures of 
emotional distress and smoking were not considered in the same model.   
Based on this review, I hypothesize that increased stress levels are correlated with 
higher smoking prevalence, but do not specify the type of correlation between 
employment conditions and stress levels (Figure 2.1). If strong economies produce high 
levels of work-related stress, procyclical smoking should be attenuated when measures of 
stress are included in models. On the other hand, if declining employment conditions 
produce stress from job insecurity and loss, procyclical smoking should appear stronger 
when stress levels are controlled in analyses.  
D. Differential Impacts on Population Groups 
Some groups may be more strongly impacted by changing labor market 
conditions than others. Job loss produces declines in income and increases in mental 
distress (Jacobson, LaLonde, & Sullivan, 1993; Paul & Moser, 2009; Ruhm, 1991), 
suggesting that if procyclical smoking is mediated through these processes, smoking 
among unemployed individuals could be impacted through both. Similarly, changes in 
income and mental health brought about by changing employment conditions may have 
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the least impact on individuals not in the labor force.   
Certain population groups are more likely to be unemployed and lose work, 
especially during recessions. In 2009, for example, the unemployment rate for individuals 
without a high school degree was more than three times the rate of those who had 
graduated college, and unemployment among Blacks and Hispanics was nearly twice that 
among Whites or Asians. Men and younger adults also suffered relatively high rates, 
compared to women or older adults, respectively (BLS, 2012). Although the tight labor 
markets of the Great Recession impacted all population groups more strongly than 
previous recessions, age, race and educational disparities are similar to those from 
previous recessionary times (Allegretto & Lynch, 2010). With the exceptions of Blacks, 
whose smoking rates are lower than those of Whites, members of each of these groups 
are also more likely to smoke than their female, more educated and older peers (Agaku, 
King, & Dube, 2012). The smoking behavior of each of these groups may therefore be 
more strongly impacted by changing employment conditions, when compared to the 
population overall. 
Finally, the smoking behavior of some groups may be more sensitive to changes 
in income or price than others. In particular, previous research suggests that younger 
adults, men, Blacks and Hispanics are particularly sensitive to changes in cigarette price, 
and smoking behaviors of younger adults may be especially sensitive to changes in 
income (Farrelly et al., 2001; Gallet & List, 2003; Townsend et al., 1994). 
Previous research on differential smoking responses to changing labor market 
conditions, however, is inconclusive. Ruhm (2005) finds that smoking patterns do differ 
by population group, but not always in the expected ways. For example, in his analysis, 
19 
 
although individuals with less education experience stronger smoking responses as 
employment conditions change, women and Whites are more strongly impacted than men 
and other racial groups, respectively. In addition, employed individuals experience 
slightly higher effects than the full population sample. On the other hand, Charles and 
DeCicca (2008) found that while men most likely to be employed smoke less during poor 
economic times, those who are least likely to be employed smoke more. Using 
employment propensity scores, they find that a one percentage point decrease in the 
employment rate is associated with a 2.3 percent decrease in smoking for individuals in 
the top decile for employment probability, but a 2.7 percent increase in smoking for 
individuals in the bottom decile. 
E. Contribution 
In this study, I use nationally representative data covering recent periods of low 
and high unemployment to examine the influence of state employment conditions on 
smoking behavior. Different from previous nationally representative research (Ruhm, 
2005), I explicitly test whether the relationship between state unemployment rates and 
smoking is non-linear in nature. I then investigate the potential impact two unexplored 
theoretical explanations for procyclical relationships, tobacco taxes and emotional 
distress, in addition to household income, in those relationships. Finally, I consider 
whether relationships between employment conditions and smoking vary across key 
population groups. 
III. Methods 
A. Data and Sample  
Data about smoking behaviors, as well as individual measures of gender, age, 
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race, ethnicity, and marital status are drawn from the annual iterations of the Behavioral 
Risk Factor Surveillance System (BRFSS) implemented between 1996-2010 (Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 1996-2010). The BRFSS is a state-based system 
of health surveys that collects regular information about health outcomes and health 
behaviors, including adult smoking behavior. During the analysis period, all 50 states and 
the District of Columbia collected smoking information from a sample of their residents. 
BRFSS data are merged with monthly state level indicators of employment conditions 
available from the BLS. The BLS Local Area Unemployment Statistics captures key 
indicators of economic conditions for different geographic areas, including states. BLS 
data used in this analysis are generated from the Current Population Survey, the Current 
Employment Statistics program, the State Unemployment Insurance System, and the 
decennial census, and primarily consist of monthly and annual estimates of 
unemployment and employment in each state.   
Analytic Sample: Between 1996 and 2010, 4,134,163 individuals aged 16 or over 
who resided in one of the fifty U.S. states or the District of Columbia participated in a 
BRFSS survey, with annual totals ranging from 121,384 in 1996 to 444,906 in 2010. Of 
the total participants, smoking information is missing for 16,876 (0.4%), and other 
covariate information is missing for an additional 90,044 (2.2%). Dropping these cases 
results in a final analytic sample size of 4,027,243 (97.4% of all participants).
2
 In some 
mediation analyses, sample sizes decrease due to missing information about income 
group (n=14, <0.01% of full analytic sample) or mental health days (n=125,826, 3.1% of 
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 Although the loss to the analytic sample due to complete case analysis was minor, the dropped 
participants did differ from those who remained in the sample in several ways. Dropped individuals were 
less likely to smoke, older, more likely to be non-white, more likely to have either high or low levels of 
education, less likely to be working, and more likely to live in states with higher levels of unemployment 
and cigarette taxes during their survey year. 
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full analytic sample). When sampling weights are employed, the sample is 51% female 
and 73% White. The majority of sample participants were married, had attended at least 
some college, and were employed at the time of survey. Detailed demographic 
characteristics of the analytic sample are presented in Table 2.1.  
B. Measures 
Outcome variable: The primary outcome variable measures an individual’s 
smoking status as a binary indicator. A BRFSS participant is considered a smoker if he or 
she answered “yes” to the survey question, “Have you smoked at least 100 cigarettes in 
your entire life?” and answered, “every day” or “some days” to the question, “Do you 
now smoke cigarettes every day, some days, or not at all?” In additional analyses, I focus 
on daily smokers, coding individuals who currently smoke every day as daily smokers.  
Explanatory Variables: The primary proposed measure of macroeconomic 
conditions is the state civilian unemployment rate averaged across the three months
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preceding the respondent’s BRFSS survey date, including the survey month. The 
unemployment rate measures the percentage of people in the labor force who are 
unemployed within a specific geographic area. A person is considered unemployed if he 
or she is not currently working, is available to begin working, and has actively looked for 
work in the past four weeks. The labor force is made up of individuals age 16 or older 
who are employed and unemployed. The unemployment rate, however, may provide an 
underestimate of true demand for work, as it does not capture discouraged workers who 
leave the labor market due to difficulty finding work. In sensitivity analyses, the average 
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 In choosing three months, I follow Ruhm (2005) in estimating the immediate labor market conditions 
faced by an individual at time of survey. In addition to capturing impacts of the recent market, this allows 
for comparison of estimates with Ruhm’s work with data from earlier years. In sensitivity tests, I use 
annual unemployment rates for the 12 months prior to, and including, the survey month. 
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employment rate, also called the employment to population ratio, for the three months 
ending with the survey month is substituted for the unemployment rate. The employment 
rate measures the percent of working aged individuals living in a specific area who are 
employed. An individual is considered employed if he or she worked for pay or profit in 
the past week (BLS, 2009a).  
Mediating Variables: To consider potential explanations for any demonstrated 
relationship between economic conditions and smoking, I employ three variables 
measuring income, cigarette excise taxes and mental health status, respectively. The 
BRFSS asks participants to indicate their household income, from all sources, using 
categories of income ranges. The minimum income category is $10,000 or less, and the 
maximum is $75,000 or more; in between category sizes range from $5,000 at the lower 
levels (e.g., between $15,000 and $20,000) to $25,000 at higher levels (e.g., between 
$50,000 and $75,000). The relationship between income and smoking is likely 
bidirectional, with smokers earning less than non-smokers (Auld, 2005). Individual 
income may therefore be endogenous, predicted by smoking status, rather than labor 
market conditions. To address this concern, I follow Ruhm (2005) by assigning each 
individual the weighted average of the incomes of all individuals living in the same state, 
of the same gender, age group and education level. Through this process I track changes 
in income likely brought about by labor market shifts, taking into consideration key 
demographic categories. Averages are calculated using the midpoint of the income range, 
adjusted for inflation, and measured in 2010 thousands of dollars.  
The cigarette excise tax variable is designed to capture the tax faced by a 
consumer in a given state at the start of the year of BRFSS response, and is therefore a 
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combination of the federal excise tax and the state excise tax. Excises taxes are adjusted 
for inflation using the  Consumer Price Index-Urban, produced by the BLS,
4
 and 
measured in 2010 cents per pack of 20 cigarettes. Annual state and federal cigarette 
excise taxes are available from the 2011 edition of The Tax Burden on Tobacco, a 
publication produced by the economic consulting firm Orzechowski and Walker, with 
financial support from leading cigarette manufacturers, and cooperation of the tobacco 
tax administrators in all 50 states and the District of Columbia. During the analysis 
period, the federal government raised taxes three times, from 0.24 cents to $1.01, and 
changes in state tobacco tax rates occurred in 123 of the 765 state-year combinations. 
State taxes ranged from less than three cents per pack in Virginia in 2003 and 2004 to 
almost $3.50 in 2010 in Rhode Island. 
The BRFSS includes two questions which capture numbers of “unhealthy days” 
the respondent experienced in the past month due to poor physical health or poor mental 
health. Specifically, the mental health question asks, “Now thinking about your mental 
health, which includes stress, depression, and problems with emotions, for how many 
days during the past 30 days was your mental health not good?” and the physical health 
question asks, “Now thinking about your physical health, which includes physical illness 
and injury, for how many days during the past 30 days was your physical health not 
good?” (HHS, 2000). When used in combination, a number of studies finding that the 
healthy days measure had acceptable criterion validity when compared to several other 
clinical assessment tools, could distinguish groups with various health ailments, and had 
good test-retest reliability among most populations (Moriarty, Zack, & Kobau, 2003). 
Although the mental health question has not been individually subjected to a wide range 
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 Current measures of the CPI-U are available at: ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/cpi/cpiai.txt 
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of validation tests, researchers often report trends in mental health using responses to 
only the mental health question (Moriarty et al., 2003; Zahran et al., 2005). Furthermore, 
previous research indicates that individuals report substantially different numbers of 
physical and mental unhealthy days (HHS, 2000). Because the theoretical basis for the 
analyses focuses on changes in emotional state brought about by changing labor market 
conditions, I measure emotional distress using the single indicator of mentally unhealthy 
days. As with income, however, the relationship between emotional distress and smoking 
may be bidirectional, as individuals believe smoking will alleviate anxiety, and some 
evidence suggests chemical components of cigarettes may alter mood states (Kassel, 
Stroud, & Paronis, 2003; Morissette et al., 2007). Emotional distress indicators are also 
missing for nearly 5% of the analytic sample. As with income, I therefore assign each 
individual the weighted average of the mental unhealthy days of all individuals living in 
the same state, of the same gender, age group and education level.   
Control Variables: To account for sociodemographic factors likely correlated 
with labor market participation and smoking, I include a dichotomous indicator of female 
gender, continuous measures of respondent’s age (linear and quadratic), as well as binary 
variables for education level (some high school, high school graduate, some college, 
college graduate), and marital status categories (married, divorced, widowed, single). In 
addition, I include four mutually exclusive categories capturing race/ethnicity (Non-
Hispanic White, Non-Hispanic Black, Other Non-Hispanic and all Hispanic) based on 
two BRFSS questions assessing participant race and Hispanic ethnicity. 
C.  Analytic Approach 
All analyses are conducted using probit models on pooled data, employing 
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techniques to account for clustering of data. Because smoking status is measured 
dichotomously, the dependent variable may be poorly predicted in linear analysis, which 
allows predictions of any value. Probit models instead employ the inverse of the 
cumulative distribution function associated with the standard normal distribution, which 
ranges from 0 to 1, when modeling the dependent variable. Estimation is done through 
maximum likelihood, in which those probit model parameters that best predict the 
existing data are identified. Models include cluster-robust standard errors to account for 
the possibility that observations collected within a state in a given month are not 
independent. Specifically, I model smoking probability as a function of state, individual, 
and time characteristics, according to the following econometric specification: 
Pr(Sijmy=1) = Φ(Xijmβ + Emjy γ + αj +δm + λy + εijmy) 
where Sijm measures smoking status (any or daily) for individual i in state j during 
month m in year y; Xijm is a vector of individual or family sociodemographic 
characteristics; Emjy captures state employment conditions; αj, δm, and λy represent 
unobserved determinants of smoking associated with state of residence j, calendar month 
m, and survey year y, respectively. Labor market conditions vary by geographic area, 
time of year, and across years (Allegretto & Lynch, 2010; Zolnik, 2011). Although 
smoking prevalence has decreased over time, these trends include spikes and troughs, and 
vary regionally (CDC, 2011a). Smoking also fluctuates seasonally, with higher rates in 
the summer, and lower rates in the winter (Chandra & Chaloupka, 2003). Inclusion of the 
state, month, and year dummy variables controls for some potential bias in estimates due 
to correlation of both employment conditions and smoking with space and time. Most 
dummy variables are statistically significant at the 0.05 level when modeled, and a 
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Hausman test comparing the coefficients from a model employing all fixed effects with 
one that employed no fixed effects was significant (χ2=5673.48, p=0.000), suggesting that 
the dummy variables inclusion may be required to prevent some omitted variable bias.  
To assess the shape of the relationship between employment conditions and 
smoking, I included a linear and quadratic measure of state unemployment rates in initial 
models, and examined the statistical significance of the coefficient on the quadratic term 
with a t-test. Because probits are non-linear models, the coefficient values are not directly 
interpretable as marginal effects, though the sign of the coefficient is consistent with the 
direction of variable correlation. To report the impact of changing unemployment rates 
under different economic conditions, I calculate the weighted average marginal effect 
(AME) of a one percentage point increase in the state unemployment rate for all sample 
members, using three different initial unemployment rates. Specifically, I calculate 
AMEs at the mean level of unemployment (5.6%), at one standard deviation above the 
mean (7.6%) and at one standard deviation below the mean (3.7%). 
Following Baron & Kenny (1986), I assess the potential mediating role of 
household income, cigarette excise taxes, and emotional distress using two additional 
models for each mediator. First, I estimate the impact of unemployment rates on the 
mediating variable using linear regression. Second, I add the mediating variable to the 
original reduced-form probit equation. To account for possible non-linear associations 
between mediators and smoking, I considered linear and quadratic forms of each 
mediating variable, ultimately including quadratic measures of income and emotional 
distress, as each are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.  
Using the any smoking outcome variable, I analyze the unmediated, reduced form 
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model, as well as the fully mediated, direct effects model, which includes measures of 
income, taxes and emotional distress, on various sub-groups of the participants. 
Specifically, I conduct stratified analyses to examine effects within specific gender, 
race/ethnicity, age, educational level, marital status and labor market participation 
groups. AMEs are calculated for both low and high unemployment conditions. 
In addition to these primary analyses, I consider several other models to ensure 
that results are not sensitive to the choice of employment condition measure, or the probit 
estimation technique.  
All analyses are conducted using regression techniques and the margins post-
estimation command in STATA 12 (Statacorp, College Station, Tex). 
IV. Results 
A. Trends in Unemployment and Smoking in the Analytic Sample 
During nine of the fifteen years between 1996 and 2010, state unemployment 
rates experienced by BRFSS participants are below 5.5%, but in the three years during 
and following the two recessionary periods in 2001 and 2007-2009, rates are higher, 
including average rates above 9% in both 2009 and 2010 (Figure 2.2). Across the entire 
time period, smoking prevalence among adults in the BRFSS sample declined from 
23.4% to 17.3% overall (Figure 2.2). While prevalence rates drop between most years, 
annual rates of decline were not uniform over the time period, and smoking prevalence 
increased by half a percent between 2000 and 2001. During and following the more 
recent recessionary period, however, smoking declines somewhat consistently. Daily 
smoking prevalence also declined from 19.1% to 12.4% during the same time period, 
with a similar small prevalence uptick between 2000-2002, and a steady decline between 
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2007-2010.  
B. Unemployment Rates and Smoking Behavior 
To assess the impact of short-term unemployment rates on smoking behavior, 
while accounting for other important covariates, I turn to the results of the probit 
regression models. Results of these analyses indicate that smoking behaviors are 
procyclical, but that these relationships attenuate as the economy worsens. The 
coefficients on the linear unemployment term in both the any smoking and daily smoking 
models are negative, but the coefficients on the quadratic terms are significant and 
positive (Table 2.2). Calculations of AMEs indicate that a labor market change at average 
levels of unemployment, from 5.6% to 6.6%, is associated with a 0.08 percentage point 
decline in any smoking and a 0.09 percentage point decline in daily smoking. AMEs 
calculated at one standard deviation above and below the mean unemployment rate reveal 
the curvilinear nature of the relationship between employment and smoking. A one 
percentage point increase in unemployment from a starting point of 3.7% is associated 
with a 0.12 percentage point decline in any smoking and a 0.11 percentage point decline 
in daily smoking, but a similar increase starting from 7.6% is associated with no 
statistically significant change in smoking prevalence, and a 0.06 percentage point 
decline in daily smoking rates (Table 2.2).  
C. Income, Taxes and Emotional Distress as Mediators 
Tables 2.3 and 2.4 present the unemployment rate coefficients (Table 2.3) and 
AMEs (Table 2.4) from models used to test mediation of the unemployment rate-smoking 
relationships by income, taxes or emotional distress. Traditional tests of variable 
mediation require significant associations between the independent variable and theorized 
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mediators, and the attenuation of the effects in the unmediated models once the mediating 
variables are added. For each proposed mediator in Table 2.3, Column 1 presents the 
coefficients derived from the linear regression of the mediator on unemployment rates; 
Columns 2 and 4 present the coefficients from the probit models of any and daily 
smoking that do not include the mediators (the models presented in Table 2.2), and 
Columns 3 and 5 present the coefficients from the same probit models of any and daily 
smoking, with the mediator added. Table 2.4 lists the AMEs of a one percentage point 
increase in unemployment rate on smoking at low, average and high unemployment rate 
starting points for the unmediated model, models that add each mediator separately, and 
one model that incorporates all proposed mediators. To illustrate effects, Figure 2.3 
provides a graphical depiction of the predicted prevalence of any (Panel A) and daily 
(Panel B) smoking for both unmediated and mediated models.  
Income: As hypothesized, the unemployment rate is negatively associated with 
income (Table 2.3, Model A1). Specifically, an increase in the unemployment rate from 
average levels 5.6% to 6.6% is associated with an average decline in income of $4,818. 
The significant, negative value of the quadratic unemployment term suggests that at 
higher levels of unemployment the negative correlation strengthens.  
Also as hypothesized, income is positively associated with any (b=0.02) and daily 
(b=0.02) smoking. However, the significant negative signs on the squared income terms 
suggest these effects diminish at high income levels (Table 2.3, Models A3 & A5). In 
calculations of AMEs for income (not shown), increases in income are positively 
associated with any and daily smoking at income levels one standard deviation below the 
mean, but negatively associated with smoking at average levels of income, or levels one 
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standard deviation above the mean. Specifically, a $10,000 increase in household income 
from an initial income of $37,000 is associated with a 0.15 percentage point increase in 
any smoking and a 0.16 percentage point increase in daily smoking. The same increase 
from an initial income of $59,000 is associated with a 0.02 and 0.01 percentage point 
decline in any and daily smoking prevalence; from $71,000 the AMEs are -0.12 for any 
smoking and -0.11 for daily smoking.
5
  
The coefficients on unemployment remain relatively unchanged when comparing 
the unmediated and income-mediated models (Model A2 vs. Model A3 for any smoking; 
Model A4 vs. Model A5 for daily smoking). These results are underscored in Figure 2.3 
and Table 2.4, in which the predicted probabilities of smoking and the average marginal 
effects from the unmediated and smoking mediated models are very similar, although 
income appears to slightly accentuate the relationship between unemployment rates and 
any smoking, especially at low levels of unemployment, and slightly mediate the 
relationship with daily smoking at high levels of unemployment, though primary effects 
remain significant.  
Cigarette Excise Taxes: Increasing unemployment rates are correlated with higher 
cigarette excise taxes, such that a one percentage point increase in unemployment starting 
from the mean level of 5.6% is associated with a 3.4 cent increase in tax levels (results 
calculated from coefficients in Table 2.3, Model B1). Although this relationship is 
curvilinear, with smaller impacts at higher unemployment levels, it remains positive even 
when unemployment rates reach the highest observed rates in the sample (results not 
shown), and therefore conforms to the hypothesized relationship. Also as hypothesized, 
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 Reference point income levels were chosen based on the 25%, 50% and 75% levels of the income 
distribution in the sample population. 
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both any smoking and daily smoking decline as cigarette taxes rise (Table 2.3, Models B3 
& B4). Although the magnitude of the coefficients on the unemployment rate terms do 
decrease when taxes are added to smoking models, the predicted probabilities of any or 
daily smoking from the tax mediated models are barely distinguishable from the 
unmediated models (Figure 2.3). Average marginal effects decline slightly when taxes 
are added, though remain well within a standard error of the unmediated AMEs (Table 
2.4, Models C & H). 
Emotional distress: The results presented in Model C1 of Table 2.3 indicate that 
emotional distress declines as unemployment grows at low levels of unemployment. The 
significant negative sign on the coefficient on the quadratic term, however, predicts that 
these anti-cyclical impacts on emotional distress would wane and eventually reverse 
direction during periods of higher unemployment. Based on the coefficients in this 
model, I calculate that a one percentage point increase in unemployment rates from a low 
starting point of 3.7% is associated with a 0.02 day decline in the average number of 
reported days in poor mental health, and a similar labor market change under average 
unemployment conditions (5.6% unemployment) is associated with 0.01 fewer poor 
mental health days. Under high unemployment conditions, however, a one percentage 
point increase in unemployment from 7.6% to 8.6% is associated with almost a 0.01 day 
increase in poor mental health days. 
The complexity of the relationship between unemployment and stress is apparent 
in the mediation analysis. As hypothesized, emotional distress is positively associated 
with any smoking, as well as daily smoking (Table 2.3, Models C3 & C5). At lower 
levels of unemployment, therefore, the positive association between unemployment and 
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stress works to slightly mediate the relationship between unemployment and smoking. 
The 0.12 percentage point decrease in the probability of any smoking and the 0.11 
percentage point decrease in the probability of daily smoking that is associated with an 
increase in unemployment from 3.7% to 4.7% drops slightly to 0.11 and 0.10 when 
emotional distress is included (Table 2.4, Models D & I). At higher levels of 
unemployment, however, the negative association between unemployment and stress 
enhances the unemployment-smoking relationship. Whereas a one percentage point 
increase in unemployment starting at 7.6% results in 0.03 percentage point decline in any 
smoking, and a 0.06 percentage point decline in daily smoking, these marginal effects 
increase to 0.05 and 0.08 in the model that includes stress effects. These effects are 
illustrated in Figure 2.3, in which the predicted prevalence curves in the stress mediated 
models become steeper than the unmediated model curves as unemployment increases. 
When all mediators are included in the models (Table 2.4, Models E & J), AMEs 
of unemployment are relatively unchanged under strong employment conditions. 
Specifically, a one percentage point increase in low levels of unemployment is associated 
with a 0.12 percentage point increase in any smoking and a 0.11 increase in daily 
smoking. In poor employment conditions, however, a suppression effect is illustrated. A 
one percentage point increase in unemployment from a high level of 7.6% unemployment 
is associated with a 0.06 and 0.07 percentage point increase in any or daily smoking 
probability, respectively when all mediators are included. These AMEs are 0.03 and 0.01 
percentage points higher than those derived from the respective unmediated models. 
D. Effects on Sub-Populations 
Procyclical smoking effects are particularly pronounced for men, Blacks and 
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Hispanics, and people who were employed at the time they were surveyed (Table 2.5). 
Even under poor labor market conditions, men’s smoking prevalence is predicted to drop 
by between 0.11-0.12 percentage points when unemployment rises by one percentage 
point, depending on the inclusion of potential mediators. Under stronger labor market 
conditions, the marginal effect remains negative, but increases to 0.15-0.17 percentage 
points. Women’s marginal effects, on the other hand, are never larger than 0.10.  
During periods of low unemployment, AMEs for Blacks (-0.41) and Hispanics (-
0.38) are about three times higher than those of Whites (-0.13). During periods of high 
unemployment higher effects remain for Blacks (AME=-0.24), but appear diminished for 
Hispanics (AME=-0.02), and Whites (AME=-0.05). However, relatively large standard 
errors, perhaps due to smaller Black and Hispanic samples, suggest caution is required 
when interpreting these results.  
Finally, stratified analyses illuminate few differences in the impact of changing 
employment conditions on smoking by education, age or marital status, although the 
smoking behavior of participants who are married or who have at least some college 
education appear slightly more susceptible to increases in unemployment during strong 
economies, when compared to their unmarried or less educated peers. None of the sub-
group analyses provide evidence for mediation of procyclical smoking by income, taxes 
or emotional distress. 
E. Sensitivity Tests 
Analyses of both the unmediated and fully mediated models are relatively 
insensitive to the choice of estimation approach, as probit, logit and linear probability 
models all produce similar marginal effects, averaged across the population (Table 2.6, 
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Models1-3). Other measures of employment conditions produce slightly different 
marginal effects when substituted for the three month unemployment in probit models 
(Table 2.6, Models 4-5). A one unit change in the three month employment rate produces 
a slightly smaller change in smoking prevalence than a one unit change in the three 
month unemployment rate, whereas a shift in the unemployment rate for the 12 months 
prior to, and including, the survey month produces slight stronger changes in smoking. 
These effects, however, remain within one standard error of each other.  
V. Discussion 
Although analyses presented here appear to confirm previously established 
procyclical smoking patterns, they also suggest such patterns are stronger in strong 
economies, especially for any smoking. Whereas a one percentage point increase in a 
relatively low rate of unemployment is associated with a 0.12 percentage point drop in 
smoking prevalence (a 0.6% drop from the average prevalence rate of 21.1%), a similar 
labor market shift when unemployment is already high produces no statistically 
significant change in prevalence. Similar but slightly muted patterns in marginal effects 
emerge when examining daily smoking. The characteristics of weak economies that 
might reduce procyclical smoking may operate by changing the patterns of non-daily 
smokers, rather than those who smoke every day.  
Because measures of labor market conditions and smoking outcomes differ across 
studies, it is difficult to directly compare the results presented here to previous research. 
In the most similar study, Ruhm (2005) finds that between 1987 and 2000, a one 
percentage point increase in the employment rate was associated with a 0.13 percentage 
point increase in smoking prevalence, or a 0.6% increase in the 23% average smoking 
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prevalence rate during that time period.
6
 These analyses suggest that a similar impact 
from a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, but only when 
unemployment is low to start. The average employment rate reported in the Ruhm study 
was 64.1%; in the sample used here, the average employment rate was only 62.6%. It is 
possible, therefore, that the effect previously reported reflects the relatively stronger 
economy of the analysis period. 
The mediation analyses lend insight into one possible reason for declining 
procyclical effects during poor economies. I documented a curvilinear relationship 
between unemployment rates and emotional distress. During relatively strong economies 
in the analysis period, unemployment rates and emotional distress are negatively 
correlated, suggesting that relief from work-related stressors like long hours on the job 
and exposure to workplace hazards resulting from incremental economic declines ease 
stress. These same reliefs, however, may be offset by stress associated with job insecurity 
and loss during weak economies, resulting in the positive correlation between 
unemployment rates and emotional distress I documented at high levels of 
unemployment. Because emotional distress was positively correlated with smoking as 
hypothesized, inclusion of it in smoking models resulted in stronger procyclical effects 
under conditions of high unemployment than was observed in unmediated models. As a 
result, the difference in AMEs under conditions of high vs. low unemployment were 
smaller in the stress effects models compared to the unmediated models, resulting in a 
more linear relationship between unemployment rates and predicted smoking prevalence 
overall. 
                                                          
6
 In sensitivity analyses (Table 6), I calculate a marginal effect of a one percentage point increase in the 
employment rate, averaged across all individuals, of 0.054, which reflects a 0.3% increase in the 21% 
smoking prevalence in this sample.   
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On the other hand, evidence for the role of household income or cigarette taxes as 
either mediators or suppressors of the relationship between unemployment rates and 
smoking behaviors was relatively weak. Although changing employment conditions 
significantly predict changes in household income and cigarette taxes in the hypothesized 
directions, inclusion of these variables in regression models did not attenuate the 
unmediated effect of unemployment rates on smoking. In the case of cigarette taxes, 
taxes were negatively associated with both any and daily smoking, as predicted, in the 
mediated models. Lack of demonstrated mediation by taxes therefore suggests that the 
people most likely to change their smoking behavior as a result of changing employment 
conditions are not the same people as those most likely to change their smoking behavior 
as a result of a tax change. Tobacco prices, while an important predictor of smoking 
consumption, may not drive the relationship between labor market changes and smoking. 
Household income, on the other hand, may have limited value as a mediator 
because of its limited average impact on smoking. In these analyses, the relationship 
between income and smoking is curvilinear. For low income individuals, income gain is 
associated with more smoking, as would be predicted for a normal good. Individuals with 
average or higher incomes, however, respond to increasing incomes by becoming less 
likely to smoke. Previous work has documented income differentials in smoking 
likelihood, finding that smoking prevalence is higher among lower income groups. Data 
from the 2011 National Health Interview Survey indicate that 29% of individuals living 
below the federal poverty level were current smokers, compared to only 18% of those at 
or above this level (Agaku et al., 2012). One group of researchers, hypothesizing that 
anti-tobacco campaigns have succeeded in attaching a negative stigma to smoking, found 
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that smoking-related stigma is stronger among people with more, compared to less, 
education (Moffitt, 1983; Stuber, Galea, & Link, 2008). Previous economic research has 
documented costs associated with engaging in stigmatized activities, and argued those 
costs explain certain behaviors like lack of welfare program participation (Moffitt, 1983). 
Perhaps as moderate to high income individuals gain income, they perceive greater and 
greater social costs of smoking, especially if the income gain has shifted their social class 
upward where smoking is less normative. The additional smoking their new income 
would afford them may not then be worth the social costs it would occur. As a result, the 
relationship between income and smoking could become negative.  
Despite the potential insights into relationships among the variables derived from 
these analyses, changes in income, cigarette taxes and emotional distress fail to provide 
strong explanation for procyclical smoking. Changing employment conditions may 
influence smoking through other mechanisms that remain unstudied. The stronger impact 
of employment conditions on men, Blacks, Hispanics and the employed, all groups that 
are strongly attached to the labor market, or particularly susceptible to changes in it, 
suggest that trends at work should be examined. Catalano and colleagues (2011) note that 
as employment conditions deteriorate, some theorists argue that employees may feel 
increased pressure to avoid any behaviors possibly perceived as negative, including 
smoking or other substance use, for fear of job loss. This line of reasoning suggests that 
job insecurity, often believed to trigger smoking, might instead prompt individuals to quit 
or reduce their consumption, at least in good economies. During particularly poor labor 
market conditions, job insecurities may be tied to fear of full plant closures or massive 
layoffs that workers perceive as unrelated to their individual performance. Smoking-
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responses to concerns about performance-based job loss could attenuate, or at least be 
offset by other stressors in hard times. Few long term studies measure job insecurity, 
workplace anxiety and smoking behaviors; more research is needed to examine employee 
reactions to stressors and insecurities in the workplace under variable labor market 
conditions.  
The role of occupation in procyclical smoking has also not been explored in the 
literature. Economic downturns impact some professions more strongly than others; in 
the recent Great Recession, for example, the construction and manufacturing industries 
were particularly hard hit, whereas education and health services jobs grew slightly (BLS, 
2012). Smoking also varies by occupation, with construction workers among the most 
likely to smoke, and teachers among the least (Bang & Kim, 2001). If tough economies 
force workers to find work in industries or occupations where smoking is less normative, 
or more likely to be regulated on the job, occupational shifts could mediate some 
procyclical relationships. The BRFSS does not consistently measure occupation of all 
participants throughout the analysis period, so other data is required to examine this 
possibility empirically.  
A. Strengths and Limitations 
Although a few previous studies have examined relationships between labor 
market conditions and smoking behaviors, this is the first national study to consider this 
relationship using data that spans the recent Great Recession, when unemployment rates 
rose to their highest level in nearly three decades. The differences in predicted effects 
under conditions of low, average, and high unemployment enhance our understanding of 
procyclical smoking, and suggest that the mechanisms connecting employment 
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conditions and smoking may be impacted by the strength or weakness of the economy in 
which they operate. 
This study was also the first to directly consider a measure of emotional distress 
as a mechanism linking employment conditions and smoking. Previous theoretical work 
on this topic has been inconclusive, with some researchers arguing that poor economies 
raise stress levels and smoking responses, and others positing that stressors on the job are 
maximized during good times, resulting in higher smoking rates. These analyses suggest 
that in robust economies, declines in employment conditions relieve emotional distress, 
but in depressed economies, the reverse is true. As a result, procyclical smoking 
relationships appear relatively weak during periods of high unemployment, unless 
emotional distress is included in the models.  
Because the BRFSS is a repeated cross-sectional survey design, respondents are 
not tracked over time. Methodologically, this presents a limitation to these analyses if 
unmeasured characteristics of individuals, including their previous job and smoking 
experience, are associated with the labor market conditions in which they live. This 
relationship is plausible if individuals move in response to changing economies, perhaps 
seeking better work opportunities. In order for this to explain observed procyclical 
smoking, however, individuals more likely to smoke would have to be more likely to 
move to stronger economies than those less likely to smoke. Although patterns may be 
shifting somewhat, well educated individuals are more likely to move than their less 
educated peers (Frey, 2005), and education is negatively, not positively associated with 
smoking (Agaku et al., 2012). Moreover, some demographers have noted that in recent 
years, especially during the Great Recession, migration within the United States overall 
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has slowed (Frey, 2009). While previous movement may influence the relationship 
between labor market conditions and smoking observed in the cross-section, biases from 
selection into stronger state economies may diminish, rather than magnify true effects, 
and are likely to be relatively small.  
Even though the cross-sectional nature of the data may not overly bias the results 
of these analyses, the BRFSS does present other limitations. Measures of income and 
emotional distress in the BRFSS are less sophisticated than those employed in other 
survey research. Income is measured categorically, making slight shifts in income 
difficult to distinguish. Similarly, emotional distress is measured through a single 
question. It is possible that better measures of each would produce different relationships 
or illuminate mediation effects masked by measurement error. However, each of these 
variables was significantly correlated with smoking behavior, and significantly predicted 
by changing unemployment conditions, suggesting some specificity of their 
measurement.  
The influence of employment conditions on smoking may depend not only on the 
short-term volatility of the labor market, but on an individual’s long term exposure to 
strong or poor conditions. It is possible that living in weak economies for extended 
periods may cause the stressors of job insecurity and loss to mount, eventually reversing 
smoking patterns to be counter-cyclical. Without information in the BRFSS about 
residential histories, this cannot be considered, but trends toward no or counter-cyclical 
effects under high rates of unemployment suggest the possibility warrants exploration. 
Although the size and representativeness of the BRFSS data makes it a valuable tool for 
examining changes in smoking prevalence over time, under different conditions and 
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among sub-populations, panel data that track individuals, their employment conditions, 
and their smoking behavior over time may be needed to complement BRFSS analyses. 
B. Policy Implications 
Even without full understanding of the mechanisms at work, the analyses here 
suggest that as the U.S. economy continues to recover, previous declining smoking trends 
could attenuate. While unemployment rates remain high, improving conditions may have 
a relatively small effect, perhaps because alleviation of recession-related stressors offsets 
procyclical smoking responses, especially among lighter smokers. Once the economy 
returns to pre-recession strength, however, additional programs may be needed to ensure 
progress toward national smoking goals (HHS, Healthy People 2020, 2011). Tested 
policy approaches, such as increasing tobacco excise taxes, are effective strategies to 
curtail smoking throughout the population, impacting smoking behaviors much more 
strongly than changing labor market conditions (CDC, 2000; Committee on Reducing 
Tobacco Use: Strategies, Barriers and Consequences [CRTU], 2007). These policies 
therefore remain critical for tobacco control. To supplement such broad efforts, however, 
policymakers may want to consider programs targeted at workers. In particular, health 
officials should consider working with new and growing industries to institute tobacco 
prevention measures in workplaces. Evidence suggests that both workplace smoking bans 
and workplace-based smoking cessation programs can help prevent and reduce smoking 
among workers (Ham et al., 2011; Hopkins et al., 2010; Leeks, Hopkins, Soler, Aten, & 
Chattopadhyay, 2010); both may deserve consideration by employers, and support from 
government. Industries that employ larger proportions of men, Blacks, and Hispanics 
may be particularly important to target. 
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This study also suggests that the ultimate impact of the Great Recession on 
smoking rates and associated health outcomes may depend on the strength and the speed 
of recovery. In the event of a quick recovery, the health care community may need to 
prepare for hindered progress toward lower smoking prevalence goals, and the associated 
medical and social costs that are incurred by smoking-related health problems, if stronger 
procyclical smoking re-emerges. On the other hand, a languishing economy characterized 
by high unemployment rate, while likely producing a variety of social concerns, may at 
least facilitate current smoking prevention efforts, especially if accompanied by efforts to 
limit smoking-responses to the stressors caused by living in hard times.  
C. Conclusion 
Consistent with previous research, this study finds evidence that as 
unemployment rates increase, smoking declines. This pattern appears strongest when 
changes in employment conditions occur under stronger initial economic conditions, 
suggesting that the strength of observed relationships depend on the conditions occurring 
in the analysis period. In the current economy, efforts to address the implications of 
procyclical smoking may not be necessary until lower unemployment rates are reached, 
though practitioners may want to use this time to work with employers to ensure effective 
smoking prevention programs and policies are in place. Because explanations for 
observed smoking relationships remain elusive, researchers should explore other 
mechanisms, like occupation, job insecurity, and long-term market exposures, while 
continuing to track trends in employment conditions and smoking to document whether 
previously explored patterns are maintained as the nation struggles to recover from the 
recent Great Recession.  
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of the BRFSS analytic sample, 1996-2010 (n=4027243)  
 
n % /mean (se)
Participant Smoking Status
Smoker 791757 21.1% (0.0004)
Daily Smoker 607974 15.9% (0.0004)
Non-Smoker 3235486 78.9% (0.0004)
State Economic and Tax Conditions
 Unemployment Rate 4027243 5.6% (0.0022)
Cigarette Excise Tax Rate 4027243 132.98 (0.1216)
Participant Gender
Male 1566630 48.4% (0.0005)
Female 2460613 51.6% (0.0005)
Participant Race/Ethnicity
White 3292763 72.8% (0.0005)
Black 322528 10.0% (0.0003)
Hispanic 237563 12.0% (0.0004)
Other 174389 5.1% (0.0003)
Participant Age
Age in Years 4027243 45.7 (0.0179)
Age Groups
Age 18-24 220541 12.4% (0.0004)
Age 25-54 2047802 57.4% (0.0005)
Age 55-64 725782 13.0% (0.0003)
Age 65+ 1033118 17.2% (0.0003)
Participant Educational Status
< 12 years 421966 12.2% (0.0004)
High School Graduate 1249102 30.4% (0.0005)
Some College 1082030 26.8% (0.0004)
College Graduate 1274145 30.6% (0.0005)
Participant Partnership Status
Married 2228321 59.7% (0.0005)
Divorced/Separated 651588 11.5% (0.0003)
Widowed 500656 6.8% (0.0002)
Single or Unmarried Relationship 646678 22.1% (0.0005)
Participant Employment Status
Employed 2268905 61.4% (0.0005)
Unemployed 173246 5.3% (0.0003)
Not in the Labor Force 1574199 33.0% (0.0005)
Missing 10893 0.3% (0.0001)
Participant Income Category
Income (in thousands) 4027229 59.3 (0.0232)
Participant Mental Health
Days in Past Month in Poor Mental Health 3901417 3.4 (0.0017)
Notes: Unweighted frequencies, weighted means, se = standard error. The unemployment rate is 
averaged across the three months leading up to and including the survey month, in the state of 
respondent residence. Cigarette excise taxes are measured as the sum residential state and federal 
rates, adjusted for inflation and measured in 2010 cents. Income is also adjusted and measured in 
thousands of 2010 dollars. Participant mental health indicates the number of days respondents report 
being in poor mental health. Both income and mental health days are averaged across individuals of 
the same race, gender, age group, education and state in the survey year.
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Table 2.2: Association of state employment conditions with smoking status (n=4027243) 
 
  
b (se) AME (se) AME (se) AME (se)
1. Any Smoking Unemployment Rate -0.0079 (0.0026) ** -0.121 (0.041) ** -0.075 (0.030) * -0.028 (0.025)
Unemployment Rate (square) 0.0005 (0.0002) ** --- --- --- --- --- ---
2. Daily Smoking Unemployment Rate -0.0075 (0.0028) ** -0.114 (0.037) ** -0.086 (0.027) ** -0.058 (0.023) *
Unemployment Rate (square) 0.0003 (0.0002) † --- --- --- --- --- ---
Notes: b=beta ceofficient; se=standard error; AME=average marginal effect. All analyses employ probit models of linear and 
quadratic measures of the average three month state unemployment rate up to and including to the interview month, controlling for 
participant characteristics, month, state, and year fixed effects, with standard errors adjusted for clustering within month and state. 
The low, average and high employment categories were determined based on the weighted distribution of the employment rate 
variable in the sample, in which average is defined by the weighted mean, and low and high employment are defined as one standard 
deviation below and above the weighted mean. The AME measures the marginal change in the percentage of individuals who are 
predicted to be smoking when the unemployment rate increases one percentage point from the starting reference level, based on the 
weighted average of the predicted effects for each individual in the sample, and taking into account linear and quadratic effects.               
† p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Low     
Unemployment 
(3.7%)
Average 
Unemployment 
(5.6%)
High 
Unemployment 
(7.6%)
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Table 2.3: Impact of proposed mediators on the unemployment rate-smoking relationship 
 
  
Regressor b (se) b (se) b (se) b (se) b (se)
A. Income Unemployment Rate -0.3534 (0.0601) ** -0.0079 (0.0026) ** -0.0086 (0.0026) ** -0.0075 (0.0028) ** -0.0080 (0.0028) **
Unemployment Rate (square) -0.0235 (0.0038) ** 0.0005 (0.0002) ** 0.0005 (0.0002) ** 0.0003 (0.0002) † 0.0004 (0.0002) *
Income --- --- --- --- 0.0169 (0.0004) ** --- --- 0.0203 (0.0004) **
Income (quadratic) --- --- --- --- -0.0002 (0.0000) ** --- --- -0.0002 (0.0000) **
B. Cigarette Taxes Unemployment Rate 5.3276 (1.1424) ** -0.0079 (0.0026) ** -0.0073 (0.0026) ** -0.0075 0.0028 ** -0.0067 (0.0028) *
Unemployment Rate (square) -0.3425 (0.0799) ** 0.0005 (0.0002) ** 0.0004 (0.0002) * 0.0003 0.0002 † 0.0027 (0.0002)
Cigarette Taxes --- --- --- --- -0.0001 (0.0000) ** --- --- -0.0017 (0.0000) **
C. Emotional Distress Unemployment Rate -0.0411 (0.0084) ** -0.0079 (0.0026) ** -0.0066 (0.0026) * -0.0075 0.0028 ** -0.0065 (0.0029) *
Unemployment Rate (square) 0.0032 (0.0009) ** 0.0005 (0.0002) ** 0.0003 (0.0002) * 0.0003 0.0002 † 0.0002 (0.0002)
Emotional Distress --- --- --- --- 0.0168 (0.0025) ** --- --- 0.0153 (0.0026) **
Emotional Distress (square) --- --- --- --- 0.0033 (0.0003) ** --- --- 0.0033 (0.0003) **
Notes: b=beta coefficient; se=standard error. Models in Column 1 use multivariate linear regression to assess the influence of state unemployment rates on the 
mediating variable (income, taxes or emotional distress). Models in Column 2 uses probit regression to assess the influence of unemployment on the probability 
of any smoking, Models in Column 3 add the proposed mediating variable to the regression. Models in Columns 4 and 5 are similar to 2 and 3, but assess 
probability for daily, rather than any, smoking. In Column 1, a linear combination of the coefficients (b ump+2*UMP*bump2) creates the marginal effect of 
unemployment on income at a specified unemployment level. Marginal effects can not be generated through a linear process in models in columns 2-5; however, 
the sign of the coefficient does indicate direction of relationship. All models control for participant characteristics, month, state, and year fixed effects, with 
standard errors adjusted for clustering within month and state. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Proposed Mediator Any Smoking Daily Smoking
1 2 3 4 5
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Table 2.4: Average marginal effects of a one percentage point increase in state level unemployment rates on smoking prevalence 
 
 
 
 
 
N AME (se) AME (se) AME (se)
Any Smoking A. Unmediated Model 4027243 -0.121 (0.041) ** -0.075 (0.030) * -0.028 (0.025)
B. With Income Effects 4027229 -0.133 (0.041) ** -0.085 (0.030) ** -0.034 (0.025)
C. With Cigarette Tax Effects 4027243 -0.112 (0.041) ** -0.071 (0.029) * -0.028 (0.025)
D. With Stress Effects 3901417 -0.115 (0.041) ** -0.084 (0.030) ** -0.052 (0.025) *
E. All Mediators 3901403 -0.118 (0.041) ** -0.087 (0.030) ** -0.056 (0.025) *
Daily Smoking F. Unmediated Model 4027243 -0.114 (0.037) ** -0.086 (0.027) ** -0.058 (0.023) *
G. With Income Effects 4027229 -0.116 (0.037) ** -0.083 (0.027) ** -0.050 (0.023) *
H. With Cigarette Tax Effects 4027243 -0.105 (0.037) ** 0.082 (0.026) ** -0.058 (0.023) *
I. With Stress Effects 3901417 -0.113 (0.038) ** -0.097 (0.027) ** -0.080 (0.023) **
J. All Mediators 3901403 -0.107 (0.037) ** -0.088 (0.027) ** -0.068 (0.022) **
Notes: AME=average marginal effects, se=standard error. All analyses employ probit models of linear and quadrattic measures of the average 
three month state unemployment rate up to and including to the interview month, controlling for participant characteristics, month, state, and 
year fixed effects, with standard errors adjusted for clustering within month and state. The low, average and high employment categories were 
determined based on the weighted distribution of the employment rate variable in the sample, in which average is defined by the weighted mean, 
and low and high employment are defined as one standard deviation below and above the weighted mean. The AME measures the marginal 
change in the percentage of individuals who are predicted to be smoking when the unemployment rate increases one percentage point from the 
starting reference level, based on the weighted average of the predicted effects for each individual in the sample, and taking into account linear 
and quadratic effects. * p<.05; ** p<.01
Low                  
Unemployment (3.7%)
Average                    
Unemployment (5.6%)
High               
Unemployment (7.6%)
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Table 2.5: Predicted effect of a one percentage point increase in the unemployment rate on smoking prevalence by population group 
   
Smoking 
Prevalence N
Low UE 
AME (se)
High UE 
AME (se) N
Low UE 
AME (se)
High UE 
AME (se)
A. All Participants 21.07% 4027243 -0.121 (0.041) ** -0.028 (0.025) 3827689 -0.118 (0.041) ** -0.056 (0.025) *
Gender
B. Men 23.29% 1566630 -0.167 (0.064) ** -0.107 (0.039) ** 1516185 -0.148 (0.064) * -0.123 (0.039) **
C. Women 18.99% 2460613 -0.096 (0.048) * 0.021 (0.029) 2385218 -0.100 (0.048) * -0.008 (0.029)
Race/Ethnicity
D. White 21.59% 3292763 -0.128 (0.045) ** -0.054 (0.027) 3187191 -0.122 (0.046) ** -0.099 (0.027) ***
E. Black 21.83% 322528 -0.412 (0.147) ** -0.235 (0.083) ** 322528 -0.475 (0.148) ** -0.276 (0.084) **
F. Hispanic 17.93% 237563 -0.377 (0.148) * -0.022 (0.088) 232857 -0.385 (0.150) * 0.017 (0.089)
Age Group
G. Young Adults (Age 18-24) 26.38% 220541 -0.007 (0.168) 0.036 (0.115) 211072 -0.046 (0.168) 0.009 (0.116)
H. Middle Age Adults (Age 25-64) 22.96% 2773584 -0.081 (0.048) -0.023 (0.030) 2684478 -0.022 (0.048) 0.037 (0.030)
I. Older Adults (Age 65+) 9.53% 1033118 -0.058 (0.057) -0.010 (0.031) 1005853 -0.032 (0.057) -0.002 (0.032)
Education
J. No college education 27.73% 1671068 -0.082 (0.069) -0.006 (0.042) 1616266 -0.127 (0.069) -0.052 (0.041)
K. At least some college education 16.12% 2356175 -0.130 (0.046) ** -0.042 (0.028) 2285137 -0.123 (0.046) ** -0.070 (0.028) *
Marital Status
L. Married 16.99% 2228321 -0.151 (0.048) ** -0.049 (0.029) 2160377 -0.149 (0.049) ** -0.066 (0.029) *
M. Not Married 27.11% 1798922 -0.071 (0.066) -0.006 (0.041) 1741026 -0.051 (0.066) -0.028 (0.041)
Employment Status
N. Employed 22.32% 2268905 -0.195 (0.053) *** -0.120 (0.033) *** 2193355 -0.162 (0.053) ** -0.104 (0.033) **
O. Not employed 35.47% 173246 -0.114 (0.213) -0.076 (0.121) 167868 -0.062 (0.214) -0.026 (0.123)
P. Not in the Labor Force 16.40% 1574199 -0.028 (0.057) -0.013 (0.033) 1529464 0.024 (0.057) 0.007 (0.034)
Model 2:Fully MediatedModel 1: Unmediated
Notes: Low/High UE AME=average marginal effects based on a 3.7%/7.6% unemployment rate; se=standard error. Smoking prevalence and AMEs are weighted 
across the sub-sample. Unmediated models analyzed as in Table 2.2, row 1; fully mediated models add measures of income, cigarette taxes and emotional distress.             
* p<.05; ** p<.01, ***p<.001 
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Table 2.6: Sensitivity of models to alternate estimation procedures or employment specifications 
 
Mean AME (se) AME (se)
Unemployment rate (3 mo.)
Model 1: Probit 5.64% -0.076 (0.030) * -0.088 (0.030) **
Model 2: Linear Probability Model 5.64% -0.095 (0.028) ** -0.078 (0.029) **
Model 3: Logit 5.64% -0.065 (0.030) * -0.083 (0.030) **
Model 4: Employment Rate (3 mo.) 62.63% 0.054 (0.020) ** 0.071 (0.021) **
Model 5: Unemployment rate (12 mo.) 5.54% -0.095 (0.032) ** -0.108 (0.032) **
A. Unmediated B. Fully Mediated
Notes: AME=average marginal effects; se=standard error. Models 1-3 use different estimation techniques on 
the same basic regression equation. Model 1 is the probit model reported in the paper, model 2 presents 
results from linear probability models, and model 3 reports results using logit estimation. Models 1, 4 and 5 
employ probit regression models substituting different measures of employment conditions. Model 1 is the 
model presented in the paper, and includes the linear and quadratic measures of the state unemployment rate 
of the respondent averaged across the three months prior to, and including, the survey month. Model 4 is 
similar, but uses a three month average of the state employment rate. Model 5 averages the 12 months of 
state unemployment rates prior to, and including, the survey month. All models include the same standard 
error corrections and covariates as the primary model; the fully mediated models further add measures of 
income, cigarette taxes and emotional distress. * p<.05; ** p<.01, ***p<.001
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Figure 2.1: Conceptual model of procyclical smoking and proposed mediators 
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Figure 2.2: Trends in unemployment and smoking in the analytic sample, 1996-2010 (n=4,027,243) 
 
Notes: Smoking prevalence is measured as the percent of BRFSS sample members indicating a given 
smoking status, calculated with probabilty weights. Individuals are considered smokers if they 
indicate they have smoked at least 100 cigarettes in their lifetime, and smoke on all or most days at 
the time of survey. Daily smokers comprise the subsample of all smokers who indicate currently 
smoking on all days. Annual unemployment rates are calculated as the weighted average of the 
unemployment rate in the survey month and two months prior to survey for all individuals surveyed 
in a given year. Grey bars indicate periods of national recession, as defined by the NBER. 
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Figure 2.3: Predicted prevalence of any and daily smoking by unemployment rate 
 
Notes: Predicted smoking prevalence is calculated as the weighted average of the individual 
smoking probabilities predicted by analytic models, holding the state unemployment rate at a 
specific level. 
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CHAPTER 3: EMPLOYMENT CHANGES AND SMOKING 
I. Introduction 
In each of the past ten years, more than 20 million people lost work, and this 
number skyrocketed to more than 27 million people in 2009 (deWolf & Klemmer, 2010). 
Although unemployment rates remain high, the economy has been improving, with 
steady, albeit slow, growth in hiring rates. More than 50 million hires occurred in 2011, 
accounting for 38% of employment (BLS, 2012). As the country continues to recover 
from the recent Great Recession, a better understanding of the short- and long-term health 
ramifications of changes to employment status is necessary to effectively prepare for 
future health needs, and guide prevention programs.  
Demonstrating a causal relationship between employment changes and health, 
however, is difficult for several reasons. First, effective analysis requires accounting for 
the possibility that less healthy people may be more likely to be unemployed, or to lose 
work (Böckerman & Ilmakunnas, 2009; Jin, Shah, & Svoboda, 1995). Researchers have 
tried to isolate causal effects by focusing on exogenously-determined changes in 
employment, such as job loss from plant closures, or controlling for health status that 
precedes an employment change, with mixed results. Some research suggests that when 
health-related selection into employment status is controlled in these ways, observed 
relationships between employment and health diminish or disappear (Browning, Moller 
Dano, & Heinesen, 2006; Burgard, Brand, & House, 2007; Böckerman & Ilmakunnas, 
2009), while other work finds continued evidence for causal relationships (Gallo, 
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Bradley, Siegel, & Kasl, 2000; Korpi, 2001; Kuhn, Lalive, & Zweimüller, 2009; Strully, 
2009). 
Additionally, researchers must account for the fact the most prevalent health 
problems, such as heart disease, cancer, stroke, and lower respiratory diseases generally 
arise following a build-up of risk factors and behavior over an extended time period 
(Ben-Shlomo & Kuh, 2002; Claussen, Davey Smith, & Thelle, 2003; Hart, Smith, & 
Blane, 1998; G. D. Smith & Hart, 2002). Many events and other life changes can occur in 
between an employment change and the onset of a health condition, making it difficult to 
isolate the effect of entering or leaving employment or the labor force. 
In this paper, I address these concerns by leveraging six waves of longitudinal 
data from the nationally representative Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to study 
changes in smoking behaviors following changes in employment. Multiple observations 
of work status and smoking behavior of PSID participants allow me to employ individual 
fixed effect analytic techniques, which control for many unobserved individual 
characteristics that might simultaneously influence employment choices and risky health 
behaviors.  
By focusing on smoking, I examine health effects that may be more rapidly 
susceptible to employment shocks than other health conditions. Because of its association 
with many prevalent diseases, smoking is associated with nearly one out of every five 
deaths each year (Adhikari et al., 2008; Mokdad et al., 2004). As such, it may serve as an 
early indicator of the longer term health consequences of the high levels of hiring and 
separation that have characterized the current economy. In addition, smoking is 
considered the leading preventable cause of mortality in the United States; research about 
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the ways in which employment changes trigger smoking responses are necessary to guide 
workplace health promotion programs, as well as public policies providing resources to 
individuals who lose work or leave the labor market.  
II. Background 
A. Previous studies of employment status and smoking 
Although limited by sample restrictions and analytic design, previous research 
about the relationship between employment changes and smoking suggests that being out 
of work, or losing work, may increase smoking behaviors. In a cross-sectional study of 
young men, Montgomery and colleagues (1998) found that the odds of smoking at age 33 
more than doubled for men who had experienced at least 3 years of unemployment, 
compared to men who had never lost work, and nearly tripled for men who had 
experienced unemployment in the past year, compared to those who had not. Schunck 
and Rogge (2010) analyzed German microdata and found that the odds of smoking were 
more than 50% higher among individuals looking for work, compared to those who were 
employed. Recent cross-sectional analyses of employment status and smoking in 
California found that the odds of smoking were 23% higher among the unemployed, 
when compared to the employed (Prochaska et al., 2013). 
Cross-sectional analyses, however, may be inadequate because they usually 
measure employment status and smoking behavior at the same point in time, and 
therefore cannot establish whether employment changes preceded smoking changes, or if 
smoking behavior may have triggered job leaving or loss. Longitudinal data can 
sometimes improve on cross-sectional estimates by leveraging temporally ordered 
observations of smoking and employment. Prior analyses of longitudinal data partially 
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confirm higher rates of smoking among the unemployed, and provide some evidence for 
a causal relationship between job loss and smoking. Using two waves of a national 
sample of older adults in the United States, Falba and colleagues (2005) found that 
former smokers who lost work had more than twice the odds of relapsing, compared to 
their peers who remained working, and that individuals who smoked at baseline were 
consuming an average of about five more cigarettes per day after a job loss, if not re-
employed. Similarly, Weden, Astone and Bishai (2006) explored 11 years of data from 
the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY) and found evidence for decreased 
likelihood of smoking cessation among the non-employed. This effect, however, was 
only statistically significant for European American women. Finally, a recent study of 
Korean men found no statistically significant relationship between unemployment status 
and smoking status, smoking intensity or quitting, but did find that the odds of re-
initiating smoking was 66% higher among the unemployed compared to standard workers 
(Jung, Ph, Huh, & Kawachi, 2013). 
Several gaps exist in current research on employment status and smoking. Nearly 
all of the prior studies compare employment with unemployment, failing to include or 
distinguish individuals who have left the labor force, and are neither working for pay, nor 
actively searching for work. Individuals can leave the labor market in order to retire, 
pursue education, or be a caretaker. In addition, people may leave the labor force because 
they have become discouraged during their job searches. The BLS (2009b) estimates that 
between 5-7% of people who are categorized as not in the labor force are actually 
interested in finding work.    
Transitions in and out of the workforce are becoming increasingly common. Even 
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retirement is not a permanent condition, with research indicating that at least 26% of 
people eventually “unretire” (Maestas, 2010). With the exception of retirement, however, 
little research examines the health or behavioral ramifications of these transitions. 
Research on the effects of retirement are contradictory, with some studies documenting 
beneficial health outcomes and others documenting negative ones (Moon, Glymour, 
Subramanian, Avendano, & Kawachi, 2012).  The two studies that did compare all 
individuals out of the labor force with workers found that labor market departure 
increased the risks of smoking, but results were limited to specific sub-populations 
(Weden et al., 2006) or geographic areas (Prochaska et al., 2013).  
Research on employment status and work also tends to focus on the repercussions 
of a job loss experience, or a comparison of static employment states, without 
considering experiences with re-employment or other components of recent work history. 
Many scholars argue that the modern labor market is increasingly characterized by job 
insecurity and precarious work, resulting in a decline in employment stability and high 
rates of job churning, or movement in and out of work (Cappelli, 1995; Cappelli, 1999; 
Grimshaw, Ward, Rubery, & Beynon, 2001; Hollister, 2011; Kalleberg, 2009; Osterman, 
2000). Analyses of recent labor market conditions suggest that recent high rates of 
unemployment result more from decreases in work opportunities and new hires than from 
increases in involuntary job losses (deWolf & Klemmer, 2010; Falba et al., 2005). In 
addition, rates of long-term unemployment peaked recently (Allegretto & Lynch, 2010), 
and the amount of time people spend looking for work before finding it or leaving the 
labor market more than doubled between 2007 and 2010 (Ilg & Theodossiou, 2012). No 
current work examines the influence of unemployment duration or re-employment on 
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smoking, but one recent study documented an increased likelihood of developing poor 
health conditions following a job loss, even when people were re-hired (Strully, 2009). 
This same study, however, found no differences in self-rated health when comparing the 
longer-term workers to those who had recently begun work after experiencing a job loss.  
B. Theoretical Bases for Relationships between Work and Smoking 
Work is a key social institution that conveys income and other material benefits, 
structures time use, facilitates social contacts, assigns social status and personal 
identification, and provides an opportunity to meaningfully engage in society (Andersen, 
2009; Jahoda, 1982). Individual movement in and out of the labor force, as well as in and 
out of employment within the labor force, may therefore have both financial and 
psychosocial ramifications that could influence smoking behaviors. While theories 
focused on resource loss suggest that expensive behaviors like smoking generally decline 
when individuals move out of employment, theories focused on changes in psychosocial 
conditions often predict the opposite, arguing that loss of work, unemployment, and even 
departure from the labor market may generate high levels of stress which can trigger 
unhealthy coping behaviors.  An additional body of work, however, identifies potential 
negative health ramifications of working, and suggests that leaving employment could 
alleviate work-related stressors, and thereby reduce smoking behaviors. 
Income: Job loss is associated with a decline in income, with effects persisting 
several years into the future (Jacobson et al., 1993; Ruhm, 1991), especially if multiple 
job losses are experienced (Stevens, 1997). As individuals lose income or anticipate 
income loss from an upcoming change in employment, economic theory suggests they 
decrease their purchase of all normal goods, including cigarettes. Cigarette consumption, 
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however, may be relatively income inelastic, or relatively insensitive to changes in 
income. A wide variety of income elasticities for cigarettes have been reported in the 
literature; a meta-analysis summarizing nearly 400 estimates suggests that a one percent 
loss of income is associated with only a 0.28 percent decrease in cigarette demand in the 
short run, and a 0.39 percent decrease in cigarette demand in the long run (Gallet & List, 
2003).  
Employment-related psychosocial factors: In addition to consequences for income 
levels, employment changes likely have psychosocial impacts. Job loss or perceived job 
insecurity may cause financial anxiety, disturb one’s self image and sense of life control, 
or inhibit one’s ability to engage socially (Andersen, 2009; Brand & Burgard, 2008; 
Jahoda, 1982; Price, Choi, & Vinokur, 2002), each of which might generate high stress 
levels. Significant research demonstrates declining mental health following job loss (Paul 
& Moser, 2009). Furthermore, research indicates that workers who are re-employed 
following displacement have lower levels of occupational status, job authority, and 
employer-sponsored benefits, and are more likely to work part-time (Brand, 2006; 
Kletzer, 1998), so the psychosocial impact of job loss may be long lasting as well. While 
chronic stress can directly impact physical health by inhibiting the body’s immune and 
endocrine response systems, it may also spur coping mechanisms, including unhealthy 
behaviors such as smoking (Bosma et al., 1998; Kubzansky et al., 1997; McEwen, 1998; 
McKee et al., 2003; Thoits, 1995). 
Other researchers, however, argue that work is a source of stress, particularly if 
working environments require long hours and allow little autonomy (Clougherty et al., 
2010; Daniels & Guppy, 1994; M. J. Smith et al., 1981). Recent empirical work has 
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documented positive associations between working conditions or longer work hours and 
poor mental health (Clumeck et al., 2009; Virtanen et al., 2011). Stressful employment 
conditions and work hours have also been associated with several risky health behaviors 
(Escoto et al., 2010), though research specific to smoking has been limited and 
inconclusive (Ota et al., 2010; Perdikaris, Kletsiou, Gumnopoulou, & Matziou, 2010).  
C. Impact on Sub-Populations  
If financial resources and employment-related psychosocial stressors are the 
primary mechanisms linking employment changes and smoking, those groups with more 
labor force attachment or with limited financial reserves may be most susceptible to 
effects. In particular, as women’s participation in the labor market has changed over time, 
it is important to consider whether gender might moderate relationships between 
employment and smoking. In addition, higher levels of income or wealth could buffer the 
financial and stress-related impacts of job loss or employment changes, perhaps 
attenuating effects. 
Gender: Many labor market studies have limited analyses to men, under the 
assumption that women are less attached to the labor force, due to lower rates of 
employment and higher rates of part-time work when they are employed. Women 
continue to make up a smaller portion of the labor force; in 2020, the BLS estimates that 
57.1% of all women over age 16 will participate in the labor force, compared to 68.2% of 
similarly aged men (Toossi, 2012). It is possible, therefore, that income and stress 
changes from employment changes might be less relevant for women, diminishing impact 
on smoking. Yet in the last 50 years, women’s labor force participation has increased, 
peaking in 1999 at 60%, while men’s participation rates have declined. Women make up 
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a larger portion of the population, so even with lower labor market participation rates, 
they are projected to make up 47% of the labor force between 2010 and 2020 (Toossi, 
2012). As women’s labor force participation grows, their susceptibility to health 
ramifications of employment changes may increase as well.  
Income and wealth: Although economic theory generally suggests that individuals 
consume less following income losses, other work predicts that individuals aim to 
maintain stable consumption levels following income shocks, a concept known as 
consumption smoothing (Friedman, 1957).  To accomplish this, consumers will 
accumulate assets in anticipation of a potential economic shock, or borrow resources 
when such a shock occurs. Following job loss, individuals have relied on wealth, or in its 
absence, unemployment benefits, to smooth consumption (Bloemen & Stancanelli, 2005; 
Browning & Crossley, 2001; Gruber, 1997; Gruber, 2001). Much of this work focuses on 
food or other necessity consumption patterns; whether individuals similarly smooth 
smoking consumption, however, is unknown. If they do, individuals with access to more 
resources through incomes from family members or accumulated savings and wealth may 
be less prone to change smoking behavior following an employment change. In addition, 
reserves of income or wealth might offset financial stresses related to moving into 
unemployment or out of the labor force, and some previous work documents positive 
associations between financial strain and smoking behavior (Kendzor et al., 2010). 
D. Contribution 
In this paper, I assess the influence of changing employment on the probability of 
smoking on all workers, as well as the intensity of smoking behavior among periodic or 
continuous smokers. By using longitudinal data from recent waves of the PSID and fixed 
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effect models, I examine smoking changes during different employment transitions, 
comparing working with both unemployment and labor force departure. In additional 
analyses, I consider whether experiencing a recent job loss influences the relationship 
between employment and smoking, and whether duration of unemployment predicts 
smoking behavior among the unemployed. Finally, I investigate whether either female 
gender or increased household resources attenuates observed relationships. 
III. Methods 
A. Data and Sample  
Individual- and family-level information about smoking behaviors, employment 
status, recent job losses, income, wealth and demographic characteristics are derived 
from the six waves of the PSID that were administered biennually between 1999 and 
2009. The PSID is a nationally representative, longitudinal study of individuals and their 
families which began in 1968.
7
  In addition to the original household adults enrolled, the 
study follows children of the original respondents as they age and begin families of their 
own, and added new families in 1990 and 1997 to better represent the country given 
immigration trends. As a result, the survey has grown from about 4,800 families in 1968 
to more than 9,000 families in 2009. The primary purpose of the PSID is to track 
economic and demographic behavior, and the survey instrument includes detailed 
questions about employment status and transitions. In 1999, a series of questions about 
health behaviors and conditions were added to the core survey, supplementing previous 
questions focused on self-rated health and health expenditures.  
The PSID is designed to collect information about a family from a single 
                                                          
7
 The Panel Study of Income Dynamics is primarily sponsored by the National Science Foundation, the 
National Institute of Aging, and the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development and is 
conducted by the University of Michigan. 
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representative of that family. Individuals identified as heads of households are 
interviewed if available, though sometimes interviews are instead conducted with a 
cohabitating partner or spouse of a household head. Employment and smoking 
information is gathered about the interviewee, and the interviewee also reports 
employment and smoking information for a cohabitating partner or spouse if relevant. In 
the six waves of data used for this analysis, data for 17,492 unique household heads and 
partners are available. Because analyses focus on transitions out of employment, 
individuals must be working at some point during data collection. I further restricted the 
analytic sample to individuals who had worked within five years of each survey 
observation, to remove individuals who worked very infrequently, and thus demonstrated 
little attachment to the labor force during the analysis period. Since analyses rely on the 
longitudinal nature of the data, eligible individuals also had to participate in at least two 
waves of the data. Of the total number of heads and partners, 2,040 (11.7%) were not 
working in any wave and 1,274 (7.3%) had spent more than five years out of the labor 
force. An additional 1,571 (9.0%) only appeared in a single wave. Ten of the remaining 
eligible individuals (<0.1%) failed to provide key covariate information, and were 
dropped, resulting in a final analytic sample of 12,597 individuals. Descriptive statistics 
about the analytic sample, including demographic and employment information, are 
provided in Table 3.1.  
In each wave of the PSID, new household heads and partners establish or join 
PSID families. Additionally, individuals who previously participated may be lost to 
follow-up if they do not participate or are no longer a member of a PSID family. The 
available analytic sample in each of the six waves of the PSID employed in this analysis, 
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therefore, ranges from a low of 8,095 (64% of the full analytic sample) in 1999 to a high 
of 10,786 (86% of the full analytic sample) in 2007, before dropping to 10,179 (81% of 
the full analytic sample) in 2009. Nearly half of the analytic sample members (49%, 
n=6,210) appear in all six waves of PSID data. In total, 58,053 person-wave observations 
of eligible individuals are available for analysis. Information about wave-specific 
samples is available in Table 3.2.  
B. Measures 
Outcome variables: Current smoking is measured in two ways in the PSID. First, 
each respondents is asked whether he or she currently smokes cigarettes, and whether his 
or her partner currently smokes cigarettes (if cohabitating or married). Previous research 
suggests that family member proxy reports of smoking status are reliable (Gilpin et al., 
1994; Hyland, Cummings, Lynn, Corle, & Giffen, 1997). I use responses to these 
questions to create a dichotomous smoking status variable for each interviewee and 
partner. Second, each respondent is asked the number of cigarettes he or she smokes each 
day, on average. I use responses to this question as continuous measures of smoking 
intensity. Previous research suggests that self report of smoking behavior corresponds 
relatively well to biochemical indicators of smoking, especially when a survey is 
administered by an interviewer, rather than completed independently by a respondent, 
and when a survey is not connected to specific smoking cessation intervention programs 
(Patrick et al., 1994). 
Explanatory Variables: Through repeated questioning, the PSID measures the 
current employment status of respondents and their partners, using eight response 
categories. I collapse these to create three mutually exclusive indicators of current 
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employment status: working, unemployed, or not in the labor force. Individuals are 
considered to be working if they report working at the time of survey, being only 
temporarily laid off, or being on sick or maternity leave, whereas those who indicate they 
are looking for work and not currently working are considered unemployed, consistent 
with BLS definitions. All others, including those who are retired, permanently disabled, 
“keeping house,” students, or in prison, are categorized as not in the labor force.  
Along with current employment status, the PSID collects detailed information 
about jobs that earned income for individuals in the two years prior to the survey (e.g., in 
2001 and 2002 for the 2003 survey), including start and stop dates, and the reasons that 
previous jobs ended. To capture recent work histories, I used employment dates, in 
conjunction with the interview date, to create a variable measuring the number of months 
since an individual last worked, for individuals not currently working. In addition, I used 
responses to the question about why jobs ended to create indicators of recent job loss 
experience. Specifically, an individual is categorized as having recently experienced any 
job loss if a job ended in the last two years due to plant or company closure, other 
involuntary job loss (layoff, fired, strike), or voluntary job loss (quit, retired, wanted a 
change, job ended, other). Recent involuntary job loss is indicated by restricting the job 
loss experience to plant or company closure, layoff, firing or strike. Strictly categorizing 
job loss as involuntary or voluntary can be difficult, especially if individuals who take 
early retirement packages as alternatives to layoffs or who resign to avoid being fired are 
categorized as voluntary job leavers, when in reality external pressure caused the job loss. 
All analyses that incorporate job loss as a key variable are therefore run twice, 
alternatively employing indicators of any job loss and involuntary job loss only. 
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Moderating variables: In my analyses, I consider variation in the impact of 
employment status on smoking by three participant characteristics: gender, household 
income and household wealth. Gender is measured with a time-invariant dichotomous 
female indicator, based on whether a participant is a male (=0) or female (=1). To capture 
total family income and total family wealth, I employ composite measures calculated by 
the PSID staff based on a series of questions. The total family income variable measures 
the total taxable, transferable and social security income of household heads, married or 
cohabitating partners, and other family unit members. This variable includes income from 
assets, earnings, business profits, social security, and government transfers. The total 
family wealth variable is the sum of the value of eight key asset categories 
(business/farm, checking/savings, home equity, other real estate, vehicles, stocks, 
annuities, other assets), net household debt. Income data in the PSID is considered to be 
measured more reliably than in other studies (Kim & Stafford, 2000), and the wealth data 
in the PSID is considered comparable to the data in other surveys that utilize significantly 
more detailed wealth question (Wolff & Gittelman, 2011). To account for inflation, 
income and wealth data are adjusted to reflect real prices in 1999 (in tens of thousands of 
dollars) using the Consumer Price Index-Urban, available from the BLS. The PSID 
measures of income and wealth are both continuous, and can be negative. In my analyses, 
I employ logged values of the income and wealth variables to decrease skewness in their 
distributions. 
Control variables: As is described in detail below, most analyses reported here 
employ participant fixed effects, which control for time-invariant characteristics of 
sample members. All analyses further incorporate measures of a participant’s age at the 
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time of survey (linear and quadratic), and their partnership status (co-habitating with a 
spouse or partner vs. not cohabitating). To account for labor market influences on both 
employment status and smoking behavior, I also matched geographic information about 
the survey household with data from the BLS, allowing me to include a measure of the 
unemployment rate during the three months leading up to the survey month in the 
participant’s state of residence in all analyses. The unemployment rate measures the 
percentage of people in the labor force who are unemployed within a specific geographic 
area (BLS, 2009a). In sensitivity tests in which fixed effects are not used, PSID indicators 
of an individual’s gender, race, educational level, and state of residence are also used to 
account for characteristics of individuals that might predict both employment status and 
smoking behavior. 
C. Analytic Approach 
The theory underpinning this research suggests that employment changes produce 
changes in smoking behavior. Two alternative explanations, however, are possible. First, 
individuals who smoke may be more likely to lose or leave work. And second, other 
unobserved factors, such as a proclivity for risk-taking behavior, could influence both 
employment likelihood and smoking behaviors. Previous research has usually addressed 
these concerns by either controlling for baseline and childhood health indicators, or 
limiting the job loss exposure variable to losses due to plant or company closures.  
Each of these approaches, however, has certain limitations. While inclusion of 
health status indicators prior to the employment change experience should improve the 
causal estimate of the relationship if poor health predicts loss or leaving of work, its 
inclusion cannot account for endogeneity problems from other unmeasured variables like 
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risk-taking proclivity. Limiting employment changes to those that occur due to 
exogenous reasons unrelated to characteristics of individual job losers can address 
broader endogeneity concerns, but will also produce an estimate of the effect of 
unemployment on smoking only for those people who lose work for a specific reason, 
like plant closure. Plant closure job loss is only a small portion of the total job loss 
experience; within the defined analytic PSID sample, this kind of job loss represents only 
7% of all voluntary and involuntary job losses, and only 27% of all involuntary job 
losses. Furthermore, because plant closure job loss is often shared with coworkers, it may 
have different psychosocial ramifications for people who experience it, and may result in 
a flooded labor market, producing unique conditions determining future employment 
likelihood. Finally, because plant closure job loss is relatively uncommon,
8
 
demonstrating statistically significant effects, even when such effects exist, can be 
difficult. These analyses instead leverage the repeated observations of individuals 
available in the PSID to employ individual participant fixed effects in analyses.
9
 Fixed 
effect models control for time-invariant unobserved individual characteristics by using 
only variation within individuals to develop regression coefficient estimates. 
Fixed effects models require sufficient within-individual variation in explanatory 
and outcome variables over time to be able to identify effects. As described in Table 3.1, 
almost 18% of analytic sample members changed their smoking status at some point 
during their participation. By design, nearly all sample members reported working during 
                                                          
8
 Plant closure job loss is only indicated in 1,027 (<2%) of the 58,053 observations utilized in this analysis. 
 
9
 Before choosing the fixed effects model, I compared the fixed effect models to random effects models, 
which account for the participant-specific component of the error term, but assume that term is uncorrelated 
with model covariates. Formal Hausman tests comparing the fixed and random effects models were 
statistically significant, suggesting it is inappropriate to conclude that the beta coefficients do not differ 
between the models. Results of the fixed and random effects comparisons is provided in Table 3.3. 
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at least one observation; almost 18% of sample members were unemployed, and nearly 
25% were out of the labor force in at least one other observation. Table 3.4 provides 
describes changes in smoking and employment status between participant observations. 
In each wave, between 3-4% of respondents indicated they had quit smoking since their 
last observation, and 2-3% indicated they had initiated or returned to smoking since last 
surveyed. Between 11-20% of participants changed employment status between 
observations. Sizeable portions of respondents experienced job loss (range: 22-29%), 
including involuntary job loss (range: 5-10%), in the two years prior to survey.  
Even with this variation, however, the power of the fixed effect model to control 
for unobserved individual characteristics can also be a weakness, as it may unnecessarily 
control for characteristics unrelated to the independent and dependent variables, limiting 
the amount of variation used in the model to levels that may be too extreme to allow 
detection of actual effects. To respond to this potential, I discuss all results that have a 
probability of differing from zero in 90%, rather than the more traditional 95% of cases, 
though distinguish these more marginally significant effects in the tables and text.
10
 
While fixed effects linear regression models work well for continuous outcomes, 
like numbers of cigarettes smoked, inclusion of fixed effects in logistic regression, as 
appropriate for modeling dichotomous outcomes like smoking status, poses challenges. In 
fixed effect logistic regression models, individuals with no observed smoking status 
                                                          
10
 I also considered the use of wave-specific propensity scores that would capture the conditional 
probability of experiencing an employment change between two waves, given a set of observed covariates. 
In theory this score could be used to create a matched sample of “treated” and “untreated” individuals with 
similar propensity scores, or to weight observations to allow individuals with more common propensities to 
contribute more to the estimate than those with outlying propensity scores. To use this technique, however, 
I would have had to limit the sample to consecutive observations, eliminating 23% of my observations. In 
addition, my paper investigates transitions both to unemployment and to labor force departure. The 
variables to predict such changes likely vary, and I was unable to identify regression models that accounted 
for more than 5% of the variation in employment status changes.  
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variation drop out, creating smaller and possibly problematically selected samples. As an 
alternative, and to facilitate comparison across models, I use fixed effect linear 
probability models, which use linear regression approaches to model smoking probability 
as a continuous variable.
11
  
The econometric specification for both smoking status and intensity models is: 
Sit = α0  + Empit β 1 + Xit β 2 + Yt β 3 + μiα1 + εit 
where Sit is the probability of being a smoker or the continuous measure of 
smoking intensity, for individual i at time t; Empit is a categorical indicator of current 
employment status, for individual i at time t; Xit is a vector of individual or household 
characteristics including age, partnership status, and state unemployment rate; Yt is a 
vector of observation year indicators; μi is a vector of time-invariant, unobserved personal 
characteristics; and εit is an error term. Because the PSID samples the same households 
and individuals over time, observations may be correlated within individuals over time; 
all models employ cluster-robust standard errors to help limit bias in standard errors. 
By modeling employment status using an individual fixed effects approach, 
estimates are identified based on changes in employment status within individuals, and 
thus capture the influence of participant changes in employment on smoking. Beta 
coefficients from regression models compare the probability or intensity of smoking 
when an individual is in the relevant employment category (i.e., unemployed or not in the 
labor force) to when an individual is in the omitted category (working), averaged across 
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 Two potential problems with linear probability models are heteroskedastic errors and predicted values 
that are smaller than zero or greater than one, and therefore outside the possible range for a probability 
score. Cluster-robust standard errors help adjust for heteroskedasticity. In my models, out-of-range 
predictions occur in 14% of cases in the basic model of employment status and smoking status. While this 
is non-neglible, the range of predictions (-0.2 -- 1.009) is not large, suggesting that even those predictions 
that are outside the expected range are not extremely outside.  
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participants. Following the main models, I conduct Wald tests to additionally compare 
the difference in smoking behaviors during unemployment vs. non-labor force 
participation. 
Additional analyses: In order to capture the influence of recent job history on 
smoking behavior changes, I incorporate measures of unemployment duration and job 
loss experience in additional models. In separate models, I interact indicators of 1) any 
job loss and 2) involuntary job loss with different employment conditions to determine 
whether the relationship between employment change and smoking is affected by a recent 
job loss experience. Additionally, I test the potential impact of unemployment duration 
on the smoking behaviors of the unemployed, using an analytic sample restricted to those 
who are unemployed at the time of survey. Table 3.1 provides descriptive statistics of this 
sub-sample. 
To ascertain whether gender, household income, or household wealth conditions 
associations between employment and smoking, I examine several other models that use 
interaction terms. Specifically, the employment variables are interacted with variables 
measuring gender, household income, or household wealth in separate models. Results 
tables present the beta coefficients from these models; in the text, I also report the 
marginal effects of unemployment and labor force departure for distinct groups. Marginal 
effects are calculated through a linear combination of coefficients on the employment 
status and interaction terms, for an identified gender group, or level of household income 
or wealth. 
All analyses are conducted using panel regression techniques and the lincom post-
estimation command in STATA 11 (Statacorp, College Station, Tex). 
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IV. Results 
A. Differences in Participants by Employment Status 
In addition to information about the full analytic sample, Table 3.1 provides 
descriptive statistics for those individuals who were either unemployed or out of the labor 
force in at least one wave. Bivariate comparisons of the sub-samples through t-tests 
indicate that employment conditions are significantly associated with smoking; compared 
to all others, people who experienced either unemployment or time outside the labor 
force had higher smoking rates. These same groups were also less likely to be White, and 
had lower levels of education, income and wealth, and were more likely to have 
experienced job losses, compared to other sample members. In addition, people who had 
been unemployed were less likely to cohabitate with a partner, and people who spent time 
outside the labor force were more likely to be female.  
B. Employment Status, Job Loss and Smoking 
Analyses of fixed effect linear probability and regression models also indicate that 
employment conditions are significantly associated with some measures of smoking, 
though not always in the same manner as predicted by the bivariate associations (Table 
3.5, Model 1). In particular, individuals are less likely to smoke, and smoke fewer 
cigarettes when they do smoke, when they are not members of the labor force, compared 
to when they are working. Specifically, the probability of smoking decreases by 1.7 
percentage points and daily smoking declines by 0.79 cigarettes, on average, when 
individuals leave work and the labor market altogether. On the other hand, the probability 
of smoking increases by 1.2 percentage points when an individual is unemployed, 
compared to when he or she is working, though this effect is only marginally significant 
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(p=0.05). No significant impact on smoking intensity is observed when comparing 
unemployed and employed statuses (b=0.29, p=0.21). Wald tests comparing the 
coefficients on the unemployed and not in the labor force terms suggest that individuals 
are more likely to smoke, and smoke more, when they are unemployed compared to when 
they are not in the labor force (F=16.57, p=0.00 for status; F=12.84, p=0.00 for intensity).  
Two additional models assess whether a recent job loss experience influences the 
relationships among employment status categories and smoking (Table 3.5, Models 2 & 
3). For individuals who are unemployed or not in the labor force, job loss interaction 
terms are insignificant, regardless of whether any job loss (Model 2) or involuntary job 
loss (Model 3) is considered.
12
 On the other hand, for individuals who are currently 
working, having experienced a recent job loss does appear to influence some smoking 
behavior. Specifically, for current workers, the probability of smoking is 0.8 percentage 
points higher when work was recently lost, compared to when it was not, although this 
difference is not statistically significant when narrowing the job loss experience to 
involuntary losses (b=0.008, p=0.23). Recent job loss experience also increased smoking 
intensity among the employed. For working individuals, experiencing a recent job loss of 
any kind is associated with smoking 0.27 more cigarettes per day (p=0.09), and 
experiencing a recent involuntary job loss is associated with smoking 0.51 more 
cigarettes per day (p=0.04), compared to working with recent employment histories that 
did not include such losses. 
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 In more than 80% of observations, people who are unemployed experienced some form of job loss in the 
previous two years. The main unemployment term in this model measures the effect of unemployment for 
individuals who did not lose work recently. The lack of statistical significance likely reflects the small 
sample of people who fit in this category. The linear combination of the unemployment terms and any job 
loss interaction (in Model 2) is statistically significant, which seems to confirm the marginally significant 
findings from Model 1. 
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Sub-analyses of employment history among the unemployed indicated that the 
length of unemployment did not significantly impact smoking behaviors. In results not 
shown, the number of months an unemployed person had spent out of work was not 
associated with changes in smoking probability (b=0.00, p=0.86) or intensity (b=0.00, 
p=0.88).
13
  
C. Gender Differences 
Table 3.6 presents the results of analyses of smoking status and intensity models 
that add a term interacting employment status with gender. While interaction terms are 
insignificant, the signs on the interaction terms indicate that predicted marginal effects 
for women are higher than those predicted for men, and predicted effects for women 
achieve statistical significance, whereas those for men do not. Specifically, women’s 
probability for smoking increases by a marginally significant 1.3 percentage points 
(p=0.10) during unemployment and decreases by a statistically significant 2.0 percentage 
points (p=0.00) when she leaves the labor force, as measured by t-tests on the linear 
combination of employment categories and associated interaction terms.  
D. Differences Based on Household Income or Wealth 
Results of models that incorporate measures of household income and wealth are 
presented in Table 3.7. No interaction terms are statistically significant in these models, 
with one exception. Higher levels of wealth appear to offset the protective effect that 
leaving the labor force exerts on smoking status and intensity. Whereas an individual 
with a relatively low level of accumulated wealth ($5,000) would decrease his or her 
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 Only 550 individuals were unemployed in multiple observations, suggesting that a fixed effects model 
might not have sufficient power to detect actual effects. Futhermore, variation in length of unemployment 
between unemployed individuals was greater than variation between (standard error (between)= 8.2; 
standard error (within) = 5.1).However, neither OLS nor random effects models indicated any significant 
associations between length of unemployment and smoking behavior among the unemployed. 
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smoking probability by 2.4% by leaving the labor market, the smoking probability of an 
individual with more wealth ($200,000) would decrease by 1.3% from the same 
employment change. Lower wealth smokers making this same shift smoke 0.6 fewer 
cigarettes per day, on average whereas higher wealth smokers would not significantly 
decrease their smoking.
14
  On the other hand, smoking responses from transitions 
between work and unemployment do not change as income and wealth incrementally 
increase, and income does not appear to impact smoking when people leave the labor 
force.  
V. Discussion 
The results presented here indicate that when individuals stop working, their 
smoking behaviors change. In these analyses, however, whether smoking increases or 
decreases following an employment transition depends on whether former workers leave 
the labor market altogether. People appear more likely to smoke when they are 
unemployed and actively searching for work than when they are working, although 
intensity of smoking among smokers does not change with this transition. When people 
retire, go to school, or otherwise exit the labor market, they are less likely to smoke 
altogether, and smoke fewer cigarettes even when they continue to smoke. 
Although employment may alleviate some smoking-related pressures, work may 
also pose some smoking risks. In this sample, working participants had significantly 
higher income levels than all others; strong differences in smoking behavior between 
workers and those outside the labor market could reflect increased purchasing power 
among the employed. Additionally, if poor working conditions, long hours and little job 
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 The two wealth figures used for comparison represent the 25% and 75% levels of the wealth distribution. 
The marginal effect is a linear combination of the bnilf + bnilf*wealth*ln(W). For high wealth smokers the 
marginal effect on smoking intensity is 0.13, p=0.70. 
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autonomy trigger smoking coping responses, as some research predicts (Clumeck et al., 
2009; Virtanen et al., 2011) departure from employment may alleviate these pressures. 
For those who need to find more work, however, the anxiety surrounding the job search 
process may overwhelm these effects, causing upticks, rather than declines, in smoking 
likelihood.  
While other previous studies suggest being unemployed is a risk factor for 
smoking (Falba et al., 2005; Montgomery et al., 1998), two previous explorations of labor 
market departure found that such movement also enhanced smoking, rather than 
decreased it, as was found here. Differing results could be due to alternative methods and 
samples. Weden and colleagues (2006) used hazard models to assess quitting behavior 
among smokers from the NLSY. Although hazard model estimates may be resistant to 
endogeneity bias, aspects of the sample could influence results. Because an age-based 
cohort was used, individuals in the sample grew up and joined the workforce at similar 
times, and therefore may have shared experiences with smoking norms at home and at 
work. In the PSID sample, participants are not limited by birth year; in each wave, most 
participants were between 20 and 69 years old. As a collective, they were exposed to a 
much wider variety of norms and trends related to smoking than the NLSY participants, 
and may better represent the current working population. In addition, because the sample 
used by Weden and colleagues was restricted to smokers, that analysis fails to consider 
smoking initiation or relapse.  
The other study that found increased smoking following labor market departure is 
based on cross-sectional data from California in 2007 and 2009 (Prochaska et al., 2013). 
Because this period spans the recent recession, discouraged workers, whose stress and 
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income-related risk factors might most resemble the unemployed, may have made up a 
larger proportion of those outside of the labor force than in other years. California’s 
population also differs from much of the rest of the country in terms of race, ethnicity and 
nativity status (U.S. Census Bureau, 2013), so it may be difficult to extrapolate results 
found there elsewhere. More research specifically focused on transitions out of the labor 
force are needed to both confirm influences on poor health, and identify the pathways 
that underpin these relationships. 
My results also suggest that for people who have become unemployed or who 
have left the labor market, the circumstances that surround that transition, including 
whether a job loss was recent or involuntary, are less important than the transition itself. 
For these groups, current relationship to the labor force may be a better predictor of 
smoking behavior than recent work history. These results, however, likely need to be 
interpreted with caution, as they may reflect limited variability in the sample, rather than 
true null effects. In each wave, only 3-9% of the sample reported being unemployed, and 
of those, about 80% had experienced some form of job loss in the past two years, and 
between one third and one half had experienced an involuntary job loss. While slightly 
higher percentages of people reported being outside the labor force during any wave 
(range=7-13%), only half had experienced any form of recent job loss, and fewer than 
10% had experienced a recent involuntary job loss in each wave. It’s possible that the cell 
sizes for unique unemployment status-job loss history groups were too small to capture 
effects. Similarly, analyses examining length of unemployment among the unemployed 
may reflect limited variation within individuals in a fixed effects model,
 
rather than null 
effects. 
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On the other hand, there is some evidence that a recent job loss does enhance 
some smoking behaviors among those who subsequently resume working. This suggests 
that spells of unemployment could have lingering impacts on the health of workers, even 
after they have returned to work. This is partially consistent with another study of PSID 
respondents which found that re-employed workers who had experienced job loss 
reported more problematic health conditions (e.g. stroke, diabetes, heart disease), 
although this result is limited to individuals who experienced “no fault” job loss through 
a plant closure or similar event (Strully, 2009). Re-employed workers who had been laid 
off, fired, or voluntarily separated did not face more health risks than their continuously 
employed peers. The smoking models presented here suggest that any job loss experience 
may increase smoking likelihood following re-employment, though effects are only 
marginally significant when restricted to involuntary losses. Effects on smoking may be 
more observable than effects on health conditions, both because smoking is more rapidly 
modifiable, and because it is a coping behavior that could serve as an immediate response 
to the stresses of movement in and out of work. 
Despite the fact that women were less likely to participate in the labor force than 
men, the smoking effects of employment transitions did not differ by gender in this 
sample. Although not statistically significant, coefficient signs on female interaction 
terms matched those of main effects, implying that if any gender-based differences exist, 
smoking responses may be stronger, not weaker, among women compared to men. One 
previous study has similarly documented stronger smoking responses to employment 
changes for women (Weden et al., 2006). Traditionally women’s lower rates of labor 
force participation have caused them to be considered less “attached” to the labor force, 
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and therefore less susceptible to labor market forces. In an examination in trends of 
women’s labor force participation over the last century, however, Goldin (2006) argues 
that recent decades mark a “revolution” in women’s labor force participation, as women 
have begun viewing work as a long-term endeavor on which their sense of self depends. 
She suggests that exits from employment or the labor force now impact women 
financially and psychosocially in the same way that such transitions impact men. The 
results presented here lend support to the proposition that women’s health behaviors are 
just as sensitive to employment changes as those of men, and underscore the need to 
include women in health-related labor market studies.  
Whereas higher levels of income do not appear to influence the smoking benefits 
of leaving the labor market, higher wealth levels do. Specifically, higher levels of wealth 
offset the reduction in smoking behavior experienced on average. Although for any 
individual the size of the differences was relatively small (1 percentage point difference 
in smoking probability, 0.6 cigarettes difference in number smoked), the significance of 
the effect may shed insight on the mechanisms underpinning observed relationships. 
Research indicates that smoking is inversely associated with wealth, such that smokers 
have less accumulated wealth than non-smokers (Zagorsky, 2004). Among wealthy 
smokers, however, accumulated assets could neutralize financial pressures to reduce 
smoking due to income losses from labor market departure.  
 Neither household wealth nor income altered smoking responses to 
unemployment. It is possible that psychosocial stressors associated with job searching 
generate a smoking response, even when financial resources may minimize financial 
strain from being unemployed. However, caution is likely required when drawing any 
 79 
 
conclusions from these null findings, especially in light of the analytic approach used 
here. In general, wealth and income vary extensively within, as well as between, 
individuals in the analytic sample. Among those who report being unemployed, however, 
these variables vary much more between participants than within participants across 
waves,
15
 so the variation used to generate the effects on the interaction terms is limited.  
A. Strength and Limitations 
Different from most previous examinations of the relationship between 
employment conditions and smoking, this study employed nationally representative data, 
unrestricted by age, gender or geographic area. Data on smoking and employment status 
were gathered from participants in at least two, and up to six, different time periods. As a 
result, I was able to examine changes in behavior and work within individuals in 
regression analyses, thereby controlling for unobserved characteristics, like risk-taking 
proclivity, that might jointly predict labor market participation and smoking. While this 
approach decreased the variation used to generate effect estimates, resulting in relatively 
large standard errors, and at times, only marginally significant effects, it should have 
decreased the bias in coefficients that would be produced from ordinary least squares 
(OLS) analysis that characterizes some previous research on this topic. Moreover, 
different from other approaches that only examine exogenously determined job loss 
through plant closures, this analysis is generalizable to other, more common forms of 
employment transition, including layoff and voluntary departure. 
In addition, this analysis explicitly distinguished between transitioning to 
unemployment or leaving the labor force altogether. My results suggest a different 
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 Specifically, for the full sample, standard errors for between and within variation, respectively, are 8.8 
and 7.1 for income 85.8 and 83.3 for wealth. Among the unemployed, between and within standard errors 
are 6.3 and 1.1 for income and 34.7 and 15.3 for wealth. 
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pattern than has been observed in other research, specifically identifying a protective 
influence of labor market departure on smoking behaviors. The two studies that instead 
document increased smoking following labor market departure employ different methods 
and are based on different analytical specifications and assumptions. The contradictory 
results demonstrated here suggest that previous conclusions about the risks associated 
with being out of the labor market are subject to debate, especially in the current context. 
One limitation of the PSID data is that smoking is only measured every two years. 
While detailed information about different jobs in the period between interviews can be 
used to construct more comprehensive work histories, the data provide no information 
about the number or timing of smoking behavior modifications between waves. Research 
suggests that up to one third of current or former smokers have made more than three quit 
attempts during their smoking tenure (John, Meyer, Hapke, Rumpf, & Schumann, 2004; 
Larabie, 2005); it seems possible that individual smoking status and intensity could shift 
more than once between observations. When smoking status does differ across waves, I 
am unable to determine when initiation, relapse or quitting occurred, so I cannot 
determine with precision whether the employment shift preceded the smoking shift. 
Longitudinal data that better tracks changes in smoking and employment may be needed 
to further test the relationships explored here. 
In addition, the PSID data prevent me from investigating other important 
information about employment history. Although I attempted to explore some influence 
of events that preceded an employment shift, I was not able to specifically consider 
whether participant responsibility for movement out of work influenced relationships. 
The PSID involuntary job loss categories fail to distinguish between job losses from 
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layoffs, and job loss due to firing, when employee behavior, including smoking, might be 
partially responsible for the employment shift. Although the PSID isolates “no fault” job 
losses from plant closures, few people in the analytic sample experienced this type of job 
loss, limiting the power of fixed effects models to uncover relationships. If individuals 
respond differently to an involuntary employment status change based on their perception 
of their own responsibility for that shock, those results will likely be masked here.  
The PSID also includes no information about job insecurity. Anxiety is common 
among workers who feel insecure about their current employment (Burgard, Kalousova, 
& Seefeldt, 2012; László et al., 2010). If people can accurately assess their job risks, they 
may correctly anticipate a shift to unemployment before it happens, and initiate behavior 
changes in advance of the actual transition. Because insecure workers are grouped with 
other employed participants in these analyses, any smoking responses they make in 
advance of changing employment status could serve to decrease observed effects. Other 
data may be required to determine whether insecurity about employment triggers 
smoking behaviors in advance of employment changes. 
B. Policy Implications 
According to these analyses, labor market participation increases smoking risks, 
both for those who are working, and those who are looking for work. Smoking prevention 
efforts, therefore, may need to target both the employed and the unemployed. For the 
employed, workplace smoking prevention programs, including smoke-free policies, 
incentives, and supportive programs have been shown to effectively decrease smoking 
and enhance quit attempts (Ham et al., 2011; Hopkins et al., 2010; Leeks et al., 2010). 
Such programs may be most successful in limiting uptake or increases in smoking 
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intensity if they target new employees, especially those joining or re-joining the labor 
force.  
Health promotion initiatives outside of the workforce should attend to the specific 
smoking-related needs of the unemployed. The effectiveness of community or healthcare-
based smoking cessation efforts among displaced workers is under-studied; one Danish 
study found that generalized programs did not serve unemployed smokers as well as it 
did others (Neumann, Rasmussen, Ghith, Heitmann, & Tonnesen, 2012). Integration of 
employment support and assistance into smoking prevention programs, or the tailoring of 
prevention efforts specifically to individuals who are looking for work could improve 
outcomes for this at-risk group. 
Policymakers may want to incorporate the findings of this study into current 
discussion of strategies to support people out of work. During and after the Great 
Recession, many states extended unemployment benefits from 26 weeks to as many as 99 
weeks, invoking discussion about the ramifications of such extensions for the labor 
market and individual recipients (Howell & Azizoglu, 2011). One study found decreased 
rates of risky health behaviors among re-employed workers who had received 
unemployment benefits during their unemployment (Bolton & Rodriguez, 2009). The 
debate about benefits extension could be improved by considering health outcomes 
during the cost and benefit analyses of these policies. Furthermore, if unemployment 
assistance programs could be paired with tobacco cessation programs or materials, public 
policies designed to support individuals financially during unemployment spells could 
help protect the health of the unemployed as well.  
C. Conclusion 
 83 
 
Although actively seeking work when not employed is associated with a greater 
likelihood of smoking, employment itself is not without smoking risks. Individuals are 
more likely to smoke, and smoke with greater intensity, when they participate in the 
labor force than when they leave it. These results hold for both men and women, and 
regardless of household income levels, though high levels of household wealth do 
attenuate some of these effects. By understanding and acting on these results, employers, 
policymakers and public health professionals can all contribute to national efforts to 
curtail smoking rates. 
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Table 3.1: Demographic characteristics of sample participants 
  
n % /Mean n % /Mean n % /Mean 
Smoking Experience (1999-2009)
Continuous non-smoker 8575 68.1% 1185 47.1% ** 2007 64.6% **
Continuous smoker 1822 14.5% 514 28.7% ** 477 15.4% **
Periodic smoker 2200 17.5% 542 24.2% ** 622 20.0% **
# cigarettes smoked per day
a
4022 9.6 1056 9.6 * 1099 9.6 *
Gender
Male 6235 49.5% 1106 49.4% 989 31.8% **
Female 6362 50.5% 1135 50.6% 2117 68.2% **
Age 12597 40.8 2241 38.1 3106 42.8 **
Race
White 7422 58.9% 928 41.6% ** 1754 56.5% **
Black 3765 29.9% 1039 46.6% ** 956 30.8%
Hispanic 1064 8.4% 223 10.0% ** 318 10.2% **
Other 296 2.3% 42 1.9% 71 2.3% *
Missing 50 0.4% 9 0.4% 7 0.2%
Completed education
Less than HS 1234 9.8% 407 18.7% ** 420 13.5% **
HS graduate 4606 36.6% 984 45.2% ** 1188 38.2% *
Some college 3316 26.3% 512 23.5% ** 808 26.0%
College graduate 3047 24.2% 272 12.5% ** 588 18.9% **
Missing 394 3.1% 66 2.9% 102 3.3%
Partnership Status
Cohabitating at least once 10408 82.6% 1632 72.8% ** 2594 83.5%
No cohabitation 2189 17.4% 609 27.2% ** 512 16.5%
Household Resources
Total family income
b
12597 8.59 2241 5.48 ** 3106 7.47 **
Total family wealth
b
12597 26.14 2241 10.09 ** 3106 30.12 **
Job Loss Experience  (1999-2009)
No reported losses 4657 37.0% 116 5.2% ** 225 7.2% **
At least one job loss 7941 63.0% 2125 94.8% ** 2881 92.8% **
At leave one invol. job loss 2972 23.6% 1375 61.4% ** 853 27.5% **
Notes: Income and wealth are adjusted for inflation and measured in tens of thousands of 1999 
dollars. Asterisks indicate statistical significance mean differences (weighted across samples for 
time-varying variables) between sample members who were and were not in an employment 
category. In wave-specific t-tests: a) smokers who experienced unemployment smoked fewer 
cigarettes in 1999, and more cigarettes in 2009, compared to never unemployed smokers; smokers 
who left the labor market smoked less in 2009 than smokers who had not; b) people who were 
unemployed in at least one wave had consistently lower levels of income and wealth than those 
who were never unemployed; people who were ever outside of the labor force had lower income 
levels, compared to those in the labor force, in all waves, but had higher wealth in 2001, 2003, 2007 
& 2009. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Full Sample 
(n=12,597)
Unemployed at 
least once 
(n=2241)
Not in the labor 
force at least once 
(n=3106)
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Table 3.2: Wave-specific individual analytic samples 
 
Eligible 
participant 
in previous 
wave
New eligible 
participants 
this wave
Total 
eligible 
this wave
Loss to 
Follow-
Up
(% of 
Total 
Eligible)
Missing 
Smoking or 
Employment 
Data this 
wave
(% of 
Total 
Eligible)
Wave 
Analytic 
Sample
(% of 
Total 
Analytic 
Sample)
1999 --- 8161 8161 0 (0.0%) 66 (0.8%) 8095 (64.3%)
2001 8161 1202 9363 187 (2.0%) 147 (1.6%) 9029 (71.7%)
2003 9363 1008 10371 540 (5.2%) 130 (1.3%) 9701 (77.0%)
2005 10371 1125 11496 1115 (9.7%) 118 (1.0%) 10263 (81.5%)
2007 11496 1106 12602 1696 (13.5%) 120 (1.0%) 10786 (85.6%)
2009 12602 0 12602 2139 (17.0%) 284 (2.3%) 10179 (80.8%)
Tot. Obs. 58053 ---
Tot. Indiv. --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 12597 (100.0%)
Note: To be eligible, participants must have been employed at least once between 1999-2009,  must have worked 
within five years of each observation, and must have been observed at least twice.
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Table 3.3: Comparison of fixed and random effects models of employment status and smoking 
 
 
b b
1. Smoking Status
Working --- --- --- --- --- ---
Unemployed 0.0116 † (0.000 , 0.023) 0.0221 ** (0.011 , 0.034)
Not in the labor force -0.0179 ** -(0.027 -, 0.009) -0.0116 * -(0.021 -, 0.003)
2. Smoking Intensity
Working --- --- --- --- --- ---
Unemployed 0.2850 -(0.165 , 0.735) 0.5195 * (0.087 , 0.952)
Not in the labor force -0.7868 ** -(1.257 -, 0.316) -0.7044 ** -(1.149 -, 0.260)
Notes: b=beta coefficient; CI=confidence interval; asterisks denote significance of t-tests on 
beta coefficients. All models control for respondent age (linear and quadratic), and partnership 
status, as well as the three month unemployment rate in the state in which the participant 
resided and year fixed effects. Fixed effects models further control for time-invariant participant 
characteristics; random effects models control for participant race, gender, educational level 
and state of residence at survey time. Both fixed and random effects models adjust standard 
errors to account for repeated observations of participants. The Hausman tests comparing the 
fixed and random effects models of smoking status (Χ2=471.70) and intensity (Χ2=29.04) were 
statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Because Hausman tests are not permitted on models 
with robust standard errors, they were conducted on the above models without the error 
correction (all beta coefficients are the same). * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
A. Fixed Effects B. Random Effects
CI CI
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Table 3.4: Changes in smoking and key risk factors over time 
 
  
n %/Mean n %/Mean n %/Mean n %/Mean n %/Mean n %/Mean 
Smoking status & history
Non-smoker 6254 77.3% 6960 77.1% 7460 76.9% 7954 77.5% 8471 78.5% 8132 79.9%
Quit since last observation --- --- 288 3.2% 311 3.2% 360 3.5% 440 4.1% 427 4.2%
Smoker 1841 22.7% 2069 22.9% 2241 23.1% 2309 22.5% 2316 21.5% 2048 20.1%
Initiated/relapsed since last observation --- --- 233 2.6% 293 3.0% 262 2.6% 301 2.8% 321 3.2%
Avg # cigs per day --- 11.9 --- 11.2 --- 10.6 --- 9.6 --- 8.9 --- 7.1
Employment status & history
Employed 7193 88.9% 7922 87.7% 8508 87.7% 9045 88.1% 9255 85.8% 8064 79.2%
Unemployed in last observation --- --- 155 1.7% 238 2.5% 360 3.5% 259 2.4% 275 2.7%
Not in the labor force in last observation --- --- 304 3.4% 366 3.8% 374 3.6% 363 3.4% 300 2.9%
Experienced any job loss in last two years 1135 14.0% 1292 14.3% 1543 15.9% 1686 16.4% 2173 20.1% 1458 14.3%
Experienced invol. job loss in last two years 200 2.5% 234 2.6% 361 3.7% 350 3.4% 451 4.2% 405 4.0%
Unemployed 276 3.4% 384 4.3% 527 5.4% 426 4.2% 519 4.8% 838 8.2%
Working in last observation --- --- 186 2.1% 295 3.0% 238 2.3% 297 2.8% 637 6.3%
Not in the labor force in last observation --- --- 38 0.4% 57 0.6% 36 0.4% 53 0.5% 78 0.8%
Experienced any job loss in last two years 218 2.7% 297 3.3% 438 4.5% 343 3.3% 429 4.0% 666 6.5%
Experienced invol. job loss in last two years 105 1.3% 159 1.8% 239 2.5% 160 1.6% 210 1.9% 442 4.3%
Not in the labor force 626 7.7% 723 8.0% 666 6.9% 792 7.7% 1013 9.4% 1278 12.6%
Working in last observation --- --- 297 3.3% 313 3.2% 427 4.2% 583 5.4% 643 6.3%
Unemployed in last observation --- --- 36 0.4% 42 0.4% 59 0.6% 59 0.5% 67 0.7%
Experienced any job loss in last two years 310 3.8% 358 4.0% 345 3.6% 440 4.3% 475 4.4% 495 4.9%
Experienced invol. job loss in last two years 65 0.8% 59 0.7% 65 0.7% 65 0.6% 72 0.7% 122 1.2%
Employment changes and job loss 
Any change in employ. status since last obs. --- --- 1016 11.3% 1311 13.5% 1494 14.6% 1614 15.0% 2000 19.6%
Any job loss since last observation --- --- 1947 21.6% 2326 24.0% 2469 24.1% 3077 28.5% 2619 25.7%
Any involuntary job loss since last observation --- --- 452 5.0% 665 6.9% 575 5.6% 733 6.8% 969 9.5%
2009     
(n=10,179)
1999     
(n=8,095)
2001      
(n=9,029)
2003     
(n=9,701)
2005     
(n=10,263)
2007      
(n=10,786)
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Table 3.5: Associations of employment status and job loss experience with smoking status and intensity 
 
b b
Model 1: Employment Status 
Employment Status
Working (ref) --- --- --- --- --- ---
Unemployed 0.0116 † (0.000 , 0.023) 0.2850 -(0.165 , 0.735)
Not in the labor force -0.0179 ** -(0.027 -, 0.009) -0.7868 ** -(1.257 -, 0.316)
Model 2: Impact of Any  Recent Job Loss 
Employment Status & Job Loss Interaction 
Working (ref) --- --- --- --- --- ---
Interaction (working & any job loss) 0.0078 * (0.002 , 0.014) 0.2686 † -(0.045 , 0.582)
Unemployed 0.0133 -(0.013 , 0.040) 0.4146 -(0.625 , 1.454)
Interaction (unemployed & any job loss) 0.0008 -(0.028 , 0.029) -0.0504 -(1.129 , 1.028)
Not in the labor force -0.0112 † -(0.023 , 0.001) -0.6814 * -(1.341 -, 0.022)
Interaction (not in labor force & any job loss) -0.0099 -(0.025 , 0.005) -0.0691 -(0.822 , 0.684)
Model 3: Impact of Recent Involuntary  Job Loss 
Employment Status & Job Loss Interaction 
Working (ref) --- --- --- --- --- ---
Interaction (working & invol. job loss) 0.0075 -(0.005 , 0.020) 0.5064 * (0.013 , 1.000)
Unemployed 0.0136 † -(0.002 , 0.029) 0.4832 -(0.105 , 1.072)
Interaction (unemployed & invol. job loss) -0.0030 -(0.024 , 0.018) -0.3177 -(1.096 , 0.460)
Not in the labor force -0.0179 ** -(0.027 -, 0.008) -0.7584 ** -(1.256 -, 0.261)
Interaction (not in labor force & invol. job loss) 0.0030 -(0.024 , 0.030) 0.1053 -(1.095 , 1.305)
A. Smoking Status B. Smoking Intensity
CI CI
Notes: b=beta coefficient; CI=confidence interval. Analyses employ linear probability models of smoking status and 
linear regression models of smoking intensity, with standard errors adjusted to account for repeated observations on 
participants. All models control for respondent age (linear and quadratic), and partnership status, as well as the three 
month unemployment rate in the state in which the participant resided, year and participant fixed effects. Smoking 
status models are based on 58,053 observations from 12,597 people. Smoking intensity models use the number of 
cigarettes smoked as the outcome variable, are limited to those participants who report smoking at some point in the 
analysis period, and are based on 17557 observations from 4017 people. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
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Table 3.6: Gender differences in associations of employment status with smoking 
 
  
b b
Employment Status
Working --- --- --- --- --- ---
Unemployed 0.0104 -(0.008 , 0.029) 0.2819 -(0.384 , 0.948)
Interaction (unemployed & female) 0.0023 -(0.021 , 0.026) 0.0067 -(0.871 , 0.884)
Not in the labor force -0.0134 -(0.030 , 0.003) -0.7442 † -(1.598 , 0.109)
Interaction (not in the labor force & female) -0.0065 -(0.026 , 0.013) -0.0669 -(1.073 , 0.939)
CI CI
Notes: b=beta coefficient; CI=confidence interval. Analyses employ linear probability models of smoking status and linear 
regression models of smoking intensity, controlling for respondent age (linear and quadratic), and partnership status, as 
well as the three month unemployment rate in the state in which the participant resided, year and participant fixed effects, 
with standard errors adjusted to account for repeated observations on participants. Smoking status models are based on 
58,053 observations from 12,597 people. Smoking intensity models are based on 17557 observations from 4017 people who 
smoked during at least one observation. The beta coefficient on the uninteracted employment status terms reflect the 
marginal effect for moving from work to a particular category for men; a similar effect for women is measured as the linear 
combination of the uninteracted and interacted employment terms. Although interaction terms are insignificant, the 
marginal effect of leaving the labor force is statistically significant for women's smoking status at the p=0.01 level, and 
marginally significant for smoking status at the p=0.10 level. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, **p<0.01
A. Smoking Status B. Smoking Intensity 
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Table 3.7: Associations of employment status with smoking behavior by income and wealth 
b b
Model 1: Income interaction
Employment Status
Working --- --- --- --- --- ---
Interaction (working & income) -0.0018 -(0.007 , 0.003) 0.0103 -(0.173 , 0.194)
Unemployed 0.0107 -(0.004 , 0.026) 0.3215 -(0.162 , 0.805)
Interaction (unemployed & income) -0.0012 -(0.008 , 0.005) -0.0092 -(0.178 , 0.160)
Not in the labor force -0.0183 * -(0.033 -, 0.003) -0.6347 * -(1.213 -, 0.057)
Interaction (not in the labor force & income) -0.0018 -(0.007 , 0.004) -0.1249 -(0.385 , 0.135)
Model 2: Wealth interaction 
Employment Status
Working --- --- ---
Interaction (working & wealth) -0.0005 -(0.002 , 0.001) -0.0361 -(0.106 , 0.033)
Unemployed 0.0061 -(0.007 , 0.020) 0.4028 -(0.190 , 0.996)
Interaction (unemployed & wealth) -0.0004 -(0.004 , 0.003) 0.0576 -(0.051 , 0.167)
Not in the labor force -0.0219 ** -(0.033 -, 0.011) -0.5439 * -(1.085 -, 0.003)
Interaction (not in the labor force & wealth) 0.0030 * (0.000 , 0.006) 0.1380 * (0.026 , 0.250)
A. Smoking Status B. Smoking Intensity 
CI CI
Notes: b=beta coefficient; CI=confidence interval. Income and wealth are both initially measured in tens of 
thousands, adjusted for inflation to 1999 dollars, and logged to reduce skewness. Analyses employ linear probability 
models of smoking status and linear regression models of smoking intensity, controlling for respondent age (linear 
and quadratic), and partnership status, as well as the three month unemployment rate in the state in which the 
participant resided, year and participant fixed effects, with standard errors adjusted to account for repeated 
observations on participants. All models use the same analytic samples as those in Table 3.4, except that Model 2A is 
based in 50,772 observations from 12,120 people and model 2B is based on 14,784 observations from 3,849 people due 
to missing wealth data. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
  
 
CHAPTER 4: THE INFLUENCE OF ECONOMIC, POLITICAL AND EXTERNAL 
FACTORS ON STATE CIGARETTE TAXES 
 
I. Introduction 
Smoking prevalence has declined significantly in the last few decades, but in 
recent years, progress has stalled (CDC, 2011b; HHS, 2012). In 1997, nearly one in four 
adults, and more than one in three high school students, smoked at least one cigarette in 
the previous month. Although by 2007 rates for both groups dropped to about 20%, no 
declines have been observed for either adults or youth since (CDC, 2011b; CDC, 2012b). 
Without further progress, Healthy People 2020 goals for adult (12%) and youth (16%) 
smoking will not be met (HHS, Healthy People 2020, 2012). 
Cigarette excise taxes are considered one of the most effective strategies for 
reducing cigarette use because they are associated with decreased consumption and their 
revenues are sometimes used to fund tobacco control programs (CDC, 2000; CRTU, 
2007; National Cancer Institute, 2011). Although all states levy cigarette excise taxes, 
rates vary from a few cents to several dollars per pack (Orzechowski & Walker, 2011).  
In 2007, the Institute of Medicine recommended that states with excise taxes below those 
in the top quintile raise their rates to be consistent with the high tax states (CRTU, 2007). 
Unfortunately, little is known about what motivates changes in state excise tax 
levels, especially in recent years, making it difficult for public health advocates to 
efficiently target their efforts. Tobacco control professionals have suggested that 
economic contractions may drive states to raise cigarette taxes to generate revenue, 
noting spikes in the number of states passing hikes following the national recessions of 
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1981, 1990, and 2001 (CTFK, 2012b) Political scientists, however, argue that economic 
characteristics are only one of several factors that drive tobacco policy innovation 
(Studlar, 1999) Political factors, like legislative control, election cycles, and public 
opinions about potential or related policies, as well as pressures from neighboring states, 
may also be important policy predictors (F. S. Berry & Berry, 1992; Lowery, Gray, & 
Hager, 1989). Some previous research suggests that public support of tobacco control 
efforts, as well as actions of local and neighboring governments, influence the uptake of 
indoor air and tobacco sales restriction policies (Pacheco, 2012; Shipan & Volden, 2006). 
Whether economic circumstances, state politics, constituency beliefs, or regional 
pressures influence state cigarette excise tax rates, however, remains unclear. 
Moreover, the key determinants of cigarette taxes could be changing over time, as 
tobacco control funding and public opinion evolves. In particular, the 1998 Master 
Settlement Agreement (MSA) between tobacco manufacturers and 46 state attorneys 
general resulted in new allocations of tobacco control revenue, some of which was used 
to fund social marketing campaigns to change beliefs about smoking and the tobacco 
industry. In the more than ten years since the MSA, the public has increasingly identified 
smoking as hazardous to smokers and others, and the majority now support some form of 
tobacco control legislation (Pacheco, 2011). If these public sentiments extend to beliefs 
about cigarette excise taxes, political resistance to tax reform may diminish, especially if 
economic downturns produce state budget deficits. On the other hand, current anti-tax 
rhetoric could be applied to excise taxes, enhancing, rather than diminishing the 
importance of political circumstances in predicting excise tax rates.   
Cigarette excise taxes may be an invaluable resource for ensuring that smoking 
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reductions continue in the future, if they are levied at recommended levels. Yet many 
factors likely contribute to state decisions about appropriate tax rates. Better 
understanding of these factors is critical for the planning of future tobacco control 
programs and advocacy. Using annual data from all 50 states between 1980-2010, I 
explore the magnitude and strength of the associations between key economic, political, 
and regional characteristics and state cigarette excise tax levels. In addition, I examine 
whether the important predictors of cigarette tax rates have changed since the passage of 
the MSA. 
II. Background 
A. Cigarette Taxes as a Mechanism to Decrease Consumption 
Cigarette excise taxes are considered one of the most successful mechanisms for 
decreasing smoking prevalence (CRTU, 2007; HHS, 2012). In a perfectly competitive 
tobacco market, the full price of any levied tax would be passed on to the consumer 
through price increases. If, however, tobacco companies collude in setting prices, they 
could share some of the costs of the tax with the consumer, particularly if tobacco 
consumption is relatively sensitive to price adjustments. Although estimates of the exact 
impact differ, recent research generally finds that cigarette tax hikes result in 
disproportionately higher cigarette prices. In other words, prices actually rise by more 
than the tax increase amount (Chaloupka, Hu, Warner, van der Merwe, & Yurekli, 2000). 
In one study, for example, a one cent increase in state cigarette taxes was associated with 
a 1.11 cent increase in price (Keeler, Hu, Barnett, Manning, & Sung, 1996).  
In economics, the law of demand states that as the price for a particular product 
increases, consumer quantity demanded for that product will decrease. The addictive 
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nature of tobacco use could limit cigarette price elasticity, or consumer sensitivity to 
price changes. Theoretical work, however, suggests that people are likely to smoke less in 
the face of higher prices and higher taxes because they account for future benefits of 
reduced consumption in their decision-making (Becker, Grossman, & Murpy, 1991; 
Chaloupka, 1991). Recent analyses of cigarette price elasticity find that a one percent 
increase in the price of cigarettes is associated with a 0.4 percent decrease in cigarette 
demand (Gallet & List, 2003), with some evidence that the influence of price may be 
even stronger among individuals of low socioeconomic status (Townsend et al., 1994). 
Although relatively inelastic in conventional economics terms, these analyses suggest 
that consumers do respond, at least moderately, to changing cigarette prices.  
A growing body of literature examines the logical extension of these findings, 
documenting decreased tobacco consumption following cigarette excise tax increases. 
Cigarette tax increases have been associated with declines in smoking, both among youth 
(Chaloupka & Wechsler, 1997; Chaloupka et al., 2011; Levy et al., 2004) and the general 
population (Chaloupka, Hu, Warner, van der Merwe et al., 2000; Chaloupka et al., 2011; 
Hu, Sung, & Keeler, 1995; Levy et al., 2004).  In light of these studies and others, a 
recent panel of experts from 12 countries, assembled by the International Agency for 
Cancer Research, found sufficient evidence to conclude that increased tobacco prices and 
taxes are effective in reducing overall tobacco consumption by preventing initiation, 
increasing cessation and reducing consumption among current smokers (Chaloupka et al., 
2011).  
Most state and federal cigarette excise taxes are fixed rates that do not 
automatically adjust with inflation or changes in product price. Without regular increases 
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in cigarette tax rates, therefore, the real value of the excise tax will decrease over time 
relative to increased prices of other goods, potentially undercutting their role in smoking 
prevention. All states and the District of Columbia currently levy cigarette excise taxes, 
but tax levels vary by state. In 2011, New York’s $4.35 tax rate was more than 25 times 
higher than the $0.17 rate levied by Missouri (CDC, 2012) Research, however, has not 
sufficiently analyzed these differences and the potential factors contributing to 
geographic variation in excise tax rates. 
B. Factors Associated with Tobacco Policy Adoption and Diffusion 
Political scientists argue that state public policy adoption is driven by the 
economic or political circumstances within a state, pressures generated by the policy 
actions of other legislative bodies, or a combination of the two (F. S. Berry & Berry, 
1990; Lowery et al., 1989). Several key articles provide insight into the factors that are 
potentially important for cigarette excise tax policy. Berry & Berry (1992) developed a 
theoretical model of state tax policy adoption, using data on income taxes and gasoline 
taxes, in which they suggested five key factors that prompt state tax policy adoption. Two 
of these factors describe internal state economic conditions, two describe internal 
political conditions, and one describes regional political factors (F. S. Berry & Berry, 
1992). In addition, recent research finds that coercive political forces, citizen attitudes 
toward smoking, and economic competition from neighboring states are important 
contributors to the diffusion of non-tax tobacco control policies (Pacheco, 2012; Shipan 
& Volden, 2008), and therefore warrant consideration as determinants of cigarette excise 
taxes. 
Economic Factors: Berry & Berry (1992) argue that legislators consider both the 
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fiscal capacity and the revenue demands faced by a state when deciding whether to 
balance state budgets by limiting expenditures or raising taxes. States that are 
experiencing periods of economic development may have a large private resource base 
that can be leveraged through taxes, increasing the tax hike likelihood. On the other hand, 
economic crises might also stimulate tax policy, if short-term demand for state services 
increases at the same time that tax revenues stagnate or decline (F. S. Berry & Berry, 
1992).  
The extent to which politicians currently view cigarette excise taxes as a good 
source of long-term revenue, however, is unclear. Economic models suggest that 
increased cigarette taxes should increase revenues in the short-term, even as consumption 
falls. Even presuming cigarette prices are more elastic than data suggests, the percent 
increase in revenues from higher taxes will likely be greater than the percent decrease in 
consumption, resulting in an immediate jump
16
 and then slow decline in revenues, taking 
many years to reach pre-tax levels (Chaloupka, Yurekli, & Fong, 2012). Some critics, 
however, have argued this process will occur much more quickly, resulting in stagnant or 
even lower tax revenues (K. E. Smith, Savell, & Gilmore, 2012); if politicians subscribe 
to these beliefs, neither economic development nor fiscal crisis may spur cigarette excise 
tax hikes. Moreover, in states where tobacco is produced, any fall in consumption, even if 
associated with higher tax revenues, could be perceived as hurting the local economy. 
Although some advocates have suggested that economic recessions may trigger state 
cigarette excise tax hikes based on descriptive data (CTFK, 2012b), no previous research 
has sufficiently explored relationships among state economic conditions and state excise 
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 Chaloupka et al. (2012)  indicate that if cigarette price elasticity is -0.8, and tax accounts for 50% of 
product price, a doubling of the tax will result in a 40% decline in smoking, but a 20% increase in revenues. 
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rates throughout the country. 
Political Factors: In addition to economic factors, Berry & Berry (1992) also 
consider two key political factors in their model of tax policy adoption. First, since tax 
increases are often considered politically unpopular, they may be least likely to be passed 
during a gubernatorial election year. Second, the political party composition of elected 
officials may determine likelihood of tax policy passage, though the exact relationship 
between party politics and policy outcomes is debated. Unified governments, in which 
either party controls both the legislative and executive government branches, may be 
more likely to pass new taxes because oppositional forces can erect fewer roadblocks in 
the process. However, the ideology or platform of the party in power could be important; 
more liberal parties that embrace extensions of government services may be particularly 
interested in raising taxes to cover the costs of such expenditures (F. S. Berry & Berry, 
1992). In a recent assessment of voting behavior on federal tobacco legislation, Luke & 
Krauss (2004) found on the federal level, Republicans were more than three times as 
likely to vote in favor of policies supported by the tobacco industry (Luke & Krauss, 
2004). Similar assessments of the role of party ideology or control on state cigarette taxes 
have not been conducted. 
Other models of policy adoption note the importance of organized political 
interests (Gray & Lowery, 1996) and public support (Erikson, Wright, & McIver, 1993; 
Page & Shapiro, 1983). In an analysis of non-tax anti-smoking policies, Shipan & Volden 
(2006) found that higher proportions of lobbyists employed by health organizations were 
associated with greater likelihood of state tobacco control policy implementation. The 
presence and activities of interest groups mobilized around tobacco control, health, and 
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the tobacco industry may be important to consider for excise taxes as well (Campbell & 
Balbach, 2008; Givel & Glantz, 2001), though one recent study argues that effects 
demonstrated in previous studies are confounded (Bergan, 2010).  Additionally, public 
opinion could predict tobacco control policy if politicians aim to respond to citizen 
concerns, or avoid electoral repercussions from the passage of unpopular legislation. 
Pacheco (2012) recently demonstrated that public opinions about smoking bans in public 
places were positively correlated with adoption of smoking ban policies. General support 
for either tobacco control or modifications to tax policies could facilitate increases in 
cigarette excise tax rates, yet no studies have explored these relationships analytically. 
External Factors: The final factor in the Berry & Berry (1992) model of tax 
policy adoption and diffusion is the tax behavior of neighboring states. Other states likely 
serve as testing grounds for new policies; politicians who observe successful 
implementation of policies in similar states may be more amenable to instituting those 
policies at home (F. S. Berry & Berry, 1992). Pacheco posits that neighboring state 
policies impact not only politicians, but also citizens themselves, finding that public 
opinions in favor of public smoking bans increase when such bans are instituted in nearby 
states. On the other hand, some researchers argue that geographic proximity may be less 
important to these social learning processes in the current context of global markets and 
enhanced communication, or may mask impacts due to regional similarities, rather than 
learning (Shipan & Volden, 2012). It is plausible that important regional factors, like 
smoking prevalence and history of tobacco production might produce similar tendencies 
toward particular tax levels in a group of neighboring states. Yet neighbor state tax 
policies may still yield independent effects through economic competition for consumer 
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dollars. According to previous research, consumers will cross state borders in pursuit of 
lower cigarette tax rates (Beatty, Larsen, & Somervoll, 2009; Decicca, Kenkel, Mathios, 
Shin, & Lim, 2008). Politicians seeking to keep citizen expenditures in state will likely 
pay attention to surrounding state excise tax rates when making policy decisions, yet this 
hypothesis has not been explored empirically. In addition, cigarettes are taxed at the 
federal as well as state level, so politicians may consider changes in the federal tax 
burden when setting state rates as well. 
Taken together, current theoretical and empirical work focused on the adoption of 
either tax policies or non-tax tobacco control initiatives suggest three categories of key 
factors that may influence cigarette excise tax policies. Economic conditions within a 
state may identify both need and capacity for generating revenues through taxation. 
Internal political dynamics, as well as opinions about smoking or tax-related topics, may 
determine the acceptability of increasing current tax levels for both politicians and the 
citizenry. Finally, characteristics external to a state, including neighboring state or federal 
tax policies and shared regional history, may produce state or regional tendencies toward 
or away from higher tax rates. 
C. The Role of the Master Settlement Agreement 
In 1998, tobacco manufacturers and 46 state attorneys general entered into a 
Master Settlement Agreement (MSA), bringing to close a set of lawsuits brought by the 
states against four major tobacco companies to recover Medicaid costs for treating 
tobacco-related illness. As part of the settlement, the tobacco companies agreed to pay 
the states a total of $206 billion over a 25 year period, with additional payments 
disbursed consistent with tobacco sales (Schroeder, 2004). Certain provisions in the MSA 
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were also designed to limit youth access to tobacco products and restrict tobacco-related 
advertising (Daynard, Parmet, Kelder, & Davidson, 2001). Despite evidence suggesting 
that states rarely dedicated allocated funds to smoking prevention efforts (Gross, Soffer, 
Bach, Rajkumar, & Forman, 2002), the MSA is arguably a key turning point in the 
history of tobacco control. One study credits the settlement with between a 5-13% decline 
in smoking rates, depending on the age group, by 2002 (Sloan & Trogdon, 2004).  The 
MSA may also have led, indirectly, to increased support for tobacco control policies, 
since funds from the settlement were used to create the American Legacy Foundation, 
which launched a national social marketing effort to raise awareness about the harms of 
smoking. Between 1992 and 2007, the percent of Americans who believed that smoking 
should be banned in restaurants increased from 42% to 64%, and the percent who 
believed that smoking should be banned in workplaces increased from 55% to 75% 
(Pacheco, 2011). Finally, evidence suggests that tobacco industry responded to the MSA 
by changing its approach to both advertising and advocacy in the wake of the agreement 
(King & Siegel, 2001; LaVack & Toth, 2006; LaVack, 2006; Ruel et al., 2004; King & 
Siegel, 2001), keeping profits from tobacco products high (Sloan & Trogdon, 2004; 
Sloan, Mathews, & Trogdon, 2004). 
If the MSA triggered a new era of both tobacco control and industry response, it 
may have altered the context in which cigarette excise taxes are enacted. The relative 
influence of political factors, in particular, may have changed, though this may depend on 
whether cigarette taxes are viewed primarily as health or fiscal policies. Cigarette taxes 
may now be considered more politically feasible if viewed as a mechanism for tobacco 
control, which has gained popularity. Different from indoor air laws or advertising 
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restrictions, however, cigarette excise taxes alter the price of the product, and may instead 
be viewed primarily as tax policy. Public opinion about taxes in general has remained 
relatively unchanged in recent years. As they did nearly a decade ago, the majority of 
Americans continue to oppose federal tax increases, even for the explicit purpose of 
reducing the federal deficit (Shaw & Gaffey, 2012). Political factors may therefore 
influence excise tax rates similarly both before and after the MSA, despite other changes 
in the tobacco control policy landscape. 
III. Methods 
A. Data and Sample 
I compiled data describing cigarette excise tax rates for all 50 states and the 
District of Columbia from 1981 to 2011, creating a data set of 1,581 state-year 
observations. Because tax rates are recorded in the year they are implemented, I matched 
each state-year tax rate with a series of select economic, political, attitudinal and 
demographic characteristics from the prior year, when tax policy decisions were likely 
made. State non-tax data, therefore, are annual measures from the years 1980-2010.  
All variables were derived from public databases maintained by government 
agencies or research teams, or publications that chart changes in state political 
characteristics, including cigarette excise taxes. For additional analyses, sub-samples of 
specific time ranges were created, based on research question or data availability. 
B. Measures 
State cigarette taxes: Information about state cigarette excise taxes were drawn 
from the 2011 edition of an annual publication entitled The Tax Burden on Tobacco 
(Orzechowski & Walker, 2011). This edition is produced by the economic consulting 
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firm Orzechowski and Walker, with financial support from leading cigarette 
manufacturers, and cooperation of the tobacco tax administrators in all 50 states and the 
District of Columbia. Excises taxes are measured in cents per pack of 20 cigarettes. In 
regression analyses, rates are adjusted over time for inflation to reflect real prices in 2010 
using the Consumer Price Index-Urban, available from the BLS. Tax values are logged to 
decrease skewness in the distribution.  
State economic conditions: I employed two annual measures of state economic 
conditions: the state civilian unemployment rate and the state per capita income. The state 
unemployment rate is calculated by the BLS, and measures the percentage of people in 
the labor force who are unemployed within a specific state. State per capita income data 
derive from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), and are calculated by dividing 
the total personal income of all residents of a state by the mid-year population of that 
state. In sensitivity analyses, I considered several alternatives to unemployment 
measures, including the national unemployment rate, available from the BLS, and 
indicators of national recession, as defined by the National Bureau of Economic Research 
(NBER).
17
  
Finally, I include a dichotomous, time-invariant indicator of whether a state is an 
agricultural producer of tobacco. States are considered tobacco growers if the Economic 
Research Services (ERS) section of the U.S. Department of Agricultural reported that 
farmers in the state grew a non-zero number of tobacco acres in the analysis period. To 
investigate whether amount of tobacco grown, in addition to tobacco grower status, 
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 The NBER defines a recession as a period between an economic peak and trough in which a significant 
decline in economic activity spreads across the economy. The NBER’s business cycle dating committee 
uses a variety of metrics, including GDP, employment and income, to assign start and end dates to 
recessionary periods.  
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influences cigarette tax rates, ERS data describing the annual number of farmed tobacco 
acres (in thousands), downloaded from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s 
State Tobacco Activities Tracking and Evaluation (STATE) System were added in 
sensitivity analyses.
18
  
State political conditions and attitudes: These analyses include two measures of 
the annual political climate in a state: gubernatorial election, and party control of 
government. The gubernatorial election binary variable indicates whether the election 
occurred in a specific year (=1) or did not (=0). Party control is a categorical variable 
with three possible values. State party control was coded as Democrat if, in a given year, 
the state governor was Democrat and if Democrats held majorities in both the state house 
and senate bodies. Likewise, state party control is coded as Republican if, in a given year, 
Republicans controlled the governorship and held majorities in both legislative bodies. In 
all other cases, state party control is considered shared. Political information was 
compiled from the annual publication, The Book of the States, produced by the Council of 
State Governments.
19
  
                                                          
18
 This measure is included in sensitivity, rather than primary analysis, due to inconsistency of the reported 
data. None of the 18 identified tobacco growing states reported zero tobacco growth at any point in the 
analysis period, but data on acreage numbers is missing for 60 of the 522 state-year combinations.  
 
19
 Some research about policy innovation incorporates measures of liberalism, in addition to party control. 
Citizen ideology and government ideology scores were developed by Berry and colleagues to capture the 
mean ideological position of the state’s citizenry or elected officials in a given year, on a liberal-
conservative continuum (W. D. Berry, Ringquist, Fording, & Hanson, 1998; W. D. Berry, Fording, 
Ringquist, Hanson, & Klarner, 2010) Citizen ideology scores are based on interest group ratings of 
Congressional representatives, with adjustments to account for citizen support for alternative candidates. 
Government ideology scores derive from analyses of roll call votes for elected Congressional 
representatives, applied to state governing bodies, weighted for each party’s relative representation. Higher 
scores on each ideology index reflect higher levels of liberalism. These scores have been widely applied in 
policy research, including research on tobacco control legislation (Shipan & Volden, 2006). However, these 
measures were highly correlated with indicators of party control, and were not available for the full 
analyses period, so I incorporated them in sensitivity tests. 
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To capture citizen or resident opinions of taxes in general, I use a measure of 
attitudes specific to taxation based on data from 19 waves of the General Social Survey 
(GSS), an ongoing survey of societal trends (T. W. Smith, Mardsen, Hout, & Kim, 2011) 
administered between 1980-2009. Respondents were asked whether they believed federal 
income taxes were “too high,” “about right,” or “too low.” Sample sizes preclude stable 
aggregation of these responses at the state level; responses are instead aggregated by 
regional division as the best approximation of state-level opinions about taxes. There are 
nine regional divisions in the United States defined by the U.S. Census Bureau, each 
containing between three and nine states. Very few respondents (<5%) specified a belief 
that taxes were too low, I therefore included only a continuous variable measuring the 
percent of respondents concerned that taxes were too high. Because the GSS is 
administered every other year, I interpolated values in alternate years by averaging 
percentages from the prior and subsequent years. 
Two variables describing public attitudes toward tobacco control are derived from 
seven iterations of the Current Population Survey (CPS) Tobacco Use Supplement (TUS) 
that were administered between 1992 and 2007 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008). Support for 
restaurant smoking bans is measured as the percentage of respondents, within a state in a 
survey period, who agreed that smoking in restaurants should be not allowed at all, as 
opposed to allowed in some or all areas. Voluntary home smoking bans are measured as 
the percentage of respondents who indicated smoking was not permitted in their home.   
External conditions: In addition to incorporating annual state cigarette taxes as the 
dependent variable in analyses, I used cigarette tax data to create measures of annual 
cigarette tax levels in contiguous states. In most analyses I incorporate a measure of the 
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average cigarette tax levels in contiguous states; in sensitivity analyses I also consider the 
minimum and maximum tax level among the contiguous states. I add the average 
cigarette tax in contiguous states to regression analyses to assess regional political 
pressures specific to tobacco taxation. In addition, to capture federal activity around 
tobacco taxation I include a dichotomous variable to indicate the six years in which 
federal excise taxes on cigarettes were raised. To isolate the impact of tobacco production 
from general area effects, I also include categorical variables indicating the geographic 
region of the state, as defined by the U.S. Census Bureau (Northeast, Midwest, South, 
West).  
State demographic controls: Measures describing the sociodemographic 
characteristics of a state in a specific year were drawn from data from the U.S. Census 
Bureau using annual Census measures and intercensal estimates of the March 
Supplement of the Current Population Survey, administed by the BLS, and employed as 
control variables. Population growth is measured as the annual percent increase in 
population size from the previous year, with negative numbers reflecting population loss. 
Variation in racial and ethnic composition is measured by the percent of the state 
population identifying as both Black and non-Hispanic, Non-Black (mostly White) and 
Non-Hispanic, or Hispanic of all races. Changes in age and educational level of residents 
are measured as the percentages of the population that are under the age of 18, over the 
age of 64, and over the age 25 with a college degree.  
C. Analytic Approach 
To assess the relationships between economic, political and external conditions 
and state cigarette excise taxes, I implement linear regression models, incorporating 
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techniques to account for potential bias or clustering from a variety of sources. In order to 
produce unbiased estimates of model coefficients, regression models require that all 
unmeasured factors captured in error terms be uncorrelated with other regressors. 
Furthermore, to produce accurate standard errors, observations must be independent of 
one another.  
Each of these conditions could be violated in an OLS regression model of factors 
associated with state tobacco excise taxes, for several reasons. First, states have varied 
histories related to tobacco production and consumption that may produce state-specific 
leanings toward or away from taxation that are difficult to measure. Second, national time 
trends or periodic “shocks” to tobacco consumption, production or policy could have 
uniform impact on excise tax rates in all states. Third, theoretical arguments suggest that 
state policymakers are influenced by their neighbor state policies; observations are 
therefore likely to be clustered spatially. Finally, because politicians likely identify new 
cigarette tax levels in reference to their state’s current levels, rather than choosing them at 
random, tax observations might be clustered from one year to the next within each state.  
To arrive at a final analytic model, I examined the data in light of each of these, 
and considered different alternatives for addressing them. Details of these procedures and 
associated analytic tests are described in the Appendix. Based on my explorations, I 
model relationships between state cigarette excise rates and economic, political and social 
characteristics using multivariate linear regression employing state random effects, linear 
time trends and a spatial lag, controlling for first order autocorrelation. The econometric 
specification is: 
tjy = Xjy-1β + Sjγ + WBjy-1ρ + fy-1α +CΔy + λj + ηjy-1 + εjy 
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where tjy measures the real cigarette excise tax rate for state j in year y; Xjy-1 is a vector of 
time-varying economic, political, and demographic characteristics in the year prior to 
observation; Sj is a vector of measured time-invariant state characteristics, including 
region and tobacco producer status; WBjy-1 measures the average cigarette excise tax rate 
in the states that border state j;
20
 fy-1 denotes years in which federal cigarette excise tax 
hikes were implemented; C is a vector of two linear time periods (before and after the 
MSA); and λj and ηjy-1 represent unobserved characteristics of states and first order state 
error terms, respectively. To better inform results and discussion, I also ran several 
unadjusted models, in which key covariates were entered as isolated regressors, 
controlling only for time trends.  
In addition to a full model based on data from all years and all states, I conducted 
further analysis to consider variation in models over time and the potential role of 
tobacco control attitudes in tobacco taxation. To determine whether correlations between 
predictor variables and tax rates changed following the MSA, I conducted stratified 
analyses in the two time periods. To assess the potential impact of tobacco control 
attitudes on tax rates, I estimated an additional model, incorporating measures of such 
attitudes. These data are unavailable for the full analysis period, so this model assessed 
correlations between attitudes held between 1991-2007 and taxes implemented between 
1992-2008. 
To ensure the results I present are not sensitive to slight variations in construct 
measurement, I conducted alternative analyses in which 1) additional variables describing 
                                                          
20
 Formally, B is a vector of the excise tax rates in each state j, in the year prior to analysis and W is a 
matrix of state weights that captures the relative influence of each contiguous state’s tax on a referent 
state’s tax. Each wjn captures the weight of influence that state n is hypothesized to have on referent state j. 
In these models, wjn=0 for all states n that are not contiguous to state j, and when n=j. Otherwise wjn=1/k 
where k=the total number of states that share a border with state j.  
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political ideology and acres of farmed tobacco, available for a subset of years and/or 
states, were added to the model, 2) alternative economic indicators were substituted for 
state level unemployment, or 3) alternative indicators of the spatial tax lag were used.  
All analyses were conducted using panel data or spatial model estimation 
packages in STATA 11 (Statacorp, College Station, Tex). 
IV. Results 
A. Growth of State Cigarette Excise Rates  
Between 1981 and 2011, average nominal rates of cigarette excise taxes increased 
from $0.13 to $1.38, an increase nearly six times the rate of inflation. The increase is not 
uniform over the time period; throughout the country, rates grow more quickly following 
the MSA time period (Figure 4.1). Although little regional variation is evident in 1981, 
by 2011, the average excise tax rate in the Northeast ($2.70 per pack) was three times 
higher than the average rate in the South ($0.91) (Panel A), and taxes in non-tobacco 
growing states ($1.58) were 1.5 times higher than those in tobacco growing states ($1.08) 
(Panel B).  Differences in average tax rates by region and tobacco-growing status were 
statistically significant in t-test comparisons, both before and after the MSA (Table 4.1). 
B. Variation in Cigarette Excise Rates  
In bivariate t-tests comparing average values, state cigarette excise taxes varied 
significantly under select state conditions, as a result of differences in both the number 
and magnitude of cigarette tax hikes (Table 4.1). Although average taxes do not vary 
across states with high versus low unemployment rates across the full time-period, 
stratified analyses indicate that tax rates were lower in high unemployment states before 
the MSA, but higher in high unemployment states following it. This shift appears to 
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reflect higher tax hikes when they occurred, rather than a greater prevalence of hikes. In 
all time periods, higher income and non-tobacco growing states were more likely to pass 
tax hikes, and incorporated hikes that were larger in magnitude, compared to lower 
income and non-tobacco growing states, resulting in significantly higher average rates.  
Significant differences in average tax rates by party control exist only following 
the MSA, when average Democrat-controlled state rates were 1.7 times higher than those 
in Republican-controlled states (Table 4.1). This difference appears to be due to more, 
rather than larger, tax hikes. Finally, cigarette tax rates are lower in states where a larger 
percentage of people believe that federal income taxes are too high, and in states that 
border relatively low tax areas.  
C. Correlates of State Cigarette Excise Rates 
Comparing mean tax rates with bivariate tests can reveal patterns, but does not 
account for potential confounding from correlations between predictors of tax rates. The 
results of the multivariate regression models, which capture independent effects of 
various state characteristics on cigarette tax rates, are presented in Table 4.2.  
The only economic factor significantly related to tax rates during the complete 
time period is tobacco-growing status (Table 4.2, Model 1). Non-tobacco growing states 
had 41% higher excise tax rates, compared to growing states, holding other factors 
constant from 1981-2011.  
Across all years, Republican party control was significantly associated with 6% 
lower rates, compared with mixed party control, whereas Democrat control and 
gubernatorial election year are unrelated to cigarette tax rates (Model 1). Regional beliefs 
about federal income taxes demonstrated a slight positive association with cigarette taxes, 
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such that a one percentage point increase in the percent of people believing income taxes 
are too high is associated with a 0.3% increase in excise tax rates. Gubernatorial election 
years are uncorrelated with tobacco excise taxes. 
Federal and regional cigarette tax rates are correlated with state rates in Model 1. 
Over the 31 year period, when average taxes in neighboring states double, taxes in the 
referent state increased by an average of 21%. Additionally, in the year following a 
federal tax hike, state taxes increased an average of 2.6%, holding other factors constant.  
Finally, significant differences in regional tax rates and changes over time remain 
in multivariate models. Model 1 shows that under similar economic, political and social 
conditions, states in the Northeast and Midwest would have tax rates 67% and 34% 
higher than those in the South, respectively. Model 1 also indicates that the rate of growth 
in cigarette taxes increases after the adoptions of the MSA. Prior to the MSA, cigarette 
rates grew an average of 1% per year, though this was only marginally significant 
(p=0.05); after the MSA, the annual growth rate increased to 7%, holding all other factors 
constant. 
D. Differences in Excise Tax Correlates over Time 
In order to document changes in the correlates of excise tax rates before and after 
the MSA, the second and third models depicted in Table 4.2 stratify the results of the first 
model by time period. Consistent with Figure 4.1, variation in taxes by tobacco growing 
state, as well as region, is strongest after the MSA. In addition, per capita income is 
significantly and positively associated with taxes in the early time period (b=0.03), but 
shows no impact in the later time period.  
Stratified results also demonstrate that prior to the MSA, control by the Democrat 
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party was associated with a 4% increase in excise tax rates, whereas Republican control 
had no impact. After the MSA, however, Democrat control becomes an insignificant 
factor, and tax rates under Republican control are 17% lower than those under mixed 
party control. Whereas neighboring states’ tax rates appear to consistently impact referent 
state rates in both time periods, federal tax hikes appear to be stronger correlates 
following the MSA (b=.06).   
E. Tobacco Control Attitude Models 
In unadjusted models, positive attitudes toward bans on smoking at home and in 
restaurants and higher excise taxes are correlated, but only the influence of home 
smoking bans remains significant once models are adjusted for economic, political and 
social factors (Table 4.3). The one exception relates to home smoking bans. A one 
percentage point increase in non-smokers living in homes with smoking bans is 
associated with a 1.4% increase in excise taxes. In this model, the effects of other 
covariates (not shown) remain similar to what is reported in Table 4.1, Model 1, with one 
exception. The measure of attitudes toward income taxes becomes insignificant. 
F. Sensitivity Tests 
Including alternative measures of political sentiment or levels of tobacco 
production did not change the magnitude or significance of most effects (Table 4.4, 
Models 2-3). Increased tobacco production was associated with a small (<1%) decrease 
in excise tax rates, whereas measures of government and citizen ideology, when added to 
the original model, showed no effect. Models that employed alternative indicators of 
economic circumstances did not substantially differ from original models; neither rates of 
national unemployment nor indicators of recession were significant factors (Table 4.4, 
 112 
 
Models 4-5). 
Models that alternatively included a measure of either the maximum or minimum 
border tax, in the place of the average border tax, did not substantively impact regression 
results (Table 4.4, Models 6-7). While each measure of border taxes is significantly and 
positively associated with the referent state tax, the magnitude of impact is strongest 
when the single lagged measure of the average tax is used. Within, between and overall 
R
2
 estimates for each of these models, which capture the extent to which the variation in 
taxes are explained by the model, are slightly lower in Models 6 and 7 than those in the 
final model reported in the data. 
V. Discussion 
Consistent with the growth of tobacco control initiatives in general (CRTU, 2007; 
HHS, 2012), state cigarette excise tax rates have, on average, increased over time, with 
stronger growth following the 1998 Master Settlement Agreement. Moreover, variation in 
excise tax rates has also increased over time. States where tobacco is farmed lag behind 
the rest of the country. Adjusted models that control for economic, political and other 
factors suggest that non-producing states levy tax rates that are more than 40% higher 
than those in tobacco producing states. Furthermore, even when tobacco production is 
taken into account, states in the Northeast, and more recently the Midwest and West, are 
establishing higher rates than states in the South. The results presented here suggest this 
may be due to both greater likelihood of tax hikes in certain areas and higher rate 
increases when hikes are adopted. 
While some advocates and media pundits have argued that economic downturns 
may trigger tax hikes designed to fill budget shortfalls (CTFK, 2012b), the results 
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presented here suggest otherwise. Taxes do appear to be higher when state 
unemployment is high, particularly in recent years, but this relationship appears 
confounded by other factors. Once politics, attitudes and regional variation are 
considered, any relationship between state unemployment rates and cigarette taxes 
disappears. Similar patterns emerge when employing other measures of economic 
conditions or recession. 
Instead, these results imply that changing distributions of political power may be 
more important than macroeconomic changes for understanding cigarette excise tax rates. 
Passage of any policy, including cigarette taxes, may be easier when the same party 
controls legislative and executive bodies; the significant effects associated with political 
control in some of the models, therefore, may be unsurprising. More notable are the 
change in those impacts over time. Prior to the MSA, Democrat control resulted in higher 
excise taxes, all else equal, and Republican control had little impact. Since 2000, 
however, Democrat control is no longer associated with high rates, whereas Republican 
control is now associated with 17% lower cigarette tax levels, compared with mixed 
control states. The descriptive data suggest this is largely due to fewer tax increases under 
Republican control, rather than smaller tax hike magnitudes. The 2012 election resulted 
in the largest number of unified governments since 1952, with 23 under Republican 
control (up from 18 following the 2010 election) (Kurtz, 2012). In these states, it seems 
likely that Republican leadership will continue to hinder efforts to raise cigarette tax 
rates. 
Consistent with both theories of policy diffusion and research on other tobacco-
related policies (Pacheco, 2012; Shipan & Volden, 2006), cigarette taxes in neighboring 
 114 
 
and federal jurisdictions may play a role in the determination of a state’s excise tax rates. 
These analyses indicate that as federal and surrounding excise tax rates rise, rates in 
referent states follow. In addition, cigarette taxes may be influenced by attitudes toward 
tobacco restrictions, though the magnitude and significance of these relationships were 
limited, once other factors were considered. Beliefs about smoking in restaurants and 
home smoking bans were somewhat to highly correlated with state demographic and 
regional characteristics (results not shown). Changes to the composition of state 
populations, and general time trends, may therefore drive changes in both attitudes and 
policies. Alternatively, more years of data may be needed to better assess the impact of 
tobacco-related attitudes on taxation. 
A. Strengths and Limitations 
While prior work has evaluated the drivers of both tax policy in general (F. S. 
Berry & Berry, 1992), and non-tax tobacco control legislation (Pacheco, 2012; Shipan & 
Volden, 2008), this research provides the first nationwide evaluation of state-level 
characteristics associated with cigarette excise tax rates. The analysis employs data from 
all 50 states and the District of Columbia over a 30 year period ending in 2011. As such it 
provides an opportunity to both comprehensively examine excise tax policies in recent 
history, and consider such policies both before and after the landmark Master Settlement 
Agreement. Furthermore, the size of the dataset allows for statistical techniques that 
incorporate assumptions about unmeasured state and regional characteristics relevant to 
tobacco control and potential serial correlation over time.  
One key limitation of this research, however, is the absence of measures of 
organized advocacy. I was unable to find data describing the state level political activities 
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by either the tobacco industry or tobacco control advocates, yet other research suggests 
such influence could be important. Analyses of tobacco lobbying campaigns in the 1990s 
document comprehensive strategies designed to defeat a wide variety of tobacco control 
policies (Givel & Glantz, 2001). For example, in 2012, the tobacco industry spent more 
than $45 million dollars to fight a ballot initiative to raise excise taxes by a dollar in 
California. Tobacco control advocates credit these expenditures with the defeat of that 
initiative (CTFK, 2012a) Some research, however, suggests the California experience 
could be the exception rather than the norm (Bergan, 2010). Based on an assessment of 
tobacco lobbying efforts in the 1990s and the 2000’s, Lum and colleagues (2009) argue 
that tobacco lobbying is becoming more sophisticated over time, targeting a smaller 
number of initiatives, but successfully defeating a larger portion of the ones that were 
targeted. If lobbyist power only applies to a handful of tax initiatives, inclusion of such 
data in models that equally weight all tax changes over several decades may produce little 
impact on effect sizes. The results presented here, therefore, could prove relevant for 
most moderate tax policy adjustments, when lobbying is less likely. For more radical and 
publicized tax proposals, however, advocacy dollars could trump party dynamics or other 
policy drivers. Without uniform data on spending by both advocates supporting and 
advocates fighting tax increases, however, the average role of interests groups in excise 
tax policies is unknown. 
This study considers the impact of a variety of factors on enacted state excise tax 
rates, and therefore considers defeats of potential tax hikes and non-consideration of new 
tax policies equally. It is possible that economic, political and external factors impact the 
introduction of tax legislation differently from its ultimate passage. Advocates for excise 
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tax policies may benefit from information about the drivers of tax policy proposals, but 
this is outside the scope of this investigation. Final excise tax levels are most salient to 
consumers of tobacco, as they directly impact product prices, and therefore are most 
likely to significantly impact smoking and associated health outcomes. From a broad 
public health perspective, therefore, the results presented here may be most relevant.  
B. Policy Implications 
Cigarette taxes are considered one of the most promising tools in the tobacco 
control toolkit. The analyses presented here illuminate two potential opportunities for 
tobacco control advocates. First, states that border others where excise taxes have 
recently risen are ideal targets for rate adjustment. Consumers likely cross state borders in 
pursuit of lower tobacco tax rates (Beatty et al., 2009; Decicca et al., 2008). 
Consequently, politicians may be most amenable to raising cigarette taxes when the 
potential for losing revenue due to a tax hike is minimized.  
Second, tobacco control advocates might benefit from distinguishing cigarette 
taxes from other taxes. In these analyses, higher cigarette taxes were positively correlated 
with both concerns about high federal taxes and support for other tobacco restrictions, 
especially home smoking bans. Thus, despite opposition to higher income tax rates 
generally, the American public may favor higher tax rates on harmful products, such as 
cigarettes, more specifically. As public opinion in favor of tobacco control continues to 
grow (Pacheco, 2011), public health officials have a window of opportunity to work with 
politicians to raise cigarette taxes and promote reductions in tobacco consumption.  
C. Conclusion 
State cigarette excise taxes remain one of the most promising strategies for 
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reducing cigarette use and preventing smoking-related illness and death, yet 
implementing them requires action by state legislators or voters. Although cigarette taxes 
have generally increased over time, there is significant disparity in tax rates across states, 
with tobacco growing and Southern states lagging behind the rest of the country. Despite 
suggestions by advocates that recessionary periods could spark higher cigarette taxes, the 
speed of excise tax growth in the future may depend more on the political make-up of 
state legislatures than the economic circumstances facing lawmakers.  
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Table 4.1: Prevalence of cigarette tax hikes and rates by state characteristics, 1981-2011 
 
  
N
% Obs 
with 
Hike
Avg. 
Hike 
Amt. N
% Obs 
with 
Hike
Avg. 
Hike 
Amt. N
% Obs 
with 
Hike
Avg. 
Hike 
Amt. 
All State/Year Periods 1581 (16.4%) 21.3 59.8 969 (16.0%) 6.0 37.6 612 (17.2%) 43.8 95.0
Economic Characteristics
 Unemployment Rate
High State UE (>6%) 681 (15.9%) 18.8 57.7 505 (15.6%) 5.8 35.4 ** 176 (16.5%) 54.3 121.7 **
Low State UE (<6%) (ref) 900 (17.0%) 23.9 61.8 464 (16.4%) 6.2 40.0 436 (17.7%) 41.4 84.9
Per Capita Income (in thous.)
High Income (>33) 736 (19.0%) 33.3 87.6 ** 261 (19.9%) 10.1 49.8 ** 475 (18.5%) 47.0 108.4 **
Low Income (<33) (ref) 845 (14.3%) 8.5 36.0 708 (14.5%) 3.9 33.1 137 (13.1%) 34.5 50.6
Tobacco Growing Status 
Non-Tob. Growing State 1023 (19.0%) 21.3 68.5 ** 627 (19.5%) 6.4 41.8 ** 396 (18.2%) 46.5 110.7 **
Tob. Growing State (ref) 558 (12.0%) 23.3 44.5 342 (9.6%) 4.6 30.0 216 (15.7%) 41.4 67.6
Poitical Characteristics
Government Party Control 
Democrat 455 (17.1%) 21.1 61.1 314 (16.2%) 4.9 36.1 141 (19.1%) 51.5 116.7 **
Republican 260 (13.8%) 27.7 54.3 121 (15.7%) 6.9 39.9 139 (12.2%) 51.0 66.7 **
Mixed 866 (17.0%) 20.7 61.2 534 (15.9%) 6.4 38.0 332 (18.7%) 40.4 98.5
Gubenatorial Election Status 
Gov. Election Year 421 (18.8%) 21.4 63.6 262 (18.3%) 8.5 39.2 159 (19.5%) 41.3 103.7
Non-Gov. Election Year (ref) 1160 (15.7%) 21.4 58.6 707 (15.1%) 4.8 37.0 453 (16.6%) 46.3 92.2
Attitudes tow. Fed. Inc. Taxes
>62% Believe Tax High 824 (17.1%) 18.3 56.6 * 561 (16.6%) 7.0 39.1 ** 263 (18.3%) 40.4 94.0
<62% Believe Tax High (ref) 757 (15.9%) 25.9 63.7 408 (15.2%) 4.5 35.5 349 (16.6%) 48.6 96.6
External Characteristics
Federal/Border Taxes
Above Avg Border Tax 690 (17.8%) 26.8 79.5 ** 431 (16.2%) 8.2 44.9 ** 259 (20.5%) 51.4 137.2 **
Below Avg Border Tax (ref) 891 (15.5%) 17.3 44.9 538 (15.8%) 4.2 31.8 353 (15.0%) 38.4 64.9
Federal Excise Hike 306 (22.2%) 25.0 63.1 153 (20.9%) 3.8 36.2 153 (23.5%) 43.9 89.9
No Federal Excise Hike (ref) 1275 (15.1%) 20.6 59.3 816 (15.1%) 6.5 37.9 459 (15.3%) 45.4 97.3
Census Region (Indicator)
Northeast 279 (27.2%) 26.6 96.1 ** 171 (23.4%) 6.1 49.5 ** 108 (33.3%) 49.3 170.1 **
Midwest 372 (15.1%) 19.2 58.6 228 (16.7%) 5.1 41.6 144 (12.5%) 48.8 85.5 **
South 527 (10.1%) 23.2 38.1 ** 323 (7.4%) 5.2 27.7 ** 204 (14.2%) 38.2 54.5 **
West 403 (18.9%) 17.9 65.0 * 247 (21.5%) 6.9 38.7 ** 156 (14.7%) 43.5 106.6 *
Notes: All categories measured in the year prior to the tax rate variable to account for tax implementation lag (1980-2010). Tax 
hikes refer to changes in state-set excise tax rates not due to inflation. Average tax hikes based only on observations in which a 
hike is implemented; the average tax rate is based on all observations in the time period. Tax levels are adjusted for inflation and 
measured in 2010 cents. Categorical groups based on continuous variables are created by dichotomizing at the mean value for 
the entire sample, except for border tax rates, which are dichotomized at the mean for the time period. Asterisks denote 
significant differences in the average tax rate of a category group, compared to its referent group (for two group categories) or all 
others (for political control and region), using two-way t-tests. * p<.05; ** p<.01
All Years (1981-2011) Pre-MSA (1981-1999) Post-MSA (2000-2011)
Avg. 
Tax 
Rate
Avg. Tax 
Rate
Avg. Tax 
Rate
  
  
1
1
9
 
Table 4.2: State economic, political and attitudinal factors associated with state cigarette excise tax rates (Logged) (n=1,581) 
   
Mean b b b
State Economic Characteristics
Unemployment Rate 5.98 0.002 (-0.01 , 0.02) 0.010 (0.00 , 0.02) -0.010 (-0.04 , 0.02)
Per Capita Income (in thousands) 33.00 0.011 (0.00 , 0.03) 0.025 ** (0.01 , 0.04) 0.006 (-0.02 , 0.03)
Non-Tobacco Growing State 0.65 0.411 ** (0.14 , 0.68) 0.347 * (0.08 , 0.62) 0.526 ** (0.21 , 0.84)
State Political Characteristics
Government Party Control
Democrat 0.29 0.034 (-0.01 , 0.08) 0.041 * (0.00 , 0.08) 0.039 (-0.06 , 0.14)
Republican 0.16 -0.064 * (-0.12 , -0.01) 0.021 (-0.04 , 0.08) -0.170 ** (-0.29 , -0.05)
Mixed Control 0.55 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Governor Election Year 0.27 0.002 (-0.02 , 0.02) 0.009 (-0.01 , 0.03) -0.028 (-0.07 , 0.01)
Attitudes toward Federal Income Taxes
% Believe Taxes Too High 61.49 0.003 * (0.00 , 0.01) 0.002 (0.00 , 0.00) 0.005 (0.00 , 0.01)
% Believe Taxes Right/Too Low 38.51 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
External Factors
Average Border State Tax (log) 2.87 0.207 ** (0.12 , 0.30) 0.180 ** (0.07 , 0.29) 0.185 * (0.03 , 0.34)
Federal Excise Hike 0.19 0.026 * (0.00 , 0.05) 0.008 (-0.02 , 0.03) 0.059 * (0.01 , 0.11)
Census Regions
Northeast 0.18 0.669 ** (0.31 , 1.03) 0.503 ** (0.15 , 0.86) 0.964 ** (0.49 , 1.44)
Midwest 0.24 0.340 * (0.02 , 0.66) 0.260 (-0.06 , 0.58) 0.479 * (0.08 , 0.88)
South 0.33 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
West 0.25 0.281 (-0.09 , 0.65) 0.104 (-0.26 , 0.47) 0.550 * (0.07 , 1.03)
Time Trends
Linear trend 1980-1999 -- 0.011 (0.00 , 0.02) 0.008 (0.00 , 0.02) -- -- --
Linear trend 2000-2010 -- 0.067 ** (0.05 , 0.08) -- -- -- 0.078 ** (0.05 , 0.10)
CI CI
Notes: b=beta coefficient; CI=confidence interval. All regressors lagged one year. Tax rates and per capita income are both adjusted for inflation. 
Excise taxes are measured in logged 2010 cents, income in thousands of 2010 dollars.  All analyses based on linear regression models with random 
state effects, controlling for state demographic conditions, and adjusted for first order autocorrelation. * p<.05, ** p<.01
Model 1: All Years Model 2: Pre-MSA Model 3: Post-MSA
(n=1,581) 1981-1999 (n=969) 2000-2011 (n=612)
CI
  
  
1
2
0
 
Table 4.3: Association of tobacco taxes with tobacco control attitudes, 1993-2008 (selected) 
 
  
Mean b b
Model 1: Percent of homes with smoking bans (n=561) 60.62 0.021 ** (0.02 , 0.02) 0.014 * (0.00 , 0.03)
Model 2: Percent supporting full restaurant smoking ban (n=510) 52.44 0.025 ** (0.02 , 0.03) -0.156 (-1.01 , 0.70)
 Notes: b=beta coefficient; CI=confidence interval. All regressors are lagged one year.  All analyses based on linear 
regression models with random state effects, controlling for all covariates used in Table 4.2 models, and adjusted for first 
order autocorrelation. Data for Model 1 drawn from all states in the years 1992-3, 1995-6, 1998-9, 2001-2, 2003, 2006-7. Due to 
data availability, Model 2 excludes the year 2003. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Unadjusted
Adjusted for variables 
included in Table 4.2 
Models
CI CI
  
  
1
2
1
 
Table 4.4: Sensitivity of models to alternative variable specifications 
b (se) b (se) b (se) b (se) b (se) b (se) b (se)
State Economic Factors
State Unemployment Rate 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) --- --- --- --- 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
National Recession Indicator --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.02 (0.01) --- --- --- --- --- ---
National Unemployment Rate --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.00 (0.01) --- --- --- ---
Per Capita Income (in thousands) 0.01 (0.01) † 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) * 0.01 (0.01) † 0.01 (0.01) † 0.01 (0.01) † 0.01 (0.01) †
Non-Tobacco Growing State 0.41 (0.14) ** 0.37 (0.14) ** 0.35 (0.12) ** 0.42 (0.14) ** 0.42 (0.14) ** 0.39 (0.14) ** 0.42 (0.14) **
Farmed Tob Acres (in thousands) --- --- --- --- -0.00 (0.00) ** --- --- --- ---
State Political Factors
Government Party Control
Democrat 0.03 (0.02) --- --- 0.04 (0.02) † 0.03 (0.02) 0.30 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02)
Republican -0.06 (0.03) * --- --- -0.06 (0.03) * -0.06 (0.03) * -0.06 (0.03) * -0.06 (0.03) * -0.06 (0.03) *
Mixed --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Liberal Ideology
Government --- --- 0.00 (0.00) * --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Citizen --- --- 0.00 (0.00) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
Governor Election Year 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01)
% Believe Fed. Taxes too High 0.00 (0.00) * 0.00 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) † 0.00 (0.00) * 0.00 (0.00) * 0.00 (0.00) * 0.00 (0.00) *
External Factors
Avg Border St Tax (log) 0.21 (0.05) ** 0.21 (0.05) ** 0.21 (0.05) ** 0.20 (0.05) ** 0.21 (0.05) ** --- --- --- ---
Min. Border State Tax (log) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.07 (0.02) **
Max. Border State Tax (log) --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.07 (0.04) *
Federal Excise Hike Year 0.03 (0.01) * 0.02 (0.01) † 0.02 (0.01) † 0.02 (0.01) * 0.03 (0.01) * 0.02 (0.01) † 0.02 (0.01) *
Census Regions
Northeast 0.67 (0.18) ** 0.78 (0.20) ** 0.58 (0.16) ** 0.68 (0.18) ** 0.67 (0.18) ** 0.74 (0.18) ** 0.76 (0.18) **
Midwest 0.34 (0.16) * 0.46 (0.18) ** 0.30 (0.14) * 0.34 (0.17) * 0.34 (0.17) * 0.39 (0.16) * 0.37 (0.16) *
South --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- --- ---
West 0.28 (0.19) 0.47 (0.22) * 0.32 (0.17) † 0.28 (0.19) 0.28 (0.19) 0.31 (0.19) 0.32 (0.19) †
Time Trends
Linear trend 1980-1999 0.01 (0.01) † 0.01 (0.01) † 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) † 0.01 (0.01) † 0.01 (0.01) * 0.01 (0.01) †
Linear trend 2000-2010 0.07 (0.01) ** 0.09 (0.01) ** 0.08 (0.01) ** 0.07 (0.01) ** 0.07 (0.01) ** 0.08 (0.01) ** 0.08 (0.01) **
Model 6 Model 7
Min. Bord Tax Max. Bord Tax
Note. b=beta coefficient; se=standard error. All regressors are lagged one year.  All analyses based on linear regression models with random state effects, controlling 
for all covariates used in Table 4.2 models, and adjusted for first order autocorrelation. All models based on 1581 observations, except models 2 (n=1400) and 3 
(n=1357), which estimated through 2008 due to data availability. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Original Ideology Tob. Prod. Recession Ind. Nat. UE
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
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Figure 4.1: Regional variation in state tobacco excise taxes over time 
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Panel A: Variation by Census Region 
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Panel B: Variation by Tobacco-Growing Status 
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APPENDIX: TESTS OF BIAS AND CLUSTERING IN CIGARETTE TAX MODELS 
I examined the potential of clustering of observations within states, during certain 
time periods, within spatial areas, and from year-to-year within states through a variety of 
models and tests, described here. 
State-based clustering 
One mechanism for addressing state-based clustering is the random effects model, 
which derives estimates that are weighted in conjunction with the proportion of the error 
presumed to be state-specific (Wooldridge, 2006). However, if unmeasured state 
characteristics are not only clustered within states, but also correlated with the 
independent variables of interest, both OLS and random effects models will also result in 
biased effect estimates by failing to control for omitted variables. In this case, state fixed 
effects models can be used to control for unmeasured time-invariant characteristics of 
states (Allison, 2009). However, fixed effects models correct for bias at significant cost to 
model efficiency, as they rely only on variation within states to develop estimates. In 
addition, they preclude estimating the effects of measured time-invariant state 
characteristics, due to the collinearity of these characteristics with the state effect.  
In choosing between fixed and random effects models, therefore, researchers may 
need to weigh the extent of potential bias produced in a random effects model, with the 
loss of efficiency and inability to assess certain covariates in the fixed effects model. To 
determine the best approach for this analysis, I compared OLS, state random effects and 
state fixed effects models, using a series of statistical tests to explore assumptions about 
correlation of error terms within states and with covariates of interest.  
Estimates from OLS regression did suffer from clustering of data within states, 
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(Breusch-Pagan test χ2=7174.7, p<.01), indicating that random or fixed effects models are 
necessary. Table A.1 presents the results of the state fixed effects and random effects 
models. A Hausman test comparing the regression estimates from each model was 
statistically significant (χ2=74.5, p=0.00), which suggests the fixed effects model may be 
more appropriate.
21
 However, the direction and magnitude of the effects for the key 
explanatory variables of interest differed very little in the two models; where differences 
did exist, they were primarily in size or direction of estimates of effects for variables that 
were statistically insignificant in both models. Moreover, the random effects model 
allowed for an estimation of the effect of state history of tobacco production, as well as 
regional effects, each of which may have more substantive meaning in interpretation than 
a state fixed effect. For these reasons, I opted to employ state random effects.  
Time-based clustering 
The passage of time could influence regression coefficient estimates for two 
reasons: a shock could occur in a specific year that would alter cigarette excise rates in all 
states, or trends in cigarette attitudes or consumption could consistently enhance (or 
diminish) pressure on excise tax rates over time. One shock likely to impact state tax 
decisions is a modification to federal cigarette tax policies; because this is a measurable 
variable, I included it in my models. To capture increasing pressures on cigarette taxes 
across all years and regions, I included a linear time trend; to account for a possible 
intensification of this trend following the MSA, I experimented with a spline in 2000 to 
allow the time trend to differ before and after the MSA was passed in late 1998, with a 
year for policy changes to be implemented. A test of significant differences between the 
                                                          
21
 The random effects and fixed effects estimates used in the Hausman test employed the linear time trends, 
measure of contiguous state taxes, and further corrected for first order autocorrelation, as described below. 
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coefficients on the two time trend indicators was significantly significant (χ2=32.1, 
p=0.00).   
An alternative to the time trend and indicator of federal excise taxes is a year 
fixed effects model, which adjusts for any unmeasured national shock likely to impact all 
state cigarette excise taxes in a given year. Table A.1 presents the results of the year fixed 
effects model, in comparison to the time trend model. The Hausman test comparing these 
was statistically significant (χ2=33.4, p=0.02). As with the state fixed effects model, 
however, the direction and magnitude of the effects for the key explanatory variables of 
interest differed very little in the two models. Furthermore, the coefficient on the federal 
excise tax hike was significant in the first model, indicating that at least some time-based 
variation is due to federal activity in cigarette taxes. Due to the small differences in the 
model outcomes, and the substantive meaning of the federal cigarette tax hike variable, I 
chose to incorporate time trends and the tax hike indicator, rather than year fixed effects.  
Regional spatial dependence and autocorrelation 
For a variety of reasons, including shared histories, economic dependence on 
tobacco production, and dominant political paradigms, it is possible that cigarette excise 
tax rates in different geographic areas of the country, or among contiguous states, would 
more closely resemble each other than random chance would predict. If the tobacco 
policies of nearby states actually exert an influence on the policy choices in a reference 
state, state cigarette excise tax rates may be spatially dependent; failure to control for 
such dependence could lead to biased estimates in regression models (Anselin & Bera, 
1998). Even if spatial dependence is non-existent or otherwise addressed, additional 
spatial autocorrelation could arise if tax levels are clustered simply due to geographic 
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proximity, producing artificially low standard errors on regression estimates.  
I explored issues of spatial dependence and autocorrelation in my data using 
spatial regression techniques employed in several cross-sectional samples. For each of 
1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010, I compared the level of spatial correlation in the residuals of 
state cigarette tax regression models that did and did not include regional indicators and 
weighted measures of contiguous state tax rates. Table A.2 lists the Moran’s I score 
calculated on the residuals of each model. The Moran’s I is a global indicator of spatial 
correlation throughout the observations. A score of 0 equals no correlation; positive 
values indicate positive correlation and negative values indicate negative correlation. In 
all comparisons, the score decreases or becomes negative, indicating a decrease in 
positive spatial correlation; in 2010, the significant level of spatial correlation in the 
unadjusted model disappears in the spatially-adjusted model. For each year, I then 
estimated formal spatial lag models, which control for spatial dependence, and spatial 
error models, which adjust standard errors for spatial autocorrelation. Table A.2 provides 
the results of the Lagrange multiplier tests of the significance of the spatial lag or error. 
The significant results indicate that the spatial lag model adjusted for significant spatial 
dependence in 1990, 2000 and 2010 and the spatial error model adjusted for significant 
spatial clustering in 1990.  
Taken together, the results of these models suggest that spatial dependence may 
present more of a problem than spatial clustering, so I opted to include a type of spatial 
lag in my final regression models. Because I ultimately adjusted for autoregressive time 
correlation within states (as described below), I was not able to use the formal spatial 
panel data models in Stata, but instead included a measure of the average of the cigarette 
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tax levels in states that are contiguous to the referent state in the panel regression models, 
which is similar to using a first order rook’s weight matrix in spatial regression. 
Serial correlation within states 
Finally, random effects models can still produce biased standard errors if serial 
correlation in the non-state specific component of the error term remains (Baltagi, Jung, 
& Song, 2010). The Baltagi-Li joint test of serial correlation in the observation-specific 
error term of the random effects model was significant (χ2=1197.9, p<.01). For my 
primary analysis, therefore, I modeled relationships between state cigarette excise rates 
and economic, political and social characteristics using multivariate linear regression 
employing state random effects, linear time trends and an approximation of a spatial lag, 
controlling for first order autocorrelation. 
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Table A.1: Sensitivity of models to alternative econometric specifications 
 
  
b (se) b (se) b (se)
State Economic Factors
State Unemployment Rate 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Per Capita Income (in thousands) 0.01 (0.01) † 0.00 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01) *
Non-Tobacco Growing State 0.41 (0.14) ** --- --- 0.42 (0.14) **
State Political Factors
Government Party Control
Democrat 0.03 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.04 (0.02) †
Republican -0.06 (0.03) * -0.06 (0.03) * -0.06 (0.03) *
Mixed --- --- --- --- --- ---
Governor Election Year 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) †
Beliefs about Federal Inc. Taxes 
% Believe Taxes too High 0.00 (0.00) * 0.00 (0.00) † 0.00 (0.00) *
% Believe Taxes Right/Too Low
External Factors
Average Border State Tax (log) 0.21 (0.05) ** 0.16 (0.05) ** 0.15 (0.05) **
Federal Excise Hike Year 0.03 (0.01) * 0.02 (0.01) * --- ---
Census Regions
Northeast 0.67 (0.18) ** --- --- 0.68 (0.18) **
Midwest 0.34 (0.16) * --- --- 0.33 (0.16) *
South --- --- --- --- --- ---
West 0.28 (0.19) --- --- 0.30 (0.19)
Time Trends
Linear trend 1980-1999 0.01 (0.01) † 0.02 (0.01) * --- ---
Linear trend 2000-2010 0.07 (0.01) ** 0.08 (0.01) ** --- ---
Constant 0.11 (0.71) 0.11 (0.71) 0.11 (0.71)
N 1581 1581 1581
Notes: b=beta coefficient; se=standard error. All regressors lagged one year. Excise tax rates and 
per capita income are both adjusted for inflation to 2010 values. Excise taxes are measured in 
logged 2010 cents.  All models include variables controlling for changes in state demographic 
conditions. Model 1 is estimated with state random effects and a linear time trend. Model 2 is 
estimated with state fixed effects and linear time trends. Model 3 is estimated with state random 
effects and year fixed effects. Error terms in all models are adjusted for clustering at the state level 
and for first order autocorrelation. † p<0.10, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01
Model 3
Original State FE Year FE
Model 1 Model 2
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Table A.2:  Models examining spatial autocorrelation 
 
 
 
I (sd) I (sd) ρ (se) λ (se)
Year
1980 0.03 (0.087) -0.06 (0.087) -0.0088 (0.012) 0.0042 (0.011)
1990 -0.11 (0.089) -0.17 (0.090) * -0.026 (0.012) * 0.0123 (0.008) †
2000 0.07 (0.090) 0.00 (0.090) -0.031 (0.014) † 0.0099 (0.005)
2010 0.10 (0.088) † 0.037 (0.089) -0.035 (0.013) * 0.076 (0.095)
Spatial Error
Model 4
Notes: I = Moran's I calcuated on model residuals, sd=standard deviation of I. ρ=coefficient on the 
spatial lag; λ=spatial error, se=standard error. All models regress state tobacco excise taxes on 
state economic and political conditions in the indicated year. Model 2 adds indicators of 
geographic region and an average of the tax rates in the states contiguous to the referent state. 
Models 3 and 4 employ spatial regression commands in Stata to incorporate a formal spatial lag 
(Model 3) or adjust for spatial errors (Model 4). The weights matrix employed in Models 3 and 4 is 
a first order rook contiguity matrix. In models 1 & 2, significance of I is tested using one-tailed t-
tests; in models 3 & 4, significance of the ρ and λ are tested using the Lagrange Multiplier test.                             
† p<.10* p<.05, ** p<.01
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Unadj. for Spatial 
Factors
Adj. for Spatial 
Factors Spatial Lag
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